The Russian perception of threats to its own security

Since 24 February we have returned to speaking insistently of Russia as a threat to European security. Wrongly, in fact, the aggressions of the last fifteen years had not warned the great Eurasian country as a risk for European countries. With the beginning of the high-intensity confrontation with Ukraine, however, our perception of the danger has completely changed, represented by a dictatorial system masquerading as pseudo-democratic.

Despite the dramatic images that are daily conveyed by the world media, however, currents of thought persist in the West that would indicate Russia as a victim and not as a perpetrator, justifying its violent actions with the perception that Moscow has of its own security, felt as a threat to its own existence. Generally, these are currents of thought that drink abundantly from the polluted fountains of propaganda coordinated by the Kremlin, almost always not checking the information critically with other independent sources but acquiring it ideologically and, often, simply copying and pasting what has been disclosed from Moscow. Legitimate position, for heaven's sake, but far from what should be an analysis that takes account of established facts, be it geopolitical, economic, historical, social or military, and this makes such positions devoid of credibility.

Without having any desire to establish who is right and who is wrong (history and the International Court will establish it) but keeping clear the concept that, in the Ukrainian case, there is a attacker (Russia) and a attacked (Ukraine), therefore, it seems appropriate to analyze the reasons declared by those who initiated this war, in order to try to understand what are the actual causes of this European disaster and what could be its medium and long-term effects.

The ideological framework

The main cause of European surprise at the new (but old) imperialist assertiveness of Russia of Putin undoubtedly dates back to the belief that Yeltsin's victory over the communist candidate Zjuganov, in the 1996 elections by universal suffrage, had helped to consolidate his democratic system, eliminating the risk of a return to Soviet communism. An impression largely favored by the fact that Russia at the end of the last century was a Russia which lacked a unifying ideology, so much so that it made use of an anthem, flag and imperial shield. To this was added later the relatively collaborative attitude shown by Moscow, with the signing of the Rome Declaration in 2002, and the opening of its own representation at the NATO headquarters in Brussels.

The writer was at the time assigned to the offices of the Cabinet of the Minister of Defense and I remember the general applause that this type of collaborative attitude aroused. An attitude that I also encountered later on my arrival at the Italian military representation at NATO headquarters in Brussels, where Russian military and political representatives actively participated in ad-hoc meetings with NATO countries, formally as equals. It was an excellent way to deepen mutual knowledge and build a climate of mutual trust together, after decades of the Cold War. Unfortunately, it was a collaboration that did not last long, since already in 2008 Russia attacked Georgia, to then repeat itself in 2014 with Crimea and, today, with the whole of Ukraine.

At the basis of everything, it must be understood that Russia is deeply immersed in the Eurasian continent, but does not necessarily have the messianic role assigned to it by what has been indicated by many as Putin's favorite "philosopher", Alexander Dugin. In his book “The foundations of geopolitics: the geopolitical future of Russia”, published in 2017, he states that “…the Russian battle for world domination is not over…” and that Russia remains “…the stage area of ​​a new anti-bourgeois, anti-American revolution…”. In this context, according to Dugin (at the time geopolitics adviser to the president of the Duma) the Eurasian empire should be constituted “…on the fundamental principle of the common enemy: the rejection of Atlanticism, the strategic control of the USA and the refusal to allow liberal values ​​to dominate us…”. Impressive and terrifying concepts for those accustomed to the Western lifestyle and the democratic values ​​on which this style is based. An imperfect style perhaps, but it is the best we have at the moment.

Given the repeated strong statements of some prominent members of the elite Russian politics, grew up professionally during the Cold War, it would seem that the "ideas" of the philosopher have however had a real influence within the country and may have provided the ideological basis that led to the latest dramatic choices in Moscow's foreign policy.

In the political debate, therefore, currents of thought from the past would have merged, which have merged to reach the present despotic ideology that invokes Holy Mother Russia as the savior of the world. An ideology that established itself with Tsar Alexander III (1845-1894) and which gave rise to Russian expansion towards Europe and the Balkans, alternating with that towards Asia. An ideology with a markedly nationalist and imperialist character and the fact that communism achieved many of its objectives helps to explain the adhesion of the Russians who, in the Second World War (called by communism "the great patriotic war") strenuously defended their homeland more than the ideology.

Geographical, demographic and geopolitical aspects

To fully understand the Russian perception of its own security, it is first of all necessary to refer to its geography and demographic dynamics.

The location of the country, a bridge between Europe and Asia, its extension, the low population density, the presence of enormously different cultures, the very long land borders and a very harsh climate have contributed to creating the feeling of danger which marked the relatively short history of Russia. Despite the reduction in territory perceived as "secure" since the end of the Cold War, Russia now covers about an eighth of the landmass, and is 60% more land area than Canada, the second largest country in the world. Extension therefore represents its strength and weakness.

The small population, commensurate with the geographical extent of the country, makes it even more difficult to control the territory and national borders. If we add to this the possible threat represented by the galloping demographic growth of some countries on its borders, we understand how over time (we are talking about 2050) the pressure can become significant. Furthermore, of the approximately 150 million inhabitants, 74% live in the urbanized areas west of the Urals, leaving the entire vast area towards the extreme east almost uninhabited (and substantially uncontrolled). An area where a few million Russians see the presence in Manchuria of something like 130 million Chinese, of which a significant number live on the traditionally Russian side of the borderⁱ. Finally, Russia's demographic heritage has been depleting over time, given that every year many citizens, mainly skilled workers, leave the country to move abroad, often never returning (375.000 families in 2015 alone).

Some studies also indicate that the percentage of Muslims in the Russian population of the future will grow, which worries the Orthodox Church of Moscow (and the Kremlin). In fact, the demographic growth of long-oppressed groups could create internal difficulties that are currently unpredictable in terms of size and intensity.

Moreover, Russia is like a large storehouse of resources, some of which are not yet fully exploited. Its economy is quite rigid and largely dependent on the export of energy resources, such as oil and natural gas. With the growing competition taking place, this makes the Russia vulnerable to the predatory appetites of neighbors starving for these resources. Added to this are the forecast of drastic reductions in exports to Europe, due to the energy transition for 2035-2050 (perceived as an economic threat), and the difficulties and costs of oil extraction, which will predictably increase in the future due to the melting of the northern tundra iceⁱⁱ.

However, the melting of the ice will open up new opportunities for Moscow, with the possibility of progressively increasing the use of new sea trade routes along the northern border. An opportunity that could be exploited jointly with Europe, creating a promising alternative to Belt and Road Initiative Chinese. It remains to be seen what capacities the country will now have to exploit this opportunity without infringing international law and without creating new conflicts. The Arctic area remains, in fact, potentially optimal for cooperation or conflict, both from an economic and geopolitical point of view, but also from a military point of view of establishing bases to support one's territorial/maritime claims along the Northern Route. The main of these claims already sees today the dispute between Russia, Canada and Denmark for the Lomonosov ridge, which connects the Canadian shelf with the Siberian shelf and which Moscow claims as belonging to its continental shelf, with implications for the Exclusive Economic Zone (read item "Exclusive Economic Zone and maritime power").

However, despite these obvious structural vulnerabilities, Putin's Russia has developed a perception of the threat oriented almost exclusively towards the West. A mistaken sense of danger which led, for example, to supplying the Kaliningrad area with additional SS-26 “Iskander” short-range ballistic missiles, even though that area is the most peaceful and quiet of all the border areas Russian.

The conviction of the hypothetical "encirclement" of NATO fits into this picture, a term used improperly since, as can be seen from the map, only a small part of the Russian border coincides with the NATO countries.

But to understand the Russian perception of its own security it is also essential to carry out a very quick analysis of the geopolitical situation along its borders.

Above all for the presence of the Chinese giant, an ally but not too much, in Far East and Central Asia it does not seem that Moscow has any particular expansionist aims, with the exception of commercial penetration (where possible and always in competition with Beijing) and the dispute with Japan over the Kuril Islands, which are located between the north-eastern end of the Japanese island of Hokkaidō and the Russian peninsula of Kamchatka. A dispute that has been going on for 75 years.

In the rest of the area, Moscow seems focused on maintaining the current borders, applying a defensive posture based on the strategy known as Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) and the deployment of a deterrent force based on missile armament and on the presence of the Fleet of Pacific (Bastion of the Pacific). (read article "The Russian naval strategy")

In this context, relations with North Korea, with which Russia shares only about 18 km of border, with China, whose influence over the Russian-Siberian territories is growing rapidly, and Kazakhstan, the largest and most populous of the ex-Soviet republics, rich in energy resources and constantly looking for a stable independence from the Russian neighbour.

Russia has an approach towards the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia that tends to keep them in its privileged sphere of influence even if, as mentioned, some countries are decisively seeking their own independent dimension, while maintaining some form of careful political balancing against Moscowⁱⁱⁱ. At the moment, even for the needs related to the war in Ukraine, Moscow does not seem to have the military tools to impose its full influence on the whole region.

Il Caucasus has always been a challenge to Russian security affairs. It is the area where geostrategic and economic themes overlap with ethnic, linguistic and religious aspects. The 2008 assault on Georgia^iv and the establishment of the two self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was a warning to the world that Russia is and wants to remain belligerently and forcefully engaged in areas it deems vital to its security. A warning that was reiterated with the aggression against Ukraine in 2014 (Crimea) and in 2022. For many analysts, these are events that could preclude subsequent further devastating and similar ambitions towards Moldova and other neighboring countries with Russia. Indeed, Moscow perceives any type of Western presence in the Caucasian area as a serious threat to Russian domination it's a weak point operating in your security area. In this context, the conflict with Turkey on the Nagorno-Karabakh question between Armenia (supported by Moscow) and Azerbaijan (supported by Ankara), which periodically returns to set fire to the area, is of particular importance.

And we come to the West, territorially represented by theEurope, political dwarf deeply divided on foreign policy and supported from afar by the US. Any discussion about relations between Russia and the West must start from the perception that Moscow has of the liberal democratic political system and of the Western economic system, considered a real deadly threat. This approach is supported by the narrative of the regime, which underlines how we are in a state of permanent competition and confrontation with the West. This makes it possible to consolidate self-esteem, trust … and controls within the country. A system which suggests that economic competition is combined with political and military competition and which therefore allows the grip of internal control to be tightened. A system that also allows any internal failure, be it economic, political or military, to be unloaded externally. Basically, if something goes wrong at home it is the fault of foreigners, bitter enemies of Great Mother Russia. It matters little if, for example, the West has not had any aggressive approach towards Russia (so much so that it was welcomed into NATO HQ), but has focused onvoluntary (and happy) inclusion of the new sovereign countries emerged from the unraveling of the Soviet system into a democratic system based on the free market.

The military aspects

It is therefore understandable how geopolitical aspects have contributed to shaping the Russian perception of its own security. A perception aggravated by difficult management of the military instrument, also due to the large distances between the two territorial extremes, as many as 11 time zones away. This has been a major security dilemma for the country since the days of the Tsars.

Due to demographic and economic constraints, Russia also finds it difficult to sustain major military interventions for a long time, especially far from its borders. As in the case of the long engagement in Syria, which has drained the already contained Russian military resources.

Few really well trained soldiers, therefore, which are indispensable but insufficient to operate effectively with modern technological means. Above all, a few really motivated soldiers, as evidenced by the Ukrainian news and forced conscription, which young Russians try to escape by all means (read article "Some thoughts on the Russian army").

These Ground Forces, with a few exceptions (troops ofelite), are ill-prepared and relatively few in number (maintaining a large army costs a lot of money, which Russia does not have) but they have to control a vast territory. In addition to the operations in Ukraine and in the various Russian military districts, there is also the need for personnel for the permanent garrisons in Syria, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Moldavia (Transnistria).

And from these structural fragility arises the need to foresee operations that develop in extremely short times. An example is the blitzkrieg in Georgia for the "liberation" of South Ossetia (1 - 12 August 2008) or the first attack on Ukraine in Crimea (23 February - 19 March 2014). A principle that was also at the basis of the aggression against Ukraine last February 24: quickly conquer the capital, dismiss its government, bringing down the scaffolding of national security, appoint a government that would ensure loyalty to Moscow and bring back the troops . The chronicles tell us every day of the complete failure of that plan.

These fragilities are at the root of the current Russian difficulties, despite some observers persist in declaring that Russia retains its industrial and military capacity intact, despite the serious losses of men, materials and economic sanctions (read article "At what point is the night").

The one element that best represents military efficiency is the Standing Nuclear Forces (missiles, bombers and submarine fleet), the cream of Russia's military personnel. However, it is very probable that many authoritative pragmatic thinkers within the Russian military apparatus are convinced that the use of nuclear weapons (even tactical ones) are legitimated only for defense and not to expand their sphere of influence with the exercise of brute force. This would leave room for maneuver for the dialectic and diplomatic settlement of disputes, even the bloodiest ones.

Conclusions

Whatever the causes, perceived or real, that have led Putin to such a serious step, there is no doubt that, militarily, the conduct of Russian troops has thus far been anything but honorable and that this dishonor will remain for many, many decades. as a mark of infamy.

The Zelensky administration may not have been transparent or honest, it remains certain that the Russian aggression has achieved the - unwanted - objective of compacting the Ukrainians around their president, loved or not.

From a geopolitical point of view, Putin's reckless action and the evident poor preparation of his Forces has caused a serious weakening (a euphemism, given that the main ships have been sunk or seriously damaged) of the Black Sea fleet, violated even inside of their ports. To the full advantage of Erdoğan, whom he thanks for the unexpected "help", as he prepares to become the major actor on the Black Sea (also thanks to control of the Straits), with all that follows in terms of bargaining power in relations with the coastal and supply states of the abundant underwater resources of the area.

Putin himself has also completely failed in northern Europe, if one takes into account that one of the objectives advocated by Dugin was “…the Finnishization of all of Europe…” while he hoped that Finland itself would be absorbed by Russia. In fact, precisely following the Russian actions, the Helsinky Parliament decided to leave the traditional neutrality and decided to start the procedures for joining NATO. Same thing for Sweden.

And what about the Central Asian area, what was the strength of the old Soviet Union? With his move, Putin was unable to acquire even the political support of Kazakhstan, the most important country (by extension and availability of energy resources) of the old Soviet system.

There is a lot to be written about relations between Russia and the West and everyone would probably remain firm in their convictions. However, even though there have been blatant political errors on both sides over the past 15 years, nothing justifies military aggression let alone the brutal treatment of the Ukrainian civilian population.

Russia, however the dramatic Ukrainian affair ends, will nevertheless continue to be an important power as history has shown that it is a country that Europe needs. The two economies, for example, are complementary. But the Old Continent needs a democratic, stable and friendly Russia.

Nobody in their right mind wants a prostrate Russia or, worse, divided into many poor and angry states, with all the obvious political, military, economic and social consequences. Despite the fears of the Kremlin, therefore, Russia's fate cannot be determined from the outside. Nor from threats (which are not the same as deterrence), perceived or real.

The fate of Russia remains in the hands of the Russians. On the millions of inhabitants of this immense country straddling Europe and Asia, very rich in raw materials and energy sources, which would be sufficient to give them all substantial and lasting well-being. Absolutist regimes and widespread corruption aside.

It is a question of overcoming, once and for all, the long-standing habit of considering oneself elected ea treating as a threat anything that cannot be occupied, submissive or frightened.

It is a matter of deciding whether to continue to submit to a government from above, which has favored the establishment of a form of presidential government with an autocratic background, which should be handled by a person capable of understanding the potential and needs of Russia and its people.

The unknowns therefore reside in how and if the Russians will be able to manage their country, in order to perceive the presences on their borders differently and no longer represent a threat to other populations, but a resource in support of world balances.