From Collaborative Space to Contested Area: The Battle for the Arctic (Part 2)

From a military perspective, the Arctic, which is five times the size of the Mediterranean Sea, is a semi-enclosed sea surrounded by states, connected to the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean through straits and shock points. The connection to the Pacific is the Bering Strait, while connections to the Atlantic are through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and the passages between Greenland and the European continent (Arctic Bridge). Therefore, the maritime operational aspects are prevalent, which includes the security needs related to the exploitation of natural marine resources and the control of communication routes. From a strategic point of view, the Bering Strait (Chukchi Sea), between Russia and the United States, and the stretch of sea between Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (the so-called GIUK gap) in the North Atlantic are of particular importance.

In this regard, Moscow assertively claims its sovereignty over the accesses and routes to the north-east, while preparing their exploitation, in every aspect: commercial, energy-extractive and, inevitably, also military. And it is precisely under the military profile that “Arctic” Russia should be watched carefully. Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, in fact, Russia is pursuing three primary objectives in the Arctic:

1) secure a base from which to project its military power;

2) establish an advanced line of defense against possible incursions on the northern route;

3) to secure the Russian economy in the Arctic area.

In this perspective, according to some sources the Northern military district, in which the Northern Fleet, would be home to 20 percent of Russia's precision-launched missile capability and all of the Kinzhal hypersonic ballistic missiles. In addition, the Northern Fleet would include eight nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and approximately 16 other active combat submarines.ⁱ. Added to this are 37 surface units, including the only Russian aircraft carrier, the Kuznetsov, and the flagship, the nuclear-powered cruiser Pyotr Velikiy.

As regards ground units, in 2015 the Arctic Brigade, which includes two motorized rifle brigades, with the addition of special forces units, and two airborne divisions, trained in the Arctic environment, with the task of guarding and defending the Federation's military infrastructure in the area. There are three major military bases, to which must be added a certain number of radar stations, border and rescue outposts (about thirty installations in all) and 13 airfieldsⁱⁱ.

The Northern Fleet and the Arctic Brigade would serve to maintain the Russian strategic concept of “bastion”, that is, above all, the defense of the ability to second strike, whose core are the submarines located in the vicinity of the crucial Kola Peninsula, but ideally also for defense (Sea Denial) and the control (Sea Control) of the Arctic watersⁱⁱⁱ (read article "The new Russian maritime strategy").

At a time when tensions with the Atlantic Alliance, following the aggression against Ukraine, are particularly high and there is a confrontational dialectic on the Russian side (the Kremlin does not skimp on references to nuclear weapons), from Moscow's perspective it becomes essential to maintain credibility in its own capabilities. second strike, when not of first strike. This is all the more true when the conflict has highlighted how Russian conventional forces are not particularly prepared for a protracted modern war. In the case of Russia, a large part of its credibility as an effective power therefore derives from the forces deployed in the Arctic.

Nevertheless, the Northern Fleet would consist of units that are mostly in increasing need of modernization work or directly replacement with new units. This makes the Russian Arctic naval force still fearsome in operations sea ​​denial in the vicinity of territorial waters, but would greatly reduce the effective power projection capacity outside of them (the Kuznetsov, for example, has significant operational problems) and, in the event of an open conflict with NATO, would be unlikely a capacity of sea ​​control, also limited to the “only” Barents Sea.

The ability to employ so-called hybrid warfare tactics remains intact, starting from propaganda to the damage of Western infrastructures or telematic lines, passing through simple "ostentatious reconnaissance" for intimidating purposes. The news of recent months confirms this, even with the use of naval units not flying the Russian flag (e.g. Chinese). It is likely that precisely in the face of a reduced capacity to represent a credible threat in conventional contexts, this remains a primary tool in the confrontation with other Arctic states.

The overall Russian situation is reflected in the US National Strategy for the Arctic Region, published in October 2022. While recognizing the importance of this region for US and NATO interests as well, due to the increased navigation possibilities, The Americans have shown no interest in competing militarily in this area and, therefore, do not foresee an increase in their presence, limiting themselves to affirming a renewed effort to invest in their reconnaissance capabilities and in the construction of icebreakers, currently limited to a dozen, of different classes. However, given Trump's recent assertiveness on Arctic issues, a change of attitude is to be expected even on this issue, compared to previous administrations. However, it will be important to have a posture that can combine strategic vision, collective good and respect for allies.. Even in the context of the ”pivot to Asia” American would, in fact, be a serious and gross strategic error to undermine the transatlantic bond and underestimate the Sino-Russian marriage of convenience, especially in the Arctic theater.

Already in 2022, the then NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, had in fact underlined the existence of the security threat represented by the potential loss of control of the Sea Lines of Communication (Sea Lines of Communication – SLOC) for the defense of the North American continent and the defense of NATO's northern flank. His considerations were the result of the observation that Europe and North America were, until yesterday, relatively protected on that side, given that the climatic conditions limited the interaction between the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet and only nuclear submarines moved freely, being able to pass under the Arctic ice cap. Today, and predictably even more so tomorrow, even the surface of the sea could be used more stably.

At the time, he also stressed that Russia and China had committed to strengthening their cooperation in the Arctic, launching a "strategic deepening" that challenges the values ​​and interests of the Alliance.^iv. This makes the Arctic region crucial for the defense of the Alliance's northern flank, with a strategic role in missile surveillance and the protection of allied interests at sea.

All this, combined with the growing Russian assertiveness in its revanchism as a reborn power with global ambitions, represented by the military progressions that in 2008 led to the capture militarily of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in 2014 at the annexation of Crimea and on 24 February 2022 at the start of the aggression against Ukraine, has prompted NATO to strengthen its presence and readiness throughout Europe.

In this context, Iceland, Norway, Denmark and the new entrants Sweden and Finland each have their own limited but qualitatively significant capabilities from a military perspective, contributing significantly to the deterrence and integrated defence posture on NATO's northern flank.

In the sector, Italy is making making its valuable maritime military capabilities available to the Alliance, including the amphibious projection. In order to compete at their best, the naval, amphibious and Navy Aviation components continue to carry out training campaigns in harsh climates, which represent unique experiences of their kind for the levels of challenge related to the environment and the distance from the mother country. The Far North, in fact, remains a remote place characterized by harsh and unforgiving weather conditions, which present significant challenges for military operations.

In this sense, the Navy's projection towards the North Atlantic is no longer only oriented towards research, as important as it is, but also concerns the responsible for contributing to NATO's active deterrence initiatives and commitment to cultivating and growing the necessary level of interoperability and capacity for action in a challenging climatic and environmental context such as that which characterises the Scandinavian peninsula and the surrounding seas.

Conclusions

The Arctic is one of the regions of the world where the effects of climate change are most evident. We have, in fact, seen that the Arctic region is warming at three times the world average speed and the progressive melting of the ice could bring significant environmental risks, with notable consequences in terms of biodiversity and rising sea levels. Scientific research therefore plays a fundamental role in monitoring and studying forms of adaptation and containment of climate change throughout the Arctic area, and its global repercussions.

In this context, the hydrographers of the Navy are find themselves playing a leading role, recognised and valued at an international level. An international role and an added value that have allowed Italy to occupy one of the two Director's seats at theInternational Hydrographic Organization (IHO), whose headquarters are located in the Principality of Monaco.

But we have also seen that this fact brings with it important opportunities and challenges on the commercial and energy levels. These are enormous natural resources that the new routes, navigable for an extended period of the year, will offer to those who are able to seize these opportunities. First of all, the new transit routes for maritime transport such as the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route will assume greater importance. But these routes will need reception ports and adequate support infrastructures. Commitments that already see some players, such as China, proposing to their implementation, with a view to commercial penetration in the area. But to reach some standard at least acceptable for an "intense" commercial traffic it will still take a long time.

In this perspective, it should be considered that the Arctic is not as far from the Mediterranean as it might seem. And this opens up dangers and opportunities, on which two schools of thought clash. Faced with the danger of marginalization of the routes that pass through Suez, because they are longer and more expensive, the Mediterranean might not see its historic role as a maritime connection of fundamental importance diminished at all, but that with the opening of Arctic routes that are not completely free from ice, it could, on the contrary, grow in importance, leading to a different and perhaps greater role of Mediterranean ports and logistics and hub Mediterranean. Whether it will be Italian, Turkish or other competitors It will depend on how we have prepared ourselves in the meantime.

In this framework, Italy cannot and must not stand by and watch. It has the technological and professional skills to play its part and the diplomatic skills to weave useful international relations that adequately protect national interests.

However, After three decades of constant and intense international cooperation in the Arctic area, it has now returned to being a theatre of significant strategic importance, as in the times of the Cold War, during which it had played its part in the confrontation between the two blocs. The Arctic has, therefore, returned to being at the center of a growing competition on the strategic-military level.

Moscow, in anticipation of an increasingly ice-free Arctic, is dangerously consolidating its military presence in the region, despite all the military, political and economic difficulties arising from the aggression against Ukraine. In light of Russia's foreign policy stance, the qualitative and quantitative military presence in the region must be read in the light of greater possibility to exercise an assertive policy on new routes which will presumably be opened.

In this context, it must be duly underlined that Russia, despite the repercussions on the operational readiness of the land component in the Arctic, thanks to its advanced air bases and naval capabilities to operate in those waters, even in extreme conditions, It still has the naval, underwater and missile capabilities to pose a threat to both the free use of Arctic sea lanes and the overall usability of global sea lines of communication.A threat, as mentioned, accentuated by the Kremlin's doctrinal posture.

- global security aspects of the opening of new Arctic routes are, therefore, extremely relevant and Italy has the duty to be present in this sector too, with their significant professionalism and, although Italy's presence in the Arctic is composite, all the actors have a strong will to stay together. In this context, the Navy is certainly a fundamental institutional protagonist, which honorably carries our flag in the area with the entire "Italian system". The Arctic therefore represents a potential employment scenario what to prepare for:

1. contributing in a systemic perspective to monitor it, within the international scientific community, the climate-environmental evolutions to the point of being able to predict, and therefore prevent or at least manage, the potential repercussions well in advance;

2. searching possible forms of convergence with nations equally penalised by the risk of short-circuiting of Mediterranean routes, such as those of the Gulf Region, whose current wealth from energy revenues has long been prudently invested in carving out a future for itself as a hub trade along the maritime trade between the East and the West;

3. acquiring from now on ability to operate there, even militarily, both in a traditional manner, with respect to challenging climatic conditions, human resource adaptability and resistance of means and equipment, and through the extensive use of systems unmanned.

As a result of the events of the last three years, it would seem that the future of the Arctic as a peaceful and open navigational region is not assured and it will hardly be able to represent an area of ​​collaboration again, both on a scientific and economic level. While some nations seek cooperation and mutual benefits, in fact, others wish to shape the region in a way that only benefits their own national priorities..

It is therefore a question of a theatre that is increasingly at the centre of significant geopolitical, economic and strategic interests and which represents a challenge both for the countries bordering it and for other medium and large powers with global interests, which aspire to play a role in the management of its enormous natural resources.

A situation, in short, that presents many opportunities but also risks related to a hypothetical increase in international tensions, today more than ever put to the test by what is happening in the world.

This is a competition that develops, as we have seen, on multiple levels: scientific, economic, geopolitical, military. All intimately connected and having clear implications for the well-being of the populations concerned and which, therefore, also affect the social and everyday sphere.

History has shown that when you are slow to react to global challenges, you generally find yourself having to play catch-up with those who moved faster.

The evolution of the Arctic scenario undoubtedly represents a challenge that you should be prepared for and, in this context, the question that arises is whether Italy and its allies will be able to enhance their respective technological skills and specific professionalism, to play a leading role promptly and effectively. We hope so because, if this is not done, marginalization and isolation will be inevitable. We will see.

_{Read "From Collaborative Space to Contested Area: The Battle for the Arctic (Part One)"}