Syria and the Middle East: what changes with the arrival of Trump?

(To Giampiero Venturi)
11/11/16

Donald Trump's election to the White House was not only unexpected in the US and Europe, but also in the Middle East. Hillary Clinton's election campaign, according to the Jordanian news agency Petra, it was financed by the Saudis for 43 million dollars, about 20% of the total budget available to Democrats. Despite many internal resistance to support a female candidate, Riad in the 2015, when it was still unclear who the two contenders were for the final race for the presidency, had already expressed clearly: Trump was hampered and for the intimate relations since the time of the mandate as Secretary of State, Clinton was the horse to bet on.

But things sometimes go differently than you want, and Riad, with Trump's election, has remained in his hand. The transformational skills and above all a good dose of pragmatism anointed by dollars and oil, will provide in the coming weeks to adjust the shot: from here to the day of the Trump settlement, diplomacy will work hard to understand how to decline for the Middle East a scenario absolutely not expected.

Clinton was the biggest advocate of increasing the American military presence in the Mediterranean. As an apparatus figure and as Secretary of State he worked to fuel the development of the so-called Arab Springs, becoming a protagonist behind the scenes, before the war in Libya and then the revolt against Assad in Syria. In an interview with Fox News, Trump called her stupid for that very reason ...

The supply of weapons to the Free Syrian Army and other Syrian rebel groups (also drawing on Gaddafi's former arsenals) was a cornerstone of Clinton's foreign policy, and by extension of Obama's. Under the electoral agenda, as President he would likely have continued along the same lines, fueling "global America," in the wake of a 90s planetary politics and her husband Bill.

With "if" and with "but" History is not made. What would have been with Hillary Clinton will never be known. With any evidence, however, the tap that has foraged the galaxy of Syrian rebel bands more or less "moderate", soon will close, if at all, certainly significantly. In essence, let's expect a reversal of the table on which we have played so far.

Trump's policy in the Middle East is based on some assumptions, which the most malicious people want cunningly sewn to not be in contrast with American public opinion and the electoral tank of deep America. 

Discounted the relaunch of relations with Israel, put in brackets in the last years of Obama. This will be affected by the relationship with Iran, on paper expected to worsen, but on which we need to think better. If the nuclear deal could be questioned, it is also true that Trump appears far from the pro-Sunni line that characterized the outgoing administration. Precisely by virtue of a change in relations with the Gulf monarchies and a new position with the Syrian Islamist rebels, there would be less reason to fuel the clash with Tehran. The agreement with Russia will also weigh on relations with Iran, which could open up, among other things, solutions on a global scale that are nothing short of unprecedented. Trump has already leaked a possible agreement in Syria, which can be implemented immediately with a softening of the US position on Assad. The new American government will thus have the opportunity to get out of the Syrian quagmire, unloading the blame on the previous one. Let's expect a common ride on Raqqa and concessions from Moscow aimed at resolving disputes on other landscapes (Trump already recognizes Russian Crimea and if Moscow proves reasonable, a review of sanctions is also likely).

The approach with Turkey will be important at this point in the Middle East. As an experienced gambler, Erdogan could not have hoped for anything better than in a change of pace in the States. If the rapprochement of Ankara in Moscow was followed by that of Washington to both, in Syria the question would be easier to solve:

  • the Islamic State would be liquidated faster than expected;
  • the Islamic bands subsidized from outside would remain dry, with the exception of Turkmen sponsored by Ankara;
  • Assad, with the necessary nuances, would be good for everyone;
  • Turkey would be granted the territorial buffer and the sphere of influence it requested.

The most important issues still to be resolved remain relations with Saudi Arabia and the Kurdish question.

As regards future Washington-Riad relations, a distinction must be made between electoral campaign and practical needs. With every certainty Trump will take a lot of pebbles from his shoes and the Saudis will pay the price of hindering him. The opportunity is greedy for the new president, because the popularity of Riad internationally is at historic lows: a tear would benefit greatly from the image of outsider not corrupted by the politics that Trump has sewn on. It is however true that a total closure will be impossible for practical reasons of mutual interest. The question remains open and crucial for all the regional assets.

Compared to the Kurds instead, everything falls within the aforementioned scheme. If Trump's US liquidates ISIS after the agreement with Russia and Turkey to recover ground, the Kurds will be the first to pay the costs.

In this regard, from the Syrian front today there are emblematic news.

The Turkish Armed Forces have taken control of a strategic area in the direction of Al-Bab stronghold ISIS east of Aleppo and 30 km from the Turkish border. There is an incessant use of T-155 howitzers by the Ankara army both against positions of the Caliphate and against Kurdish militiamen of the YPG, in turn active against ISIS and against Islamic militants supported by Turkey.

If the US will be in a hurry to close the bad game played so far in Syria, it will be enough to withdraw from support for the Kurds, doing everyone a favor (except for the Kurds of course ...).

(photo: web / Türk Kara Kuvvetleri)