The growth of the Saudi geopolitical weight in the last decade is indisputable. Several times in this column we have talked about the new role that Riad has managed to carve out over time, to become a point of reference far beyond the area of the Middle East for countries in search of patronage and money. Above all money.
The charism of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the preponderant weight represented in the OPEC and the Arab League, is a foregone conclusion. However, the growth of the role of Riyadh on the international level has in recent years taken on a different form, especially in relation to the "Islamic question". If for decades we have been accustomed to considering oil and investment in the financial and real estate markets of the West as a spy of Saudi dominance, over time the relationship between Al Saud and the expansion of Islamist Sunnism has come to light, especially in its more conservative interpretation.
The red thread (indeed, green ...) of Riyadh's supervision of the return of fighting Sunnism, starts from Afghanistan in the 80s and continues in Pakistan during the apology of the Taliban, moves around the world through a galaxy of groups of which we know the most celebrated names (Al Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram ...) often only apparently in contradiction with each other.
To relate Riad directly with terrorism sometimes it is not easy and above all it is not convenient. However, the involvement of Arabia in all the war scenarios that ravaged the Middle East and not only in the last 15 years remains evident.
The fact is not causal but is based on the aforementioned geopolitical growth of the Saudi monarchy on an international scale. In essence, the questionable moves of Riyadh in foreign policy, respond to a clear strategic plan, but with all evidence is failing across the board.
The main problem of Saudi Arabia it's called Iran. To curb the cradle of Shi'ism, considered diabolic by the Wahhabi Sunnis, Riad has remained loyal to the US for years, eventually shaking hands (without being seen) to Israel. For Saudi Arabia it is a question of survival, not least linked to the demographic superpower of the Persian bubble.
The Shia scarechair is a constant in the history of the sheikhs. Fear has become however obsession when Iran has emerged from international isolation, ending up being useful for the Western cause. The first step of the customs clearance occurred with Iraqi Freedom in 2003, when Tehran, while remaining aloof, welcomed the end of the Sunni Saddam, his enemy of all time. The fall of the Saddam of Baghdad, supported by the Gulf monarchies during the Iran-Iraq war but hated after the invasion of Kuwait of the '90, ended up opening dramatic scenarios for Riad: in Iraq, the only predominantly Shiite Arab state, has really materialized the possibility of a supremacy of Ali's followers, with great alarm of all the small Sunni kingdoms of the area grown on oil.
The thing was and still remains unacceptable for Saudi Arabia. From this perspective we understand the birth of ISIS and the financing of Islamist rebels in Syria against the Shiite Assad. The armed intervention in Bahrain is also explained to suppress protests against the local monarchy and above all the bloody invasion of Yemen in support of Sunni President Hadi.
Two in particular were the grand goals of Riyadh of the last decade: to prevent Iraq joining under Shia leadership; divide Syria by creating a Sunni area between the Mediterranean coast and Mesopotamia.
In this sense, the US choice to eliminate Saddam has created a huge problem for the Saudis, forcing them to invent a design that would divide the much demonized Shiite axis between Damascus and Persia. The policies of Clinton and Obama have supported this project of rearrangement of the entire region, in all probability just to remedy a scenario that is the result of a strategic error, actually created by Bush: to return to Iran, not surprisingly involved directly in Syria and Iraq alongside Shiites.
The unforeseen course of the war in Syria, however, has changed the cards on the table, forcing Saudi Arabia to hysterical reactions. Two examples on all:
- last May, Riad imposed the inclusion of the Arab League Hezbollah in the list of terrorist groups, with great scandal among the most anti-Israeli Arabs;
- a few days ago, Saudi Foreign Minister Al Jubayr, from Jordan, thundered against the growing influence of Shiite militias PMU (Popular Mobility Units), present on the front of Mosul in Iraq.
Not surprisingly behind Hezbollah and Iran's Shiite militias are Iran main sponsor also of the Houthi in Yemen.
It is quite reasonable therefore to argue that at the beginning of 2017, Riad does not have much reason to smile. The defeat of Clinton, with which he flirted throughout the Obama administration, interrupted the flow of guarantees to their political addresses. The overturning of the war in Syria and the situation in Iraq, where a strong Iranian influence seems to be taken for granted in the near future, do the rest.
In the coming months, we can expect countermoves on an international scale by Riyadh, intending to remain at the helm of the global Sunni cartel and to maintain the role of geopolitical power that it has built over time. For the moment the only reaction is the keeping alive of the Islamic State and its offshoots, not by chance and against all odds, still in relative health.
(photo: القوات البرية الملكية السعودية / web)
