In the seemingly inextricable Syrian tangle, one thing at this time seems certain: every evolution of the framework to put an end to six years of war will pass through the role that Turkey has decided to play.
Over the past 60 days, Ankara's diplomatic dynamism has left many observers in place, in a mix of political hazards and cynical calculations.
We make the point.
The operation Euphrate Shield he had been in the drawer for two years. As already argued no time could have been more propitious to cross the Syrian border. The spark was the capture of the city of Manbij by Kurdish militias against the Islamic State. Manbij is 40 km inside the Syrian territory and around 30 from the western shores of the Euphrates. As an important center of the Governorate of Aleppo, it represented a strategic node for the Caliphate, perched in Al Bab and now on the ropes in the northern provinces of Syria. Leaving the offensive to the Kurds flattered by the West would have meant accepting the status quo of an entire autonomous region close to its own border: it would have given access to the link between Syrian Kurds and their PKK militia their cousins; from a political point of view it would have been the consecration of the Turkish failure in the Middle East for ten years now.
At the center of the controversy over the support of jihadist militias and accused of turning a blind eye (or rather two) to the supplies reaching ISIS from its territory, Ankara has reached its maximum international isolation in the spring. Three key factors: relations with Moscow, at historic lows after the fall of Russian hunting in November; removal from Israel, a traditional partner in the region; the open hostility of Egypt by Al Sisi, sworn enemy of the Muslim brotherhood, sponsored primarily by Turkish President Erdogan.
Turkey's summer turnaround was born out of the need to loosen strangulation and is part of a precise strategic calculation.
To explain it in no uncertain terms is Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, in an interview on state TV. 
Ankara, with a completely Byzantine ability (!!!) to manage international relations, first clarified its position with Mosca, presenting itself with its hat in hand and a letter of apology. He then re-established relations with Israel, regardless of the wishes of the United States. He then sent signals to Cairo to clarify the opposing positions in Libya where Egypt and Turkey are on opposite sides: Egypt supports the "rebel" Tobruk; Turkey is the big brother of the Tripoli faction, also recognized by the international community. Finally, the statements by the Turkish government in May, with which it supported itself, were equally important "The non-existence of problems with neighbors". The statements summed up with those according to which President Assad "Is an essential interlocutor to get out of the Syrian crisis ..." issued by Yildirim himself. For 5 years the removal of Assad had been a staple in the Turkish management of the Syrian crisis. Why so much availability?
Erdogan found himself forced to make a virtue of necessity. Intent on raising the stakes with the West, which is holding the refugee problem and the pre-eminent role in NATO, he hastened to solve the contingent problems on the territory. Aware that the muted support policy for Islamist militias in Syria has created more problems than it has resolved, it has decided to act directly, before US support for YPG agitated Turkey's only real big bogey: birth of a Kurdish nation.
Ankara's ability was to attack ISIS and YPG Kurdish militias at the same time, so as to avoid total international condemnation. Official Damascus protests over the violation of their sovereignty are part of a diplomatic ritual. As we have been saying for a long time on this column, Syria and Turkey were destined to dialogue again to resolve common problems.
The double or triple Turkish game suggests horizons that are apparently devoid of certainties. In reality the question could be simpler than it seems. In the coming weeks we could expect this type of framework:
- Turkey will directly reclaim Syrian land between Aleppo and the Euphrates River. Likely that the Kurdish army will continue to occupy a security buffer after tacit agreement with Damascus. The militiamen of the revived Free Syrian Army participating in Shield on the Euphrates they will be left to their fate when the Turkish goal (downsizing of the Kurds) is achieved. The issue at that point will be an internal problem in Damascus;
- the Kurds will be abandoned by Washington, forced to indulge Erdogan's designs, after having failed the torpedo;
- the retreat of the Caliphate, now useless to all, will continue gradually towards the south.
As for the war of the Islamists in the Governorate of Idlib and the battle of Aleppo, everything will depend on the support that Turkey will continue to give to the jihadist militiamen and to the position of Iran, Hezbollah's sponsor and indirectly active in the area. The spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of Tehran Qassemi in this regard stated that "Ankara is required to coordinate with its neighbors in order to operate in Syria". If they are not evidence of dialogue, at least they are not declarations of war.
This being the case, we could hypothesize a future with a Syria without ISIS, but with a Turkish cushion of protection along the central eastern border. With Assad in power in a smaller country, all would be winners except the Kurds of Rojava and the USA. On this last point, however, we can expect tail blows.
(photo: Türk Kara Kuvvetleri / Alalam)
