38 ° parallel: the endless war

(To Giampiero Venturi)
07/08/16

The Second World War taught us to distinguish conflicts also based on temperature. We have learned to superimpose the concept of “cold war” over the war fought on the ground, the result of an ideological opposition and at the same time the mother of a permanent state of alarm.

Almost all of the traditional "hot wars" and suspended conflicts of the second half of the 900s took shape around the rules of a rigid contrast in blocks: on the one hand those who came under US protection, on the other those who were part of the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union.

A separate scheme is the case of the Korean peninsula, an example perhaps unique in terms of duration and context: the clash that, strictly speaking, militarily consecrated the idea of ​​the Cold War, paradoxically ended up surviving it; a war no longer fought but still officially in progress, linked to an armistice (that of '53) which has never matured into a real peace treaty.

The neither hot nor cold war between Seoul and Pyongyang is in fact the oldest confrontation in the world, apparently immune from any political cataclysm or simple evolution of the times. Even in terms of propaganda and language, the dispute has remained frozen over the years, indifferent to the changing seasons.

If the confrontation has remained creeping without events for better or for worse capable of putting an end to the stalemate, it is also true, however, that skirmishes and surges of tension have never been lacking and that the memory of the 2 million deaths of the war of 1950-'53 it has always projected the Korean crisis onto catastrophic scenarios. The apocalypse on the 38th parallel is based not only on the continuous threats of nuclear escalation but also on the memory of one of the most violent and least known wars in history, to date the only direct large-scale clash between superpowers not delegated to third countries.

The surreal impasse following the war of that time we are witnessing today, therefore imposes a fundamental question. Is the parallel 38 ° a page of History, the last branch of an ancient world, or is it still needed?

Starting from the fact that the deployment of forces in war on the friction line between the two Koreas is a unique scenario in size (only the friction between India and Pakistan in Kashmir holds comparison) we can respond under three angles.

If we examine the war of the '50-'53 in the strict sense it is clear that the clash is historically outdated. The dividing line between the Second World War and the fear of the Third, the Korean War was the event with which the American-led Western world has officially identified the new global enemy in communism. The end of the Cold War has therefore emptied the Korean peninsula of content and interest, downgrading the North to a grotesque fortress destined sooner or later to leave the scene.

If we consider instead the strategic function of North Korea beyond the frost with its South cousins, the situation changes. The existence of the Pyongyang regime allows the United States a permanent positioning in the Asian Pacific with an offensive potential far greater than the totality of the bases present in the other allied countries of the area. The American presence justified in the 80s by anti-Soviet logic, today takes on value only by virtue of a serious risk of a political and military crisis with possible nuclear complication, in a corner of the world with strong industrial traction. It is therefore sustainable to believe that the Kim Jong-un regime is useful for a broader strategic purpose, according to the ancient law "If there is an enemy, I have a duty to defend myself".

The importance of Pyongyang, inevitably diminished with the implosion of the communist bloc in the 91 and with the subsequent start of economic reforms in China, has again been re-evaluated in the last decade, a period of time in which Choree crises have often flared up. The rebirth of Russia and the evolution of Beijing to the rank of power have therefore turned Seoul into an indispensable square for the Pentagon schemes, whose current interest in demilitarization of the area, beyond the proclamations, is almost nil.

Last but not least is the active role of China itself, which has always been the big brother of the North Korean regime. In Mao's time, the line of continuity between Beijing and Pyongyang was ideological. Today the Chinese geopolitical ambitions invest Communist Korea with a new role, elected as an experimental laboratory for weapons systems and diplomatic provocations. Far beyond official statements, tolerating and fostering Kim Jong-un's farces offers China a thermometer of American tolerance, without direct involvement.

Russia, meanwhile, observes and reiterates its presence in the Kuriles claimed by Japan. If anything was necessary, all this reminds us that the Pacific seems to be back in fashion.

At the end of the US, China and Russia, masters of the Korean War puppeteers, they know very well that once the eternal match between Seoul and Pyongyang is closed, to return to blow on the fire one should light another.

The hot-cold war between cousins ​​can only continue.

(photo: US DoD / US Army)