As we have repeatedly had occasion to stress on this heading (v.articolo), Turkey and Russia have not loved each other for centuries. The developments in the war in Syria and the crises in Libya and Nagorno Karabach in recent months have, however, provided an opportunity to further exacerbate relations between Moscow and Ankara, offering several arenas of political confrontation and in some cases military.
Given the political weight of the two countries, the friction, fueled by a particularly dynamic foreign policy for both, has moved on a global track, involving primarily the US and the EU. On this basis, the Putin-Erdogan meeting, at least in theory, could appear as a twist to change the picture of the Eurasian geopolitical structures. In reality, the Russia-Turkey thaw was somewhat predictable, especially in light of the pragmatism that, although in a distinct way, distinguishes both Putin and Erdogan.
First of all, an assumption: Russia and Turkey were moved at the same time by the necessity and by the greedy opportunity. Let's start from the Russian point of view. Moscow has an urgent need to collect credits for a foreign policy aimed at restoring it powership Russian on global dimension. The costs of investments in military and political terms have been very high and although widely repaid in terms of internal stability (Putin will be re-elected with a plebiscite in 2018 and will remain in the Kremlin up to 2024), the new cold war wanted by the US effects. International isolation and economic sanctions applied by the West require a liquidation of interest accrued in Moscow, especially in the Middle East, now with no more references.
In global terms, Russia can not afford to close in a game of relaunching with America and Europe, which in its time was already the cause of the implosion of the USSR. Nobody knows it better than Putin himself.
At the same time Moscow has a golden opportunity. For the first time since the 50 years, Turkey has questioned its role in NATO, claiming the right to a more autonomous foreign policy. The possibility of inserting itself in the open gleam between Ankara and Washington is a too tempting morsel and, to a wall against sterile and dangerous wall, the Kremlin has preferred the concrete way: put tares between Turks and the West showing to have credits to cool the boilers Ottomans.
Putin, after the demolition of the Russian Sukhoj in November, he patiently waited for the good opportunity. Once again today forces the US to move from Moscow or at least to find it sitting at a serious table with much voice in the chapter. Translating into diplomatic measures, the Russian-Turkish thaw may have serious consequences immediately in Syria, Libya and indirectly in Ukraine. This allows us to see it from the Turkish perspective. Erdogan desperately needs to get out of the Syrian quagmire, where the Russian allies of Assad fight against the Jihad supported by Ankara.
Probably the Kurdish node is a good negotiating ground: armed with the US, the Syrian Kurds are a mange for both Ankara and Damascus. Putin could be the meeting point between Turkey and Syria, at the same time seizing the opportunity to realize a way out of the war in which Russia has been involved for a year now.
Also in Libya, Ankara and Moscow are on opposite sides. A cooling of relations between Russians and the general of Tobruk Haftar (passing through Al Sisi's Egypt) could be part of the overall package. Even if with minor tones, the same can be said of Ukraine, where the NATO role of Ankara can act as a brake on the continual re-launch of the EU and the US.
The recent events of Crimea will be a litmus test to know the tones that America wants to continue to use in Eastern Europe. How easy it is to imagine Erdoğan's rapprochement in Moscow, which has passed from the apology letter to the killing of the Russian 2015 fighter, is also a further opportunity to blackmail the West.
Can Washington afford a removal from Ankara? After the shadows linked to the attempted coup, can the US afford the strange flirt between Turkey and Russia? The disastrous Obama policy in the Middle East in a decade has already affected relations with Israel. Erdogan knows this and knows how important Turkey is to the Eurasian balance. It exploits its strategic position also in terms of migratory flows and plays on the upside.
In light of the above, is it plausible that Turkey and Russia are inaugurating a new geopolitical season? Probably, at least for now, let's talk about medium-short term political calculations. The most important fact, however, is the return of individual states' diplomacy at high levels. In the future that concerns us, supranational bodies seem to have less and less space; the great politics still remains the prerogative of national chancelleries and leaders. In the face of historical alliances.
(photo: Kremlin / SANA)
