The Trump era begins, the historic occasion of Europe

(To Giampiero Venturi)
20/01/17

Trump's settlement paves the way for gossip. As if there was nothing better to think about these hours, it seems to make the news more passable as such, than the historical-political framework in which it comes into being.

Without wasting time discussing whether it will be good or bad, what should be emphasized is that the arrival of Trump marks an indisputable moment of rupture with respect to traditional politics and the fact perhaps happens in the most propitious historical moment. More than politics, we are talking about geopolitics.

The reason is simple. We all (understood as organized communities and as free citizens) live with patterns related to the balance born at the end of the Second World War.

Those equilibriums, sealed at Yalta, have generated two great factors, elements of distinction of an entire era:

- prosperity and peace in the countries of Western Europe, for centuries accustomed to betrayals of holy reason;

- transfer of the keys of power from the Old Continent to the USA.

Thus, while Europe was growing in prosperity, America became the great brother of the West, the hat of all the values ​​embodied by man who was essentially recognized as white and Christian.

The passage of deliveries between the two sides of the Atlantic has put Paris and London in the attic, the center of the world for centuries, leading them to a political decline sublimated then by the end of the colonial empires.

That system was essential to allow Europe to survive and had reason to exist essentially on the basis of fear, ie by a threat. The expression of Ronald Reagan that outlined the USSR as an absolute evil still in the 80 years, was the synthesis of half a century of equilibrium in which the last two generations of humanity have reasonably been recognized. 

The current problem is that the rules are still the same, but the balances on which they were built no longer exist today. In essence, there is a total disconnect between the world we live in and what appeared in 1945.

The process began with the end of the Cold War, but out of laziness and interest, it has been left out. It is not difficult to understand why: every change has a cost and above all and often involves the assumption of great risks for everyone. The simple deduction applies to both Americans and Europeans.

The Americans know very well that once the bases of Ramstein or Aviano have been closed, to reopen them would require another world war. The problem is never a door slamming; if anything, reopen it after closing it. In the last quarter of a century, therefore, nothing was more comprehensible than the constant work of the United States so that its role as a hegemonic power remained such. Case never would have surprised the opposite.  

Likewise, it is difficult to adapt to new balances for us Europeans. Like a fat calf, weighed by its own inertia, Western Europe for decades (and for the first time in its history) has not bothered anything, if not to maintain its well-being. The blank signing to the United States of America in the 45 (in the 49 in fact, with the NATO's birth) has in the end guaranteed two acceptable results: Europe's wealth; America's wealth and power.

Time passes however and with it many of those factors that make the political and social frameworks stable. Today the world appears to be substantially different from that of 1945, as we have already said, but scraping the old world to accept a deeply changed reality is by no means automatic. Getting in front of the mirror can be traumatic, especially if it forces current leadership to consider two factors:

- the birth of new balances entails the end of consolidated certainties;

- Adapting to new balances means taking responsibility and responsibilities cost.

The first point, more than an invitation, is a historical fact that is difficult to contest. Without sinking the analysis into the pre-unification Italian history, just scroll through what happened from 1861 to 1945 to understand that relations between states are usually fluid and that convergences and divergences between countries rotate with higher frequencies than those we are used to.

If the very concepts of sovereignty and nation are to be regarded as non-absolute principles, how can one think that the state of art born in Yalta in 1945 can remain eternal?

More than a political discourse is an anthropological idea: men organize themselves according to always new rules and forms; those born after World War II are perhaps the only ones in the history of Europe who have not experienced it.

The second point is also based on objective data. In other words, being a merchant's ear for us Europeans is still worthwhile because it means first of all not taking a fight. That this involves a compromise with freedom and identity pride, as happened for 70 years, obviously there is not even to say ...

If Trump, who is now President of the United States of America, is actually the breaking point between old and new, we will understand soon. Regardless of how it will be and how consistent it will be, the assumptions are there.

Sooner or later Europe will have to understand that the 20th century is over. Uncle Sam's hat will not always be so large as to protect everyone. The courses of History and Trump, for better or for worse, could be the instrument through which they accelerate.

For us Europeans, the enormous and dramatic question remains about how to put decades of political inertia in the attic. The culture of identity and its defense have been erased from our optical prism like a dangerous poison. When the account of a new and inevitable weaning arrives, there will be pains for the Old Continent. Perhaps, paradoxically, this will not be bad.

(photo: websites)