The Islamic State declares war on Saudi Arabia after Riad, through defense minister Mohammad Bin Salman (one of the inherited princes), has officially promoted the coalition of 34 Islamic countries that will fight the Caliphate, cited as a terrorist organization. The news has three days and is accompanied by video evidence of the execution of a "agent" of Riad, accused of collaborating with the "crusader" front led by the US.
The news raises many doubts in light of the doubts that for some time the Saudi conduct raises about relations with ISIS.
The first reflection concerns the list of participating countries: in addition to Saudi Arabia that would coordinate the operations from Riyadh, many Asian and African Islamic countries are included, but not all the members of the Arab League.
The complete list includes the presence of Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Chad, Comoros, Ivory Coast, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Gabon, Djibouti, Jordan, Guinea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Maldives, Malaysia, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine Qatar, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen.
Presence and omissions are not random. Syria and Iraq, not considered by the Saudis victims of terrorism but hostage to "unworthy" institutions to represent the Islamic world in the imaginary fight against terrorism, are missing first. Iran is absent from the list of unreasonable absentees, outside the Arab countries but also due to the Saudi graces thanks to the political clash that has been dragging on for decades between Tehran and Riyadh.
The political message is not too subtle if we consider the filters through which Prince Mohammad would have presented the cartel. First of all, we observe the involvement of countries that are anything but politically stable. Putting aside the case of Somalia not able to guarantee its national integrity, there are other states on whose credibility thick fog mists thicken. This is the case of Sudan, Mali and especially Libya, quickly included in the list of probi, even before the frontal agreement with which we strive to believe in a government of national unity.
The Sunni axis, including the jihadist components it contains, seems to be able to do without the "African wing", especially the one in which the Islamist drifts seem to be rooted. The presence in the list of Saharan and Sahel countries is not accidental. From Senegal to Djibouti, all the states of the new frontier of Sunni Islamization are cited from west to east, that is, that which is chief politically and especially financially to the Gulf monarchies and to Turkey, also mentioned.
In this regard, the inclusion of Nigeria, Chad and Côte d'Ivoire in the list of Muslim countries should not be underestimated. If in the first two countries Islam does not represent that 50% of the population, the Ivorian one proclaims itself Muslim only for a third. Although irrelevant from the geopolitical point of view, the quote from Togo, considered Islamic by Saudi Arabia, is emblematic even if the Togolese Muslims do not exceed 20%.
Saudi Arabia with an official declaration that is leaving less traces than it should, selects self-selector of good Islam from the impure one before the international community.
The omission of Shiite Iran in this respect has a very important political value. At least as much as that of the insertion of Yemen, to be read not in support of the peace treaties between Houti rebels and Hadi president (among others postponed to January) but as the reaffirmation of a Saudi assumption: San'a is Sunni and is our ally. In confirmation of this it is good to note the absence of Omani, the only one among the monarchies of the Persian Gulf not to have idyllic relations with Saudi Arabia and not to be a majority Sunni.
With regard to the fight against international terrorism, the Saudi bombing announcement therefore leaves many obscure points. Although Prince Mohammad is considered a "reformist" pragmatist, it is not hazardous to think that Riyad, far from a relentless commitment to terrorism, is sharpening its arms to build a stronger geopolitical dimension of the country. The goal in the near future is to respond to American pressure for greater media initiative against terrorism and to become a point of aggregation free of oil and assets financial assets in the world.
The silent reaction of the countries involved, internal and external to the Arab League, seems to endorse this design and confirm this impression: Riad has progressively increased over the years its ability to impose political awe, not only to its neighbors. The trends It seems destined to grow, especially if the United States and Turkey continue to entertain special relations with the Saudis.
Waiting for a place in Indonesia (the first Islamic country in the world), possibly invited to join the cartel, the only voice out of the chorus is Pakistan. Islamabad was quick to distance itself from involvement, saying it was not consulted.
We refer to this section on the geopolitical considerations on current Pakistan.
Imagine, however, that the common Sunni denominator that has often placed Islamabad and Riyadh on the same front is strong. The specification of Pakistan seems more a claim of political weight within the coalition than an ideological distinction. The fight against what we consider Isis probably needs other assumptions.
(photo: الجيش العربي السعودي / web)
