Somalia, for our country, remains a "complicated" political subject. Already since dawn, the delay in national unification and the difficult capitalist development have created many difficulties in pursuit of the desire to carve out "a place in the sun" in the small space left by the expansionist nations. The constitution of a colony would have assumed the appearance of an act of power, unimaginable for a country so young and above all so devoid of significant political and diplomatic weight. It is no coincidence that the green table of the foreign officeseven today, the same players of the half of the 1800 are sitting, to which have been added progressively other competitors able to point and propose for the division of the mail. Thanks to the good (and interested) English offices, Italy had access to Somalia, in fact colonized after the Great War, opting for compromise solutions capable of not impacting the existing balance of power. Both the administration of the Fascist twenty years and that of the fiduciary administration did not help to resolve the Somali state fragility, the victim of geographical, cultural and historical shortcomings that led to what was defined "Anarchic Pastoral Democracy" conditioned by an unsurpassed "clanic" optic. The North, Somaliland, Anglo-Saxon, has managed to politically propagate more effectively what the South, the Italian matrix, has failed to do.
History has seen, at the Italian departure, the affirmation of the regime of Syad Barre, followed by a fierce civil war without seamlessness that has led to the fragmentation of power, held in the hands of warlords, and to the exclusion of elders. State bankruptcy has been highlighted by the alternative proposed by the religious unity of the "Islamic Courts" capable of administering justice and providing the population with the constant failure of dozens of governments succeeded in Mogadishu. Clanic sectarianism then clashed with the militant jiahdism of Shabaab, pointing to a military solution capable of generating wide-ranging destabilization. It should not be surprising that, in a situation of such precariousness, episodes of piracy have also long been associated with the depletion of fishery resources and the sale of fishing licenses to foreign companies, usually operating illegally within the 15 mile from the coast.
The main pirate groups in the business are in the Puntland region, with no effective control by the security forces; what else should induce us to think about is the possible link between pirates and Somali militants of the Islamic State, due to the common membership of the country. For the international community, the collaboration between these organizations is not new, even though it has known frustrations mainly due to the consideration given to pirates by the Islamic Courts, refusing to accept as ethical conduct the "armed robbery, as well as the failure to collect fees levied on the ship by the Salafis, problems that were, as it seems, with a pact which provided for the granting of weapons by to Shabaab, plus the ability to stop ships seized by pirates with a 20% of redemption. When you want one entente cordial you always find it.
Ma to Shabaab it is not just this; while North Korea has carried out its sixth nuclear test, as attested by a diplomatic note addressed to the US Ambassador in Somalia Schwartz, it seems increasingly certain that I Islamic boys have taken control of Galmudug's uranium mines - a site already monitored since the 80 years by the IAEA - in order to bring significant quantities of uranium trioxide to Iran. It is no coincidence that Somalia has decided to stop diplomatic relations with Tehran, accused of threatening the security and unity of the Horn of Africa with documented shipments of arms and ammunition, and especially because it intends to support Saudi Arabia following the attacks on his diplomatic headquarters in Iran and at the Mashad Consulate, as retaliation for the execution of Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr. Obviously everything has a price, even when and above all it is faith: the support received from Riyadh has been generously estimated at about $ 50 million in aid.
The intensification of military naval operations against piracy initially led to the collaboration of terrorists and pirates, forced to "diversify" their activities, directing them to the trafficking of human beings and the smuggling of weapons and drugs, but then reaching the 2017 which saw a new and decisive surge in maritime crime. What happened made it clear how the closure of the NATO Operation Ocean Shield it was premature, and like the Mission Atalanta of the EU plays a leading role. One of the major consequences was to induce one of the "new" players, the United States, to take the cards in hand after leaving the Somali gaming table in 1994, increasing its presence in the area: the Horn of Africa with the Gulf of Aden constitute a geopolitical area whose strategic interest can certainly not be overlooked both for the control of a pivot for the fight against terrorism and for the safety of maritime routes. By completing the short-term framework, there could be no climatic impacts, such as the current drought, capable of further dismantling an area already martyred and socially depressed.
Geopolitics still attracts somewhat to the Somali bed players: Americans aside, the British still keep their diplomatic linen and, with the new partnership for Somalia of 2017, along with other political parties involved, have established a security pact aimed at guaranteeing stability and security thanks to deep structural interventions, not least on the FF.AA. Mrs. May, in this regard, did not hesitate to ensure an effective support to guarantee material and financial assistance to support the Somali Central Bank, burdened by considerable debts incurred over the years. Moreover, it is not a mystery that the United Kingdom has taken up its dormant Italian geostrategic interests in the Horn of Africa, seizing and maintaining the initiative in the oil field - extractive and entrepreneurial.
One element of novelty could be represented by the new president, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed "Farmaajo", "Cheese", a food he seems to be delightful as a child. Strong with remarkable political experience, also gained in the USA, and its culture, Farmaajo already Premier has received consensus both for its commitment to Shabaab and against corruption, endemic evil that puts Somalia in the last world positions. Good outsiderdespite internal political impoverishment, has reached the summit of the institution thanks to a careful balancing of charges distributed according to a wise respect for the relevance of the clans. The "foreign" side has seen its opening towards the Saudi kingdom (sic!), Never so active on the international stage, tending to create a balance with the main competitors of the area, Ethiopia and Kenya on all, with the second country engaged in the realization of a defensive barrier aimed at limiting the confinement of Somali terrorist groups.
But how does Italy stand in the face of the contingency of its former colony? And most importantly, what steps do you intend to accomplish, or are you doing, to protect your interests as other great players?
Beyond the trite enunciations of rite the Liaison strategic seems problematic, conditioned by history, but also eroded and above all by one participants' vision lacking and discontinuous geopolitics.
Somalia has already turned in the past to the ancient strong mentor of a cultural and legal legacy still warned, but without receiving the due responses. As evidenced by parliamentary documentation, bilateral co-operation pre-existent with 1990, interrupted by the precipitate of the political situation, was initially limited to NGO activities, and only after 1992, following international positions, it was expressed with the opening of new channels both in terms of political mediation and humanitarianism. This has not avoided criticism of the Italian Government as a supporter of President Barre, so to provoke a conflict between the Italian feluche and some of the factions involved in the civil war.
Italy, in the decade 1980 - 1990 has allocated for the cooperation more than 1.400 billion lire, directing them to the realization of large infrastructures, concentrated productive investments, and only for 13% for investments dedicated to programs of "Institution building". A distribution so unbalanced towards the physical element has shown technological and regulatory inability that has led to the sinking of most of the initiatives funded in any case.
Italian cooperation has failed due to obvious defects in programming and coordination with international and multilateral initiatives, and because it has had the logic of national interests that had nothing to do with Somali needs. Technical mistakes, leavened costs, lack of preparation of qualified technical personnel to devote, marching errors of assessment, judicial initiatives, have led to failures that justify well-founded doubts about the validity of Italian initiatives. If the national political and entrepreneurial framework is reliant on trust, it remains the defense of the Atalanta both on the ground with European Union Training Mission, tries, even in a deafening communicative silence, to enliven an otherwise desolating image while field diplomacy attempts to mission impossible trying to prove that Italy has never forgotten its primogenous Colony or ever, really, has gone.
Together with the attempted improvement of the security and living conditions in Mogadishu and other relevant locations, unfortunately tragically opposed by the latest attacks, the EU - in a wider geopolitical framework, is trying to provide strategic advice to the Somali authorities also for what concerns the institutional aspects of intelligence. After the tragic experience of the 90 years Italy - leading the mission and with a presence of the Ministry of Defense level Mentoring and Advising - he returned to Somalia to train Somali units to fight the asymmetric threat of to Shabaab, significantly transferring training activities from Uganda on site.
In a context so rich of unknowns and where there is no recognizable line of the forehead, the task is not easy, and the training focus has shifted from the individual to the unitary plan with the intention of forming departments of the (embryonic) Somali National Army, able to operate across the national range and capable of consolidating government power over the liberated territories. The Italian "player", however, can not ignore being sitting at a table where others too competitors international and area plans to impose their influence, not least Turkey, heavily intervened on both menage political - electoral campaign with strong money making, both in material terms with additional military and training support.
The Italian commitment to the field by the institutions that, in the national context, have maintained and cultivated technical skills and continuous relations with external realities, Foreign and Defense, are witnessing the potential and "tactical" capabilities; what is missing is a real "strategic" capacity of broad British-style, free from sordid. In this sort of Italian culprit vacatio the United Kingdom occupied a proscenium that was naturally considered congenial to Beautiful country; the prevalence of the politics on Policies, typical of the Farnesina, the absolute lack of long-term vision of the Italian role in the world, does not reflect on how much naive not considering development cooperation as one of the most important tools for the projection of the strategic interests of a country, has meant that it is underestimated yet another opportunity.
The six-legged dog of the IEN left its first impression in the Egyptian desert in 1954 making its eminently strategic presence and able to confirm itself as the first international producer on the African Continent; probably the first to be perplexed for his countrymanship would be Enrico Mattei himself, lucidly oriented towards a policy capable of ensuring a balance in a hostile and fragmented international context.
Beyond the commitment of the EUTM, focused on consulting and long-term capacity building and encompassing the areas of operations, planning, logistics, administration and legal affairs, and also put to the test in these In recent days, the Somali situation adds to the chaotic management of the other former Libyan colony. While digressions are on the agenda in Rome, Italy is definitely burning its last remnants of influence in favor of other powers, much more determined and aware. Even in the awareness that the military leaders of EUTM are Italian, it is beyond doubt that Italy has put itself out of the geopolitical games for too long, losing ground respect competitors aggressive and well prepared, like the Turks, also present on the Libyan theater in support of Fayez al-Sarraj.
The fact that the Horn of Africa is politically, economically and strategically important seems to have come to light in many; that the ancient colonial nation is trying to grasp it is practically certain. The Prince of Metternich, in 1847, wrote in a note sent to Count Dietrichstein that "... the word Italy is a geographical expression, a qualification that concerns the language but does not have the political value that the efforts of revolutionary ideologues tend to imprint on ..."; by omitting the historical evaluations and the contingent interpretations that have been given to him, perhaps this might be the best opportunity to demonstrate renewed political weight and capacity. Will they be able to do it?
(Photo: US Navy / UK Government / Navy / EUTM-Somalia / ENI / Presidency of the Republic)
