The American elections will be discussed for a long time to come: the country is too important, the president-elect too divisive. It was a festival of errors, starting with the most immediate ones related to the polls, which predicted a tight head-to-head1 they were then overwhelmed by the avalanche net, to end with those who had been enthralled by the narrative of US imperial decline, forgetting the sense of why Henry Luce, in March 1941, had anointed the twentieth century with star-spangled Pentecostalism.
Is the American century over? According to Joseph Nye Jr., no, but the American primacy of the 21st century will not resemble the previous one, given the evident difficulties in controlling power.
The Union has highlighted evolutions and political awareness not without their foundation, obviously more or less shareable depending on the point of view, according to what should be normal dialectics and alternation. Probably the problem lies in having to accept a result that was democratically and electorally achieved, but so unexpected as to leave, perhaps more abroad than at home, stunned. The political wisdom of yesteryear would impose an evaluation of the lessons learned, or rather a re-examination of the more or less recent past at a time, this, that is very little suited to reflection, given the cultural rejection of the past and the teaching it offers, according to paradigms adopted by those who have lost. A defeat of this magnitude, rather than mockery and anger, in a futuristic key, should suggest how to avoid repeating errors that have proven to be fatal.
The Dems will have to come to terms with the parliamentary debacle, where the numbers outline a balance of power that, barring surprises, will allow the elected president to avoid incurring halvings reserved for less fortunate viscounts. If we want to imagine unlikely scenarios, the only risk could come solely from internal GOP factions; be careful though, in light of the events that have occurred, it is reasonable to expect a more shrewd and expert Administration than the one that fell in 2020, an establishment that already knows the vulnerabilities and has knowledge of where and how to intervene more or less harshly, an Administration with a sectoral and incisive political memory, so to speak. It is hardly necessary to remember that among the senatorial powers there is that of confirm or not the presidential nominations addressed to the highest institutions, like those of the Supreme Court robes.
The Dems leave a legacy of large internal and external political fault lines, which effectively make the art of government difficult; divisions and dysfunctionality, starting from within the Union, will have to be reduced. It is essential to put an end to the ongoing conflicts, safeguarding the global trade system and adapting the international order, net of the inevitable anarchy, to the diffusion of power. But before arriving in Palestine, Iran2, Ukraine, American priorities will have to be aimed at internal economic and political recovery with the reconstruction of the middle class, the needle in the balance of polarization and social equalizer. It is important to be able to recover the private sector to allow Americans to enjoy adequately paid jobs even in the presence of technological developments such as that represented by AI. It is obvious to also intervene on a dangerously high public debt, so high as to absorb the resources necessary for education, defense, research; the social security system, at this rate, is destined to default in no more than ten years. It is essential to bridge the gap between expenditure and income, a structural rift that requires a fiscal order that, with increasing spending, offers no escape routes and leads to the raising of the retirement age. Internally, the immigration problem will have to find a solution free of demagogy, which regulates the influx of undocumented people into a country where, paradoxically, in many states, one can vote without any certification.
Foreign policy will require careful diplomatic exercise between Russia, Ukraine and the Middle East, given that no conflict will see a winner on the field and that every clash is destined to leave long and dramatic aftermath.
It is then necessary to safeguard the commercial system by adopting forms of friendshoring of supply chains avoiding decoupling and fragmentation. This is really difficult to do; if the tariffs hold politically, economic nationalism can trigger uncontrollable trade conflicts as happened in 1930 with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, capable of facilitating the collapse of international trade. The US will therefore have to be careful not to be intimidated by Chinese syndromes, because the first risk for their soft power continues to be endogenous. Free trade is in trouble, restrictions on trade and financial flows have tripled compared to 2019: skepticism towards openness to trade has affected both Republicans and Democrats. While the Dems have seen trade policy as a support for manufacturing against unfair practices of others, Trump has exalted the tariff as the only system capable of preventing conflicts by rebuilding the national industrial base and containing the public deficit3. Not by chance in one of the last World Economic Outlook, the IMF has hypothesized a scenario that warns of the risk of a trade war provoked by The Donald4, of which an effective and delineated doctrine is not yet understood.
As power shifts from West to East and from North to South, the need for a new international order arises, requiring the broadest possible consensus so that it can take on otherwise unsustainable burdens. The new order, if it ever exists, will have to be pluralistic; international politics is in a moment of crisis like the one outlined in the 30s by Gramsci, who sensed the difficulty for the new world to appear on the scene given the enormous variety of morbid symptoms. It is an interregnum in which the old order disappears and morbidity runs rampant.
That the world is changing is evident, that there is no one on Gramsci's level in the face of a star system that is as pervasively charming as it is politically inconsistent and capable only of annoying an electorate in economic and social difficulty, is equally clear. Free endorsements have not only weakened candidates, but have also annoyed voters. If there is one thing that Vance's American Elegy has demonstrated, it is that the electorate needs answers and not mere speculations, because this is what daily life requires of everyone.
The problem is that politics, in spite of Weber, has become something else. ethics, dedication, preparation and passion, and the Dem side has been no exception. Not that the GOP is much better, but not much worse, which says a lot about the situation.
Kamala Harris, a sudden and forced choice for the Dems, is not the only loser: the media are keeping her good company; the Americans have decided on their own and only time will tell how. What is certain is that, given the extent of the Republican success, a large part of the Americans do not follow a main stream in anoxia. A fact to consider. If the Dems have pointed to Trump's propensity for lying, the electorate has noted that the Democrats have not been any less, for example on Biden's health status. The problem for the Democrats has been that Harris does not possess Trump's innate ability to master the image, managing to create iconographies that can transform potential disasters into media successes, starting with the Atlanta mug shots, a powerful and gratuitous spot skillfully used by the staff, to move on to the media triumph of the bloody face of the Butler attack, to end first with the photo in a McDonald's apron in a drive-through, who extolled his (alleged) billionaire loyalty to the working class, and then leapt from a garbage truck thanks to an unexpected assist from gaffeur Biden calling Trump supporters garbage. In his mastery of the political imagination, Trump reminded his supporters hatred Dems with Harris unable to demonstrate basic skills.
Il relationship with China it is the most important global bilateral relationship and Washington is expected to have a diversified and flexible policy, which is all the more difficult the stronger Trump's maximalism is, exacerbated by Xi's autocracy; with Biden the liaisons have moved from a negotiation phase to an ideological and multilateral state, so much so that with Blinken they have reached both the definition of Axis of evil5, both to the establishment of a network of alliances aimed at containing Beijing in the Indo-Pacific. From the realistic de-risking dem to the dangerous decoupling rep the step is short, as in the Taiwanese theme Biden's strategic ambiguity6 it has become a de facto Trumpian ambiguity7.
Europe appears much more divided and weak than in the past, and the hypothesis of a sort of strategic autonomy is more present than before, in view of the feared American threat of a generalized political-military disengagement. In the MO, a resumption of relations with Saudi Arabia is expected, on the basis of the decisions taken during the previous mandate with the mediation of the Abraham Accords, the moving of the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, although the American side must be expected to demand a return result for the commitment made. The US will have to regain the trust of regional political actors, starting with Jordan, maintaining strategic cooperation between Morocco and the Gulf on shared interests, starting with Doha and the recent position taken on the permanence of the Hamas political office in Qatar. In conclusion, the MO must remain central to the US diplomatic strategy, where the approach of peace through strength remains intact.
Trump is the first US president to serve two non-consecutive terms since Democrat Stephen Grover Cleveland in the late 800s; is the first with a criminal conviction, not to mention his not very young age and certainly the most capable in riding the rabid tiger of a disappointed society that, thanks to him, could find itself less polarized. The Republican conquests in Dem strongholds tell how already in 2016 Hillary Clinton missed the suburbs and their soul labor, or contact with that same reality that rewarded the Dems in 2020 to punish them in 2024 by depriving them even of symbolic victories.
Given his style of governing, on Trump we can hazard predictions, perhaps belied by his erratic style and transactionalism; note that Trump has already omitted any collaboration with the General Services Administration, which provides the data needed by an incoming government to be immediately ready to fulfill its mandate, although it should be remembered that most of the work has been outsourced to Heritage Foundation and his 2025 project and the lesser-known transition project of theAmerica First Policy Institute.
On November 5, Americans elected a wartime president., diction politically incorrect but realistic and for which there is a lack of a generational strategy, a trend that led the Washington Post editorialist, George F. Will, to compare these elections to those of 1940, when the USA had not yet declared war on the Axis but had in Roosevelt a President well focused on the issue8. Philip Zelikow, in the Texas National Security Review, also estimated that the 47th president has a 20-30% chance of being involved in a world war. Will should not be snubbed; when in doubt, It is worth rereading Roosevelt's third inaugural address from January 1941.9.
What remains of the Manifest Destiny It remains to be seen, as it remains to be seen how little remains of Obama's politics and ideology neocons, if there is still something that can be combined with a Vision projected towards a Kennedy dream. What is certain is that the defeat of the post-2016 Dem strategy was characterized by that of the coastal elites, too far from unattractive elegies. According to Jon Ellis Meacham, the current situation harks back to 1800, when the revolutionary spirit of 1776 seemed to have vanished, unless, poetically, it is just a copy of a thousand summaries, Where only the wax remains, where afterwards nothing remains.
1 See 1880, election of Garfield against Hancock (cf. current immigration); 1828 election of Jackson against Adams (tariffs); 1808 election of Madison against Pinckney (isolationism); 1900 election of McKinley against Bryan (US strategy in the Pacific)
2 One of the first decisions against Iran concerns the expiration of the snapback mechanism of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 in October 2025, which allows for the reimposition of sanctions for Iranian non-compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
3 Despite the tariff initiatives, the US trade deficit has not decreased. Trump proposes universal tariffs of 60% to be imposed on all Chinese goods to implement the decoupling, and 10% or 20% on all goods from wherever they come from. Assuming Trump succeeds in carrying out his policies, his initiatives could increase revenue for the federal government while only partially containing the deficit created by the economic program.
4 Compared to 2017-2020, the US covers about 1/5 of EU natural gas imports. Trump then revalued cryptocurrencies through the launch of his company, World Liberty Financial and indicated his propensity for a strategic reserve of Bitcoin.
5 Russia, Iran, North Korea and China
6 Taiwan's military defense without explicit declaration
7 Trump has been pro-Taiwan in the past, but recently criticized its competitive advantage in the semiconductor industry, arguing that the island should pay more for its defense. There is a belief that Trump could make overtures to China on the island's status in the context of negotiations..
8 See 1937 Chicago Quarantine Speech
9The time has come for us, in the midst of rapid events, to pause for a moment and take stock, to remember our place in history, and to rediscover who we are and what we could be. If we do not do so, we risk the real danger of isolation, the real danger of inaction. The life of nations is not determined by the counting of years, but by the life of the human spirit..
Photo: donaldjtrump.com
