Every beginning is a harbinger of interests and curiosities; the so-called honeymoon is placed within the first 100 days, before a f replace the m.
Trump has given an unprecedented political acceleration in compliance with his electoral promises. Beyond the very troubled and unfinished approval of the team of secretaries of state, the structure of the federal government, in terms of workforce, has been the same for over 50 years, despite the fact that demographics and expenses have grown so much as to highlight the role of technology and external collaborators necessary to fill the gaps, collaborators who place themselves with federal employees in a ratio of more than two to one and create a parallel force that raises questions regarding the responsibilities and limits of executive functions.
One of the promises of The Donald consists of reducing the federal government, which has allowed Musk to lead an organization outside the government, DOGE, which has run into problems of feasibility. Firing public employees without a strategy to guarantee services leads to disasters1, also because spending projections seem to show that savings from staff cuts would be too small and would not fill the deficit; furthermore, most public employees simply apply regulations2; not doing so would constitute a failure, an unavoidable responsibility for any President, as happened to Carter for the helicopters that crashed in Iran; to Bush for Hurricane Katrina; to Obama for Obamacare; to Trump 1 for Covid; to Biden for the Afghan withdrawal. We must therefore understand what the federal government is, or rather, what it wishes to be today.
Another – unpopular – premise to be made concerns the American social connotation, contrasting with the European narrative of the melting pot, since Trump represents the deep America, that of the white, conservative, fideist states. The electoral themes are a reprise of those of 2017: illegal immigrants and blocking the Birthright citizenship3, with a temporary alliance with the business world, conditioned by the fickleness of the relationship with both Musk and the technological elite, extremely sensitive to changes in the wind and where the Republican congressional majority is not so solid: recourse to executive orders is inevitable.
In the meantime, conservatives have appreciated the criticisms addressed to previous Administrations, while stigmatizing the total lack of political etiquette; progressives have instead been struck by the disconcerting positions taken by the Silicon Valley nobility, never felt so distant on the left, and in any case masters of the keys to the future, in a context where chronological age conditions and in which JD Vance could assume a substantial importance. Big business has understood that the war variable is against any interest, that's all.
The management of migrants, given the quarrel with Bogota, for which politically there are no illegal immigrants and the feared reopening of Guantanamo, evoke new prospects inaugurated, already on the morning of January 20, with an increase in arrests especially in the major cities.
Let's change sides: foreign affairs. In the Gulf, Riyadh is entering the crucial phase of the Vision 2030 reforms and is looking to Trump, a valuable ally on one side but an unknown quantity on the other, where he can put MbS in difficulty on Iran, on integration with Israel and with, in the background, the continuing Houthi rage. In short, a political asynchrony emerges that must be carefully evaluated. Obviously, it is not only the Israeli factor that complicates the Arab-Iranian normalization, given the presence of China that will induce an American hardening in the Gulf where, since the end of Biden's presidency, we have witnessed the renunciation of technological investments already signed with the red principles in accordance with a détente that facilitates American commitments in anticipation of possible friction between Riyadh and Tehran. Pending foggy bottom Saudi Arabia weaves its network in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq; after the annihilation of the Hezbollah leadership and the fall of the Syrian regime, the Saudis are finding an unprecedented political space.
A little diplomacy. Kissinger believed, beyond ideology and pseudo-morality, that states were rational actors for which political ability is the only quality capable of allowing compromises to be found that satisfy everyone's needs and that make the world less chaotic and costly. According to Trump, US action should not be easily predicted; if Washington remains powerful and unpredictable, competitors will back down: in this perspective, the US wins without having to fight. Trump probably contributed to the Gaza ceasefire and the hostage/prisoner exchange, not to mention that Tehran could seek dialogue while Russia and Ukraine perceive changes that recommend a change of course in the conflict. In short, the Americans now seem to be little suited to more classic diplomacy, although the situation does not provide elements that take for granted that temporary successes can become paradigms.
There is no doubt that some states will try to get through Trump's term unscathed, perhaps hoping that the president will give in early. What is certain is that, even starting from the assumption that world orders change according to legitimacy and balance of power, the evolutions will be profound and impactful on American interests.
In the meantime, China is running despite starting to suffer from a shortness of breath due to internal economic vulnerabilities determined by unexpected declines 5 years ago; the US will have to capitalize on the importance of financial leverage, establishing a strong direction and identifying objectives. Compared to 2021, the distribution of power between Washington and Beijing has changed: the Chinese real estate bubble has burst and the stock indices have not responded as hoped. The different economic performances have allowed the US to occupy a more favorable position to re-establish contacts, but it would be wrong to want to win by a landslide, also because Xi is in a stronger and more consolidated political position. In any case, nothing attenuates the competitive nature of Sino-American relations, also because China has proposed itself, by 2030, as a producer of almost 45% of global turnover4.
Risks for Washington: national security in the balance; irreparable fractures between social classes, industrial hyper-concentration in China. If Xi abandons diplomacy, he will deepen relations with the US's antagonists, which will lead to a axis of upheaval with Iran, North Korea and Russia, a hypothesis currently slowed down by Beijing itself, which is opting for a BRICS+ multipolarism. Any Cold War-style division would reduce markets for American companies; Trump will therefore have to ensure Xi's support for an effective bilateral relationship and a coherent and constant government line. If Biden with investment and competition has encouraged political and technological strengthening with allies, however, there has been a lack of prioritization of goals, a target that Trump should make his own, also by raising tariffs, to protect American products and strengthening deterrence, in order to stimulate a restyling of the industrial base; even on Taiwan Trump can give his clear assent to maintaining the status quo.
What is certain is that improvisation and a strong asymmetry with Beijing cannot work, as it did for Panama.5, abruptly reminded of the importance that its Canal has for world trade, net of the pervasive Chinese interests6. It is no coincidence that in Davos almost all the participants expressed optimism towards Trump: the message was clear: no one wants to clash with the USA, also because there are no alternatives, in terms of GDP, growth percentages, attraction of capital. The problem is that while the financial signals tend to rise, the geopolitical ones are falling, so much so that the flood arrived punctually with the duties, associated with other motivations such as fentanyl or the alleged association with criminal cartels, which were followed by the inevitable reactions of the sanctioned, aimed at hitting everyday goods.
Trudeau highlighted how the trade conflict will have consequences for Canadians but also for Americans, including job losses and increased costs of raw materials; a war that the US will soon wage against the EU despite opposition from investors and Wall Street. The measures taken in the meantime will weigh on American families, according to a cut that sees neighboring countries penalized more than China.
Counter-tariffs will still be less effective than tariffs since Canada and Mexico have a trade surplus with the US: 77% of Canadian exports go to the US, so presumably Ottawa's economy will suffer significantly. It is obvious to think that, at least on the American continent, the affair will end with peace, even if it will not be a quick process, so as not to give Trump a weak image and to push the conservative candidate in the next Canadian elections. The result will be a more binding trade agreement, which will protect Canada and Mexico from further and more serious confrontations. There should therefore be no doubts about the alliances to be made.
The problem is that duties do not only penalize partners, but also affect consumers and businesses, forced to pay higher prices for raw materials. Regardless of the rhetoric, American aluminum producers are asking to exempt Canada from duties: increasing the cost of the material risks endangering not only businesses but also thousands of workers. Aside from the immediate risks of increased costs and the certainty of trade retaliation, the loss of competitiveness will have to be considered. In short, there are no easy solutions, also because the economic network remains transversally vulnerable.
The order established by the WTO in 1995 is therefore destined to decline, at least for Washington, which intends to exercise an incomparable negotiating weight; an example that is all in all dangerous if taken as a paradigm by Russia and China. In fact, the tariff barriers upset North American integration, which is also put at risk by the possible creation of other supply chains within other borders, without considering that the duties push up internal prices even if not uniformly; in short, a set of causes and contributory causes that risks raising inflation.
American protectionism is giving rise to a division of the market into free trade zones, while in the background the institutions responsible for this are being scaled down. Commercial cohesion for product prices could be extinguished if different prices were applied to different countries based on the level of their trade restrictions. The major American companies will be the ones to put pressure on the White House to find a exit strategy.
European perspectives appear equally uncertain given the political-security ties between Washington and the old continent; while not being able to resort to significant retaliation against the major ally, one cannot even imagine a supine acceptance of the American request to purchase products regardless of economic convenience. If the assortment of products is wide and involves a large participation of companies, as in the Italian case, it is not advisable to resort to countermeasures, but to try to persevere in the dialogue.
What leaves us with more than one hesitation is the management of emergencies, in light of the tragedy that occurred in the skies of Washington and which saw Transportation and Defense involved in the investigation of the most serious air accident of the last 20 years. In fact, once the euphoria of the inauguration was over, the worst reality took over.
1 Trump has proposed that federal employees resign by February 6 to receive pay and benefits through September 30, while they are in administrative holidays; however, there is no guarantee that this offer is legal, especially in light of the wages that would have to be paid anyway.
2 See air traffic; cutting or containing the number of public air traffic controllers would only increase airport delays and entropy
3 Ius alone
4 UN for Industrial Development
5 The US remains the main user of the canal. After 2023, the transit cost setting system has changed for the dual system based on reservations and the auction of available slots, an aspect that affects the US for the transit of military ships.
6 Panama was the first Latin American country to sign the BRI in 2018; the Chinese have committed to the energy, infrastructure and water management sectors
