Sad episode of the Kurdish dream

(To Antonio Vecchio)
19/10/17

Since last September 25, the date of the referendum on the independence of Kurdistan, little has happened at the end of last week, without prejudice to the repeated proclamations and threats addressed by Baghdad to the Autonomous Region (KRG), with the support of Turkey and Iran.

At the substantial firmness of President Barzani, who has repeatedly called for negotiations, Iraqi Prime Minister Al Abadi opposed the rejection of dialogue, if the referendum had not been canceled before.

The United States immediately assumed an attitude of apparent minority, well expressed by Trump's recent declaration of not wanting to enter into an internal dispute between states, preceded however by a statement by his secretary of state, Tillerson, who basically offered the full US support for negotiations between the parties lasting one year, after which, in case of non-agreement, America would support the reasons for the referendum.

The situation then plunged the 15 last October, when Kirkuk, an important oil city, found itself surrounded by an important deployment of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), special forces against terrorism (CTS) and popular militias (PMU) mostly Shiite and supported by Tehran, whose most famous general, Qasem Soleimani, director of all Iranian military activities abroad, was already at time in the KRG.

A sporadic fighting, which left on the ground some dozens of dead and mostly wounded Kurds, was followed by the collapse of the defensive line of the Peshmerga, whose units of fighters belonging to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) - the opposition party of the KRG - withdrew spontaneously, leaving the forces of Baghdad, who soon occupied the airport, the government building, the military base K1 and, last but not least, the city's oil wells.

Al Abadi's reaction was not long in the rest of the country: the 17 October was the turn of Sinjiar, a Yazid city passed by hand - it seems - after a negotiation between Yazide components of the Peshmerga and popular mobilization militias (PMU), followed by the sale of other territories in northern Iraq, which had been under Kurdish control with the launch, just a year before, of the military offensive to free Mosul.

The sale of land took place without particular criticality between the parties, preceded by negotiations and a general agreement, confirmed directly by the Ministry of Peshmerga in the late morning of 18 October.

Two days ago, President Barzani accused the PUK of agreeing with the PMUs and having surrendered Kirkuk without opposing any resistance, leading instead the transfer of territory to the rest of the country to the "will to defend the Kurdish people".

It would seem, therefore, that the initiative of the president is destined to be resolved into nothingness, and with it the charisma of a much loved leader, at least in its geographical area of ​​reference (north of the KRG).

At the sunset of his figure and the project he embodied, the renewed credibility of Prime Minister Al Abadi, who held firm hand in all phases of the crisis, appealing to the unity of the country and respect for its Constitution.

It is he, at the moment, the one destined to detach the major dividend, to whose realization contributed most of the Iranian neighbor.

In fact, Teheran has influenced not only the political leadership of Iraq, but also the evolution of operations on the ground, counting on the Shiite PMUs ringalluzzite by the on-site presence of the myth of Soleimani.

Iranian influence also needs to refer to the political division within the KRG, with the split between the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (PDK) supporting the Barzani family and the PUK, the latter close to Iran.

In this way, the bulky Shiite neighbor has also had the opportunity to send a message to Trump, long committed to contain regional influence.

Once again, the Kurdish independence project seems destined to a sad postponement, hindered by the states of the region and prevented by internal divisions.

It will be the future to confirm or not this possible prediction, and tell us if I send, as I write, more Peshmerga in defense of Kirkuk wells (the same ones sold last Monday), it is only the late burst of pride of a leadership now at sunset.

(photo: US DoD)