Is terrorism true in Istanbul? Lights and shadows behind the attacks on Turkey

(To Giampiero Venturi)
01/07/16

The attack on Ataturk airport in Istanbul is not extemporaneous, nor casual. It fits into the midst of the current crisis scenarios in the Middle East and specifically follows the thread and the evolution of the Syrian framework.

When there is a large-scale attack against Turkish institutional symbols, especially if the modality is stragista, at present only two can be the principals: bombers linked to the Kurdish cause and in particular to the PKK; militiamen or executors on commission for ISIS account.

The ideological and political origin of the two groups is diametrically opposed: the Kurdish hand makes references to Ankara's internal politics and to issues suspended for decades; the fundamentalist matrix linked to the Caliphate acts vice versa in relation to the Turkish foreign policy and to the balances generated in the last 10-12 months. 

Several times on this column we have made remarks on Ankara's conduct in relation to the Syrian issue, in particular the proven support to the Islamist militia of Al Nusra, Syrian branch of Al Qaeda (v.articolo). We have spoken on several occasions of a departure from the dogma of secularism imposed by the Ataturk revolution, and of an Ottoman revanchism, the driving force of Erdogan's new Turkey for political leadership in the whole area between the Libyan Maghreb and Central Asia .

Conjectures of pure geopolitical logic suggest that Ankara has more than one interest in playing the role of victim of Islamic fundamentalism. On the one hand, to strengthen the image of a nation on paper on the front line against fundamentalist terrorism; on the other, to justify the perennial state of emergency and internal repression, as well as the strong militarization on the south-eastern borders and direct interventions beyond the Syrian border. 
The plots between Ankara and Islamism, unveiled unequivocally by many analysts, cannot however ignore the rapid evolution of the war in Syria and in particular the scenario matured in the first months of the 2016.

The substantial reversal of the course of the conflict has created the conditions for the survival of the Assad government, with a critical weakening of the "institutions" of the Islamic State and its military capabilities. The US-led anti-terrorism coalition, after the initial moment of embarrassment, responded to the general offensive of the Syrian Armed Forces, starting from April 2016 with a dynamism hitherto unprecedented: the Kurds of the SDF supported by the American special units (entered into Syria without official approval from Damascus) are progressing on the north and south front, well beyond the official objectives covered by the Kurdish independence cause; in Iraq, after the sensational fall of Fallujah, the pro-American government forces are now advancing towards Mosul, the "Iraqi capital" of the Caliphate.
In other words, the countdown to ISIS seems to have begun.

Why right now? Why has the international anti-terrorism coalition decided to get rid of the Islamic State after years of inaction and suspicions of collusion?

The sudden haste of the United States is linked to the unexpected "marketing" success of Putin's Russia and his allies in the field and the need to reduce the future role of Damascus, which ended up on the board of villains from the 2011. For Washington, playing a decisive role in the final rush against the Caliphate is a must political and media that explains the deployment of theEisenhower and the massive and decisive bombings in Iraq, readily exalted by the TVs of NATO countries.

In confirmation of the decision to end the "ISIS mad toy" news arrives from the northern Syrian front, where the clash between militants of the Islamic State (v.articolo) and other Islamist factions is a given by now 2016 beginnings.

In confusion, in addition to apparently lay groups created and following the best practices from the USA (the last is the New Syrian Army, fringe of the FSA allied to the Kurds of the SDF), a dominant role in the clash is played by the terrorist militias of Al Nusra supported by Turkey, often engaged directly with their regular forces.

The attack on the Istanbul airport can therefore be interpreted in two ways:
- ISIS revenge for Turkish operations in Syrian territory;
- officialization of the Turkish role against the Caliphate, which at the same time would not prevent Ankara from continuing to move in the area by supporting its own Turkomite Islamist vassals.
This last aspect would suggest a sort of strategy of tension, where the apparently victim subject would actually be the one that benefits most from the attacks themselves.

Are bombs against Turkish targets therefore a military consequence of a political choice or a more or less blessed event that suits Ankara?

Understanding the dose with which the two interpretations are mixed is not easy. However, objective data remains the descending parable of the Islamic State and the instrumental function of its open hostility in Ankara.   

We will have confirmation of this before the end of the year, as Turkey and the United States will in all probability be incensed as champions of the victory against the Caliphate.

(photo: web / Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri / US Navy)