Even before the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the energy crisis, the detonator of Germany's seemingly only energy policy was highlighted here.
The detonating factor that went unnoticed by strategists and analysts was the NorthStream2, a colossal and useless work according to any technical logic and of prompt profitability, but it was part of the strategy of isolation of Ukraine and the former Soviet vassals of the Warsaw Pact as well as a symbol and apotheosis of the Russian-German union, and finally a trap in to which - both to propitiate a possible new relationship with Germany and for absurd reasons of US domestic politics - Biden fell.
Il NorthStream2 - started and implemented with German funding, almost as a challenge in full force of the sanctions against Russia - it marked, almost amid the indifference of the majority of European partners, a historical change in the German geopolitical posture, always aimed at redeeming the signs and conditioning of the defeat in the Second World War and therefore punished with the deprivation of autonomous strategic / military capabilities, only apparently deprived of a real strategic thinking.
In the last decades of the twentieth century, the German strategy was not military but financial: well before the single currency, the exchange currency that replaced the dollar, especially in the relations of European countries (even before the EU) was the mark, and the mark was the second currency in the Balkan and Eastern countries, after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The eastward and southeastward expansion of Germany which was unsuccessful with the Blitzkrieg, was conducted with the mark, which in parallel became a conditioning towards the European partners who subjected themselves to a stable currency for their exchanges; all this finally had its consolidation with the single currency, the euro as a clone of the mark (with enormous advantages for Germany).
The German currency was a lever for the construction of a renewed German geopolitical influence, and even with the single currency the solidity of German finance could almost become a risk, an asset to be played if there was a new desire in Berlin to express power.
A German policy that is only apparently ambiguous, capable instead of choosing the opportunities of the moment in an adequate measure to its own stature, from time to time aligning itself (without submission) with the United States, to manage the resources (gas, energy) of the historic rival, the Russia, to subjugate it industrially, to then trade (money !!!) with everyone's challenger, China.
Not a perennial indecision, as some observers wanted to minimize this extraordinary ballet in justificatory form, but well-planned, constant geostrategy and geopolitics, facilitated by the long stay at the top of Germany of the consortium that benefited most (in the face conflicts of interest !!!) of this conduct.
An ambiguous policy that had already proved useful (and coherent for Germany) in the case of the sanctions on Russia following the invasion of Ukraine and the de facto annexation of Crimea: formal adherence to the sanctions, but immediate triangulations and winks and complacencies in the context of the conservation of the existing and of power relations (maximum in the treatment of the energy theme, support of a Russia whose well-being is based on conveniences and not on manufacturing) which for Germany has translated into an axiom: maximization of benefits , without paying the costs.
A success, almost a strategic independence that has created friction with the cumbersome Atlantic ally but has not always benefited the European Union.
Germany proved to be the only power that could have undermined the stars and stripes hegemony on the continent, winking and showing itself willing to shake hands with the Russian power, and did not fail to make it weigh, both in the immediate future. than looking to tomorrow.
The same form and formula for determining the price of gas in Europe has been and is a demonstration of this strategy, thanks to the abdication of the other EU countries, almost a blank delegation, on volumes, prices, form of bargaining inexplicably evolved to contracts spot
The United States had understood the strategy, with great concern, and got the message: the proposal for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), launched in 2013 and crushed, in an undeniable moment of general stalemate in the negotiations, ensued. end of August 2016 by a unilateral declaration by the German Vice-Chancellor.
It was a transatlantic treaty oriented towards a balance that is very difficult to achieve, but obviously and always opposed by Germany: its failure had led to the almost humoral reaction of the Trump administration of the application of duties, and today the superimposition of the crises leads to a its inevitable re-edition, albeit limited, with less European bargaining power
Today, with the change of German government and the increasingly evident distancing from the "Merkel kingdom", a greater community sensitivity could emerge, but partisan interests are always evident: precisely at the moment in which the crisis of gas, the necessary supply alternatives are finally opened, and the European Council recognizes special treatments for the most affected states (Spain and Portugal but strangely not Italy) allowing them to independently manage prices (and therefore costs, also as purchases, since "the energy mix of the Iberian Peninsula has a large share of renewables with few interconnections") EU states remain divided on solutions to counter the surge in gas prices.
Germany and the Netherlands are opposed to measures to fix the price of gas - their traditional will - and to reform the electricity market by detaching the cost of gas from that of electricity.
Therefore, the statement by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz at the end of the recent European summit should be underlined with concern, when he reiterated that "Germany and other countries are skeptical when it comes to interventions on the energy market because supplies are put at risk and there is no sustainable effect on prices".
Voices interested, perhaps too many interested and part of that always latent anti-Americanism, aimed at emphasizing a supposed passage from one dependency to another: this is not true only as it will not be a "rigid" connection of dependence, such as a gas pipeline, and ships can be moved to different suppliers, but why should we finally get out of that perverse mechanism, controlled by Germany and the Netherlands which conditioned (always upwards) the price of gas in Europe (to the point that, before the crisis, the cost on the European market was five times higher than the already expensive cost of the little gas extracted in Italy from national fields).
In recent declarations, both by the European Council and at the conclusion of the EU-US bilateral meetings, it is insisted that the price must be "accessible".
According to the agreement (which is political and not commercial) the formulation of the price "should take into account the Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price and other stabilizing factors".
THEHenry Hubs is the reference price of American gas, which has historically lower prices than TTF (the European price set between Germany and the Netherlands).
At the same time as the deal, the Henry Hub price - speculatively rising following the deal - was almost seven times lower than the TTF price.
The reference is not mandatory, being regulated on spot prices, and the EU itself emphasizes the calming aspect, which should be advantageous for the US companies themselves and make the sale of gas to Europe interesting in a perspective of stable demand in the long term. term.
Not only do long-term contracts get lower prices than spot ones, but they can be further controlled thanks to clauses "take-or-pay”Made possible by European storage capacities, attributable to Germany and Italy.
A turnaround in contracting and pricing (the US ones do not take into account the trappings, surcharges and speculations resulting from the demagogic / environmentalist madness that reigned in energy matters in the EU, before with the even acceptable 20-20-20 and then with the follies of the 2030 and 2050 goals.
In parallel to these gas diatribes, the announcement (and hopefully the decision) of the German government that it would like to become almost independent from Russian oil by the end of 2022 and from gas within the first six months of 2024.
With this total reversal of direction, in order to prevent Russian tensions and reactions, it would still be necessary to evaluate the opportunity and convenience of on / off relations with Russia.
Not only Russia's prosperity but also Russia's survival depend on the income from conveniences: maintaining a fair level of purchases, albeit with the appropriate redundancies and alternatives, means bargaining power and control by the West, while cutting them means putting a neighbor on the ropes. which in desperation could groped for hazards (and in this regard a minimum of reflection must be made, on whether the ineffable, demagogic and unattainable but declared energy transition policy of the EU has not influenced the recent actions of the Kremlin)
Gian Carlo Poddighe (CESMAR)
Image: euronews
