Attack on Kursk. Oleksandr Syrs'kyj as Scipio Africanus?

The action began on August 6 along the two routes that branch off from the city of Sumy towards Sudzha and towards Nikolayevo-Darino and both converging on the town of Kursk. As always happens when operations are underway, the news is fragmentary and imprecise.

Open sources¹ they report at least five Ukrainian brigades, not 300 men and 11 tanks and about twenty armored fighting vehicles,² as initially stated by the Russian authorities to downplay the event. The five brigades in question are the 22nd, 88th, 116th and 61st mechanized brigades of the army, which were joined by the 80th air assault brigade, which can currently be considered as anelite of the Kiev Armed Forces.

In particular, the 116th brigade published a video, shot by the target acquisition group khorne which operates under him, in which he shows his tanks and troop transport vehicles as they proceeded towards Kursk. In the video, the team specialized in ISTAR activities³ rejoices, declaring: “Our vehicles move on Russian soil as if it were our homeland. "⁴ The 61st Brigade also released a video⁵ which the 99th mechanized battalion, part of the unit, created and put on the network from the Russian city of Sudzha.

Overall, the five brigades confirmed in the Kursk area constitute an eclectic group operating a diverse mix of vehicles and armaments of Russian, European and American origin. Among these it was reported⁶ the presence of APC-IFV⁷ Stryker, supplied by the United States, of tanks PT-91 of Polish manufacture and a wide range of artillery pieces: howitzers 2S3 Russians, howitzers AS-90 British and howitzers M-109L Italians, as well as rocket launchers RM-70 of the Czech Republic.

Near Sumy, about 50 kilometers from the Kursk battlefield, the 49th artillery brigade was deployed, equipped with AS-90s and other types of howitzers. It can be assumed that the 27th artillery brigade, whose base is in Sumy, is also employed in the area, as it is one of the two Ukrainian brigades that have multiple rocket launchers HIMARS (the other is the 15th artillery brigade) and a video also made by Khorne Group shows what appears to be an attack with the HIMARS against a column of Russian troops marching towards Kursk.⁸ The attack destroyed a Russian battalion on the night between 8 and 9 August and the series of indignant reactions from numerous milblogger Russians. The comments, sometimes very colorful, express the Russians' anger at the consequences of the action. Many of them called for the commanders who authorized the column's movement to be punished; Russian military analyst Roman Alekhine wrote “we need executions”; the blog The Two Majors wrote that “Whoever gave the order to move in column into the area... should be condemned according to the laws of war”. Thirteenth channel, which boasts ties to the Wagner Group, named those responsible “mindless creatures”. It's still: “In the third year of the war, even a monkey could be trained, but not some general of the general staff of the [Russian] Defense Ministry who gave the order for such a suicidal march into the front area”.⁹

About the M-109L, a very small digression is necessary relating to the repeated declarations of the government which, in the aftermath of the attack conducted by Ukraine, was quick to point out that the weapons supplied by Italy are not used in the area of ​​operations. Evidently this is not the case and it is normal that it is not. Politics acts according to its own criteria and sophisms, but the rules on the terrain where it is fought are different. A weapon is a weapon and whoever has it uses it as he deems most appropriate, to defend himself or to attack. It seems trivial to have to say it, but reality dictates it.

The same goes for all the doubts expressed by international politics regarding the fact that Ukraine "dared" to attack in force beyond its border. Since the beginning of the war following the Russian invasion of February 24, 2022, there had already been attacks carried out on targets in Russian territory: military units, military-industrial sector structures, oil extraction areas. Many of the attacks were carried out with drones, in other cases there were fire bombings and railway sabotage. Ukrainian intelligence services have admitted to organizing some of these attacks. Others were carried out by Russian anti-war activists. There have been cross-border bombings, rocket attacks and ground incursions from Ukraine, mainly in oblast' of Belgorod, Kursk and Bryansk.

Repeatedly, pro-Ukrainian paramilitary forces launched incursions from Ukraine into Russia, entered border villages and fought against the Russian army, but these were always hit-and-run actions, never a continuous and progressive military movement that has gone deep for over thirty kilometers from the Russian-Ukrainian border, occupying over 1000 square kilometers of land in a week, as has happened now.

The war is fought on two fronts and, from the point of view of diplomacy and international law, it is one thing to make efforts to find solutions that lead to peace, it is another to not recognize the right to defense of those who are attacked. Therefore, it is nothing strange if Ukraine now subjects Russian villages and cities to what it has been suffering on its territory for two and a half years. Sorry for the 120.000 Russian civilians forced to abandon their homes to date, but this is what tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians had to do.

It is legitimate, then, to ask: “Why now and not before? Why didn't Ukraine attack Russia at home some time ago?” In the context of the initiatives undertaken by the International Community to contain the effects of the conflict, it is probable that the refusal to consent to Ukrainian military actions carried out beyond its borders has always prevailed, but now, it seems that there is a tendency towards "tacit tolerance", at least from the West, and it is in that direction that Ukrainian President Zelensky is trying to “force the hand” to gain full support. Naturally, if Ukraine has been able to take this direction it is also by virtue of the armaments that continue to be supplied to it.

While it is still possible that the brigades do not intend to remain in Russia, there are currently no signs of them slowing down their attacks.

Nothing strange, then, if in the context of the hybrid campaign conducted by the Kremlin, Moscow's war narrative continues along the lines of the delusional proclamations to which it has accustomed us up to now. President Vladimir Putin described the incursion of the Ukrainian armed forces intooblast' of Kursk as one “large-scale provocation”.¹⁰ He accused the “Kiev regime"of “indiscriminately fire various types of weapons, including missiles, at civilian buildings, homes and ambulances”.¹¹ Former President and Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, issued a statement saying that “this (war) is no longer just an operation to reconquer our official territories and punish the Nazis. It is possible and necessary to travel to the lands of still existing Ukraine. In Odessa, in Kharkiv, in Dnipropetrovsk, in Mykolaiv. To Kiev and beyond” and that “even the current military campaign will end with Russia's unconditional victory”.¹² Then we have the statement from Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov “We are at war with the entire West”¹³ and the statements of the mayors of various villages affected by the battles, reported by our local news, who claim that the Ukrainian army used chemical weapons during the attacks.

I also want to focus on the emphasis given to the news of the use of “a fearsome Odab-500 thermobaric bomb”¹⁴ on the Kiev troops engaged near Kursk and I agree with what was observed by Colonel Giorgio Orio Stirpe, an expert military analyst: “The Russian emphasis on the use of a single thermobaric bomb is a pure propaganda operation, which the Russians are masters of, but it does minimal damage on a large dynamic operation involving 5 to 8 Ukrainian brigades.”¹⁵

Finally, nothing strange if on August 10, the Minsk government announced the transfer of a missile Iskander, of multiple rocket launcher systems Polonez and special forces units in the areas bordering Ukraine. Then, on August 11, the Belarusian Defense Ministry announced that it was moving its tanks to the border with Ukraine to reinforce the contingent of troops stationed there. Such maneuvers foreshadow the attempt to help Russia and distract the attention of the Ukrainian command in the direction of Belarus.

I now take inspiration from some of Gen.'s statements. Paolo Capitini, fully agreeable, formulated by him in the brilliant summary of what is happening in the Russian Kursk region, presented in the broadcast Omnibus of 12 August 2024. In response to the question whether it was possible to glimpse a failure of Russian military intelligence in the failure to predict the attack conducted by the Ukrainians starting from 6 August, he replied that nowadays what was a characterizing element of military maneuver, i.e. the "surprise effect", is practically impossible to achieve. As a personal consideration I would add that what can still be done with a certain effectiveness and, however, you have to be really good and have a bit of luck (without ever counting on it, however), is to study and implement a good deception plan. But this is not the case.

What can (and must) be done - and here I take up Capitini's reasoning - is not to neglect the indicators of what is evolving in the area of ​​operations; “do not overlook” means knowing how to identify what is relevant and, above all, knowing how to interpret it to understand what the enemy's orientation is. That's what deception plans are for. Making the work of analysts difficult and leading them to draw incorrect and misleading conclusions.

But let's go back tointelligence failure of the Kremlin. The news of signs of an imminent Ukrainian attack on Russian territory was reported in various media; the fact that they were apparently ignored by the leaders of the Moscow armed forces cannot help but raise some doubts; among other things, a relevant consequence is that even towards the iconic Gerasimov the Kremlin's patience is running out:

The Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, Valery Gerasimov and senior officials probably ignored intelligence warnings about the gathering of the Ukrainian army on the border of the Kursk region. Bloomberg reports this, citing a source close to the Kremlin.¹⁶ According to the agency's interlocutor, the security services received the information two weeks before the attack, but Vladimir Putin was not informed about it. At the same time, the Russian army was apparently taken by surprise by the attack and therefore did not offer adequate resistance to the Ukrainian armed forces. Bloomberg's interlocutor believes that Gerasimov is unlikely to be removed in the near future, but "the Kremlin's patience with its actions in the war is running out."¹⁷

Evidently the lesson learned from the results of the invasion of February 24, 2022, which saw the failure of a rapid conquest of the Ukrainian territories and an equally rapid painless consolidation on them, was not so well "learned". Once again the desire to please a leader (Putin) seems to emerge by denying evidence which, ultimately, has a boomerang effect that can only cause him irritation:

"This is a slap in the face for the president. We have not been able to repel the enemy for (three days). In the regions of Russia, a danger has been created for the population. The price of European gas has increased. This is not the way a country that is confident of its victory behaves,” the source said. “Our border guards were surrounded and forced to fight. The conscripts were captured. It is clear that the offensive of the Ukrainians can only be a short-term success. However, what happened is very unpleasant, from the point of view reputational view,” he continued. ... The Ukrainian army's operation has "made Putin nervous", a government official told Politika.¹⁸

Setting aside the hypothesis of a large-scale operation aimed at conquering territories on Russian soil permanently, this is precisely one of the objectives that Kiev may have set itself and which gives meaning to the initiative: destabilizing theiceman Putin, pushing him to make rash decisions in the wake of out-of-control emotions. On August 7, the Russian president hastened to convene an emergency council with the top brass of Defense and National Security - Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, Secretary of the Security Council Sergei Shoigu, Director of the Federal Security Service Alexander Bortnikov and the Chief of Defense Staff Valery Gerasimov - during which he was reassured about the current events:

"Vladimir Putin: Good afternoon, dear colleagues!

Please report through your departments on the developing situation in the Kursk region. The Chief of Staff [Valery Gerasimov] is now in one of the operational control centers and will report via video link. And then Sergei Kuzhugetovich [Shoigu] will talk about the results of his trip to Iran and Azerbaijan.

Please, Valery Vasilievich.

V. Gerasimov: Comrade Supreme Commander-in-Chief!

At 5:30 in the morning on August 6, units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces numbering up to a thousand people went on the offensive with the aim of capturing part of the territory of the Sudzhansky district of the Kursk region.

The actions of the units covering the state border together with the border guards and reinforcement units, air strikes, missile forces and artillery fire stopped the enemy's advance deep into the territory in the direction of Kursk. Currently, units of the Northern Group, together with the border guards of the Russian FSB, continue to destroy the enemy in areas directly adjacent to the Russian-Ukrainian border. Enemy losses amounted to 315 people, of which at least 100 were killed and 215 wounded. 54 armored vehicles were destroyed, including seven tanks.

The operation will be completed by defeating the enemy and reaching the state border.

The relationship is over."¹⁹

However, six days after entering Russian territory, the situation remained unchanged and Putin felt compelled to call another emergency meeting, which was also attended by the head of the Russian national guard (Putin's "praetorians") Viktor Zolotov, to reduce the emotional impact that the events are having on the population. The Ukrainian units, after five days of fighting, occupied approximately 450 square kilometers in theoblast' of Kursk and captured dozens of Russian soldiers.²⁰

If at a strategic level, therefore, the objective can be considered to have put the resilience of the company to the test leadership Russian policy, at a tactical level it could be the conquest of the road and railway communication routes that lead from Kursk to Belgorod, in order to interrupt the logistical flow that supplies the Russian troops operating in the oblast of Kharkiv. Here, then, the director of the FSB Aleksandr Bortnikov received the mandate from Putin to organize in oblast' of Kursk, Bryansk and Belgorod what, with the Russian attitude to propagandistic downplaying of events, has been defined as an "anti-terrorism operational regime", to temporarily take control of the regions until conditions return to normal.

A few more observations, of an eminently tactical nature. The first concerns the choice of the Sumy area to move into Russian territory. Due to the morphological characteristics of the territory, this sector remained practically undefended compared to others occupied by the Russians in Donbass:

"Consider also that the Ukrainian city of Sumy is surrounded by compartmentalized terrain (hills and forests), but after the Russian border there are plains and relatively open terrain up to Kursk, blocking this area may force the Russians to deploy units of garrison in open areas more easily hit by artillery. Furthermore, the east-west roads between Sumi and Kursk are few and low-range (the largest is a regional road while the E 38 highway passes much further north), any armored attack in this area would have its own supply lines channeled onto a few roads and therefore easy prey to interdiction by artillery fire. For this reason the Russians did not prepare large fixed defenses in this area, given that any armored penetration could be stopped simply by blocking the few east-west roads."²¹

Furthermore, the transition from positional warfare to maneuver warfare to which the Russians, after a very long period of "positional warfare" had to suddenly readapt to face the penetration carried out by the Ukrainian forces, is absolutely relevant. This change forced them to move troops deployed in other sectors, also using forces kept in reserve, as in the case of a military column transferred from Belgorod Oblast to Sudzhansky District (in the fighting zone), equipped with artillery pieces self-propelled Msta-S 152 mm modified with anti-drone chassis and combat support vehicles.²² The symbols on the vehicles showed that the Russian command was already transferring troops with combat experience in 'region of Kursk as reinforcement.²³ It is very likely that another goal of Kiev is to relieve the pressure exerted by the Russian military device in Donbass.

I conclude with the reflection of Vladimir Pastukhov, a Russian political scientist whose point of view on what is happening in the Russian-Ukrainian theater of war is very lucid, leaving room for new perspectives from which to look at the capabilities and operational choices of the two adversaries, both under the political-strategic profile, both from a tactical-military point of view:

“There are two hypotheses regarding the state of the Russian armed forces. It assumes that Russian military resources are, in principle, unlimited and that Russia can mobilize as many people and resources as it wants (within the scope of this local conflict, of course). The only question is political will and time. Another hypothesis is that Russia, like Ukraine, operates at the limit of its capabilities, but plays poker better (bluffing). In this case, unexpected and excessive pressure can have a butterfly effect.²⁴ In this sense, the unexpected offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Kursk is not about square kilometers, but about the future of the war. Based on its results, approaches to peace plans, plans for military and financial assistance to Ukraine (on the other hand, military-technical assistance to Russia) will be measured. Perhaps this is one of the most important battles of the 2023-2024 campaign in terms of political significance, surpassing in its consequences everything that happens near Avdiivka and its surroundings. This is not a tactical turning point, but astrategic enterprise (precisely in a political sense, and not purely military).”²⁵

History is a teacher of life and it would seem that the Ukrainian Chief of Defense Staff Oleksandr Syrs'kyj has learned the lesson of Scipio Africanus.