According to what was announced by the US itself, the CIA has predicted the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine for tomorrow (February 16). US sources also tell us that Kiev could fall two days after the start of Russian offensive operations.
I don't think any of this will happen. If I'm right, it will be easy to make cheap ironies about the efficiency of the stars and stripes intelligence, perhaps recalling the "irrefutable" evidence regarding Saddam's weapons of mass instruction in 2003 or just a few months ago the assurances given in about the resilience of the Afghan security forces in the face of bearded Koranic students.
However, I do not believe that US intelligence has caught a crab. I believe that in this case (and in my opinion also in the two previous cases that I have mentioned) it was US policy that deliberately altered the information in its possession to make "disinformation" and get something from the allies.
We know well (and I've already written about this in this magazine) that the Russians are masters of disinformation and that we are among their targets, but are we sure that we are not also the object of misinformation that comes from overseas?
Meanwhile, the Kremlin informs us that it has initiated the gradual and expected slow withdrawal of its troops to the Ukrainian border (that from a military point of view, however, does not mean that the offensive capacity of the assets already deployed does not remain unchanged).
However, communication is important from a media point of view because it has a not too vague flavor of mockery (“Since, as we've always told you, it was just a drill? What fault do we have if they have domestic electoral problems in the White House and are in the grip of hysteria? ").
Caution! The whole affair is not over yet and we may have other surprises in store, but some considerations can already be ventured.
As Sun Tzu asserted "Supreme objective in the art of war is to defeat the enemy without fighting". If Russia achieved what it set out to achieve with this show of force and was able to pursue its goals without actually taking the risks of a conflict, then surely it would be a great Russian success.
Whether these objectives have been achieved or not will be seen in the coming months. I do not believe that Moscow believed it possible to rewind the clock of history and go back to before NATO's enlargement to the East. I believe that this inadmissible request was a false purpose, put on the table only as a negotiating currency.
Personally, I believe that among the real goals of Moscow were the following:
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Demonstrate that Russia is once again a superpower that the US, EU, NATO and individual European states must confront and fear of (I would say that the interminable procession of heads of government and ministers in the Kremlin during this period tells us that the goal is achieved).
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Demonstrate to the anti-Russian component of the Ukrainian government and population that they have to be careful, because if you go from promises to facts, the assistance of Washington and Brussels could turn out to be much lower than their expectations (goal achieved).
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Block the process for accession to NATO (and in the future to the EU) not only of Ukraine but also of Georgia and Moldova. I will return to this aspect about which much has been written.
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Obtain full international recognition of the annexation of Crimea and the start of a process that leads, if not independence, at least to a strong autonomy of the two self-proclaimed Russian-speaking people's republics of Donbass (we will see in the near future how the issue will develop) .
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Hitting the credibility and cohesion of a NATO, which with Biden's arrival in the White House had taken a decidedly more hostile position towards Moscow than in the past.
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Send the message to Europeans that Moscow deals directly with individual countries and that the EU as such is not considered by Moscow to be an interlocutor representing them all ("divide and conquer ", moreover, it was also Trump's policy towards the states of the old continent and is still that of Xi - Jinping)
With the bowls stopped and when the military deployments around Ukraine thin out, we will see what has been achieved and to what extent.
On the US side, emphasizing the danger and imminence of the Russian threat was extremely useful and had some advantages:
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Distracting American public opinion from domestic issues and overshadowing both Chinese threats to Taiwanese independence and the memory of the hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan,
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Recompact NATO (whose cohesion had suffered from the lack of collegial decision-making regarding the engagement in Afghanistan and which felt threatened by the ambitions of European "strategic autonomy").
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Strengthen the relationship between NATO and Ukraine (a relationship that represents a priority of Washington, which has long been pushing for Ukraine to join NATO).
Here too it is perhaps too early to draw conclusions, but perhaps the US objectives have not been achieved.
NATO and the EU appeared insignificant on the whole, while the individual countries moved on their own (thus making Moscow's game). Particularly active appeared, as expected, Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz.
Macron in particular seemed to carve out a role of European leadership (and not only as the current president of the Union), looking in a certain sense as the heir of Angela Merkel.
The role played will also come in handy when dealing with the problem of the European Common Defense and the EU's “Strategic Compass”. An entity that is abstract for now, but which, if it were to take concrete form, would inevitably have French traction (let's face it).
And Ukraine? Zelensky's statement that NATO membership was perhaps a never-to-be-come-true dream is extremely sad. One cannot fail to glimpse the sense of having been betrayed. Or rather "seduced and abandoned". Whatever happens, there will be internal repercussions for the Kiev government and there will be a showdown that I don't think will be painless.
Ukraine is today weaker against Russia and, above all, it has realized that if Moscow moves with tanks, Westerners will certainly be generous in opening the purse strings but will not deploy their children alongside the soldiers. Ukrainians.
There will likely be a return to negotiations with Moscow, along the lines of the Minsk protocols, but with a much stronger Russia and a weaker Ukraine.
There will probably be concessions to the Russian-speaking minorities and the probable recognition of greater autonomy for the self-proclaimed people's republics of Donetsk and Luhans'k (first phase along a hypothetical and not simple path towards an unlikely independence for now). Among other things, the Duma has asked Putin to proceed with the recognition of this independence already now (but this could be a hasty move).
We will see how Ukraine will emerge.
Finally, a lot has been said about Ukraine's accession to NATO, but it seems to me not always about it.
It is undeniable that every independent country has the right to determine its own security policy (as the US and NATO claim).
However, it is not true that if a nation asks to join an international forum, this request must be accepted. For example, both Morocco and Turkey have in the past asked to be admitted to the EU, but the door remained inexorably closed.
NATO also has specific requirements that should be met by countries aspiring to join it (defined by the MAP- Membership Action Plan). Access would therefore not be automatic, even if from 2000 onwards the Alliance has often closed one or both eyes to these requirements in allowing new member countries to access (benevolence shown for example towards some countries of the Balkan Peninsula or the Republics Baltic).
However, the Atlantic Treaty, regarding the admission of new countries to the Alliance, in article 10 states: "The parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State capable of promoting the development of the principles of this Treaty and contributing to the security of the North Atlantic region to accede to this Treaty".
That is, it takes a unanimous agreement of the countries already members to invite a new nation, whose entry must be functional to the security of the countries already members. Therefore, the invitation must come from the Alliance, for the interests of the Alliance and it has little to do with the legitimate aspirations of third countries. On the other hand, we know all too well that a possible request for admission to NATO by Cyprus would have no chance of being accepted (given the inevitable veto of Turkey and the USA).
Finally, it is also not true that Ukraine's membership of NATO is not "on the agenda", as the German Chancellor Scholz declared yesterday, as if to suggest that Moscow's concerns are unfounded. Ukraine's entry into NATO has been talked about for at least 15 years. The accession of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO was widely discussed and in part promised (under pressure from President Bush) already during the Summit of NATO Heads of State and Government held in Bucharest in 2008. More recently, the final communiqué of the last Summit of NATO Heads of State and Government of June 2021 ensures the "repeated support" of NATO to safeguard the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova (Article 14) and even promises that Georgia and Ukraine "Will become members of the Alliance" (they will become members of NATO - art. 68 and 69).
It is sad to admit, but perhaps, like the Afghans already, the Ukrainians may have been naïve to trust the assurances of the US and NATO.
Photo: MoD Ukraine
