A Middle Eastern mess between Turkey, Greece and… many others

(To Andrea Mucedola)
18/08/20

In recent days the Greek and Turkish positions on the exclusive exploitation of oil resources around the Aegean have been frequently quoted by the media. The reason is linked to the definition of the limits of the respective EEZs in a very large area that was discovered to be very rich in gas. Before going into the specifics, I think it is appropriate to summarize what is happening and give some legal elements, if only to understand what we are talking about.

Those warm Middle Eastern waters

Let's start with the current crisis in the eastern Mediterranean between Greece and Turkey. According to Athens, the legal status of the Aegean was clearly regulated by the Treaties of Lausanne and Paris of 1923 and 1947. The Treaty of Lausanne of '23 ordered the demilitarization of the Greek islands of Lemnos and Samothrace, the latter close to the Strait of Dardanelles, which was also fully demilitarized along with two Turkish islands. However, with the Treaty of Montreux, signed in 1936, the right to remilitarize the area was effectively returned to Turkey. Although Greece was not recognized a similar right, Turkey recognized that the same rule should also be extended to the Greek Aegean islands.

The Treaty of Paris of 1947 was concluded between the allied powers of the Second World War and Italy saw the Italian islands of the Dodecanese (including Rhodes and Patmos) in the eastern Aegean (once with Turkish sovereignty, then occupied by 'Italy in the Libyan war of 1911, and remained under Italian sovereignty until 1943). In this regard, the Greek interpretation of the Treaty of Paris is that Turkey, having not signed the agreement (being a neutral country during the war), cannot make any claims on this archipelago. The rise in tension in the eastern Mediterranean has as its object the drilling of natural gas near the Greek island of Kastellorizo, located a few kilometers from the Turkish coast, but about 600 kilometers from the Greek mainland to which it legally belongs.

As you will recall, on May 30, Erdogan signed a Memorandum with Libya according to which the Turkish state oil company, TPAO, could have started energy explorations also near the Greek islands. In fact, the publication confirmed Turkey's intentions to implement the agreement signed on November 27, 2019 by Prime Minister al-Sarraj and President Erdogan who agreed on the delimitation of their respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), although the maritime borders decided by the two countries by the UN had not been approved. Last but not least, the signing by Athens, on 6 August 2020, of an agreement with Egypt for the delimitation of the respective exclusive economic zones, a spill of petrol on the fire considering the certainly not idyllic relations between Ankara and Cairo. In a nutshell, the political and economic litigation has gone from statements at different temperatures to a collision, perhaps unintentional, between two military units (v.articolo).

The Turkish coast in the eastern Mediterranean is in fact limited to a narrow strip of water due to the extension of the Greek continental shelf, characterized by the presence of many islands close to the Turkish border. According to Erdogan "Greece's request for a maritime jurisdiction area of ​​40.000 square kilometers due to the 10 square kilometers of land occupied by the island of Kastellorizo ​​is absolutely illogical". While this may seem logical on the one hand, on the other the Hellenic claims are based on the Montego Bay Convention, which obviously is not recognized by Turkey.

It is not the only case in the Mediterranean. You will remember the dispute over the Gulf of Sirte, advocated in the 70s by Gaddafi's Libya, which was based on a principle, among other things foreseen by UNCLOS, of historical bays, and of the right in the case of being able to trace straight baselines. At the time, most nations did not recognize the request for a new baseline because, according to UNCLOS, it did not conform to the shape of the coast.

How will it evolve?

Although the situation is complex, forced between Erdogan's desire to impose his image and the political limits given by belonging to a political-military alliance to which Turkey belongs. In other words, Turkey knows that it cannot force its hand too much and that it will have to find a political solution, perhaps through the mediation of a third country, France, which has forcefully entered the area.

An interesting statement by Charles Kupchan, a senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, who, although concerned by the situation, told the Al Jazeera newspaper that "In a way, we are seeing a direct diplomatic response and I think the French are trying to say wait, we will try to cool the temperature before things get out of hand". A commitment that Paris will not give without expecting its own personal advantage, aware of the indolence of the European Union and its Member States, including Italy. Let's not forget that the Greek Cypriots, after the discovery of the gas fields, entered into agreements with Egypt and Israel to define the limits of their respective EEZs. with concessions to the French Total (ops), to the Korean KOGAS and also to the Italian company ENI, whose ship, the Saipem 12000, was forced to leave the area after five days of blockade by a Turkish military ship.

Now the French have sent a naval group into the area, under the guise of a bilateral exercise with the Greeks, and signed an agreement to use a naval base in Cyprus. An important presence that cannot be overlooked. And the Italian government wants to do?

On which side does reason stand according to international law?

First of all, when we talk about international law, by general terms, we mean the set of treaties and norms of customary law that are established through the actions that States undertake by accepting a common legal obligation. Obviously international law changes both through the change of treaty regimes and when new and different legal norms are accepted by states. For maritime disputes, customary international law and the law of treaties play a central and constant role in the evolution of the law of the sea. On the other hand, customary international law is not always immediately understood and accepted but the so-called international customs are still considered binding as a law all over the world not because they are allowed by jurisprudence but because they are considered binding on the basis of state practice and opinio iuris. The International Court of Justice has stated that "Not only must the acts in question constitute a consolidated practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way as to prove the conviction that this practice is made mandatory by the existence of a law that requires it."

Given the above, the most important reference document is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), also called the Convention on the Law of the Sea or the Treaty on the Law of the Sea. We talked about it in other articles, but as they say repetita iuvant, "Repeating things helps their understanding."

UNCLOS is an international agreement resulting from the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place between 1973 and 1982. This convention defines the rights and responsibilities of nations with respect to their use of the world's oceans, establishing lines guide for business, environment and management of marine natural resources. The political and economic significance of this Treaty is therefore very important. The Convention, concluded in 1982, entered into force in 1994. As of June 2016, 167 countries and the European Union joined the Convention, although it is not yet clear to what extent it codifies customary international law. The UN provides support for meetings of States parties to the Convention but does not have a direct operational role in the implementation of the Convention. This explains how some issues in thorny areas of the world are still open. However, the role played by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Commission for Whaling and the International Seabed Authority (ISA) is important.

In practice, UNCLOS specifically defines the various maritime zones and characteristics. However, there are ongoing disputes all over the world on the definition of these areas that generate disputes with even military aspects. Being a multilateral treaty, accepted by most nations, it has a customary connotation, supported by the opinio juris and has valid only for signatories who have ratified it. And here the problems arise. We will soon see what will happen in this Middle Eastern mess.

Photo: Hellenic Navy / US Navy / United Nations