The evolution of events reflects the objective difficulty of framing the contingent situation, making any attempt to project a rational reading oriented towards the future futile. It is chaos, a destabilizing element but at the same time a key to interpretive reading for a region sensitive to constant changes capable of leading to substantial variations.
In Syria the categorization in proxy war it's simplistic: despite some proxy have been classified as anti-government forces, and that the sponsors have worked to ensure military and financial aid, the civil war in Syria has presented unusual characteristics. Hezbollah has been an atypical sponsor, a party proxy in turn financed by third parties, Tehran; the Syrian Kurdish minority, politically skilled but still an unknown quantity that tries to cure the hedging1; the dynamic competition between Russia and Iran. Instability, in fact, has older roots that date back to Sykes and Picot's 1916, the dividers of Turkish Ottomanism; after the fall of the Sublime Porte, the MENA area was left searching for new balances that the Turks and Persians are now trying to impose, having to manage the new Israeli presence which has become a guarantee against imperial revanchism.
The great hegemons remain: the USA, the power par excellence, and Russia, weakened by the Ukrainian haemorrhage but which cannot afford to lose Damascus, without which it risks becoming to close from Ankara. Moscow in Tartus must protect its last Mediterranean naval base, without which, with the immobilization of the Black Sea Fleet, all Middle Eastern ambitions would decline.
We mentioned Jerusalem; attentive observers for the possible consequences on their territory, the Israelis have actively contributed to the situation by hammering Hezbollah, Pasdaran close to losing influence in Lebanon and Iraq, and Assad's tributaries. Despite their current indecipherability, the Syrian events will affect the evolution of the Middle Eastern balance, including the Gulf. It is certainly no coincidence that the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham offensive2, a team led by a now presentable Mohammed al Jolani3 and is made up of groups ideologically driven jihadists, surprising from an operational point of view, was launched on the same day that the ceasefire between Beirut and Tel Aviv came into force, with a significant reduction in Hezbollah's war-fighting capabilities, a void in the pro-Assad ranks into which the jihadist insurgency has entered, capable of exploiting Iranian weakness.
The Israeli takeover of the demilitarized zone on the Golan is inevitable, a wedge at the disposal of the new sultanate Syrian opposed by the Tsahal elite.
Interesting is the convergence of Turkish-Israeli interests, namely the exercise of Ankara's imperial influence and the Jewish interruption of the corridor between Hezbollah and an overly vulnerable Iran, hit by the unprecedented use of violence by Israel. A strategic error by Hezbollah that, in an attempt to relieve pressure on Gaza, triggered a devastating clash. According to the agreements, the current ceasefire is not substantially different from that provided for by resolution 1701 of 20004; what has changed is the strategic context, apparently more favorable to Tel Aviv, with Hezbollah that, in fact, had to disengage from Hamas and from supporting Assad. Tehran will have to carefully evaluate whether and how to resume its strategic lines, both in function of the fact that Donald Trump will presumably try to accelerate peace negotiations with a reprise of the Abraham Accords after the weakening of the Shiite territorial continuity in a Syria5 sacrificial and predestined victim of a conflict against Israel, as well as of the devastating internal repercussions within the Ayatollahs' regime in the event of a clash. An alarm bell that induced Assad both to abstain from intervening in the multi-front conflict against Israel, and to limit the activities conducted in Damascene territory by theAxis of Resistance, a measure that alienated him from many sympathies in the face of the pursuit of personal interests that did not make him remember how the survival of the Baathist regime, albeit in constant resuscitation, had to be traced back to Iran and Hezbollah, distant from the more moderate Sunni countries.
One of the key points was perhaps precisely that of having confused Assad's opportunism6 with a wise political consideration that, if present, would have made him consider differently the pervasiveness of the Iranian presence in synergy with the Kremlin, an obstacle to maintaining relations with Sunni countries interested in the Levant, also by virtue of the weakening of the vertical chain of command of the Syrian army.
There is no doubt that the Russian-Iranians had the intention of testing their strategic capabilities in the field, in anticipation of the creation of a new pole to contrast the Western bloc and the Gulf monarchies by increasing deterrence towards Israel. A project that remained such, given the awareness of the potential lethality of a clash with Israel. Turkey's return to the scene was inevitable, aware of the regional importance of Syria and determined to send unequivocal messages to the various international subjects after the failed reconciliation between Ankara and Damascus, which has always requested the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the north, the end of collaboration with the opposition and which has attempted to maintain an impossible position of strength, crushed by the lightning advance of the HTS that may have obtained a result superior to the initial Turkish expectations by limiting its objectives to a smaller area than the typical Qaedist one. Turkey's assent to the offensive, without prejudice to the ritual requests for cessation of hostilities, effectively positions Ankara as the most influential political entity in the country with which it must necessarily interface, including Russia. Let's not forget Erdogan who already controls part of Syria and, above all, the lever represented by the Syrian displaced, source of significant European funding.
The Syrian events have an impact on the balance of power in the countries in the area, starting with Libya, where Haftar fears the Syrian dynamics could be replicated, a quagmire for the Russians, busy protecting the naval base of Tartus; if a Syrian base can fall, why couldn't the same thing happen, by domino effect, in Libya?
Trump's USA reiterated that it does not want to get involved in Syria, but confirmed both its support for Tel Aviv and negotiations for peace despite a renewed hard line against Tehran.
Given the Iranian-Russian mistakes, if it is true that the reality in the coming months will be even more unstable, it is equally true that it will offer the new American administration greater opportunities for reassertion also towards China.
Just under two weeks were enough to sweep away 50 years of an unexciting government; a turning point that opens up new scenarios. Having certified the Russian-Iranian weakness, what remains is the speed of action of troops that have little of irregular and improvised.
Now is the time for transition, conditioned by the progress on the board of this tragic game of risk; in the face of the Iraqi collapse, it would not be so unwise to trust in the maintenance of the little institutionally positive aspect that exists (if it exists) in the Syrian administration. There remain the issues related to the management of the areas affected by the presence of foreign military bases, such as Tartus and Latakia, for which it will be necessary to reach negotiations between Iran, Turkey and Russia. The north-east of Syria, on the other hand, should concern (we insist on the conditional) the Kurdish-led forces.
So who will be in charge? None of the previous hegemons has the same weight. With Turkey, two players could stand out, namely Saudi Arabia, with MbS called to decide what it intends to become, and Israel, also because the economy, in terms of the passage of goods and resources, remains fundamental, as it remains fundamental to understand who can truly propose itself as a credible and above all reliable and non-erratic energy hub. If the Kurds have made a political mistake, it was that of not establishing relations with the Arabs and Israelis in time, given the inextinguishable antagonism with Ankara.
It is a question of power vacuums, unacceptable in international relations, with the upcoming arrival of Trump who, unlike the Dems, could re-evaluate Turkey as a new shore, an unprecedented scenario.
As Israel strengthens its position on the borders and the Golan Heights, Iran will have to re-present itself in a new (dangerously) more proactive guise, while Moscow will have to decide how to play its cards between Ukraine and the warm seas, awaiting Washington's moves in January.
Given that nothing prevents us from having to talk about it in the coming months Siria, the fact that the Europeans until recently were looking for a new point of contact with Assad, makes us understand the nature and effectiveness of the old continental politics, while the Shiite crescent seems, at the moment, to be close to sunset, replaced by the Anciran one.
1 Strategy, based on a mix of cooperation and conflict towards multiple political subjects
2 Formerly known as Al-Nusra Front and a former al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria; In 2016, under Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani, al-Nusra Front cut ties with al-Qaeda and adopted the new name of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. The following year, merged with other factions in the Syrian war, it became Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Levant Liberation Organization, a rebranding aimed at making the jihadist aspect more acceptable
3 Pseudonym of Ahmed al-Sharaa
4 IDF is expected to withdraw from southern Lebanon while Hezbollah is expected to withdraw from the border area about 20 miles north of the Litani River
5 To the northwest, groups directly (SNA) or indirectly (HTS) linked to Turkey; to the northeast, along the eastern bank of the Euphrates, the Syrian Kurdish forces (SDF).
6 Although Assad remained at the helm and was reinstated in the Arab League in 2023, he remained on the fringes of international politics. With its economy in crisis, Syria has contributed to the spread of the synthetic drug captagon.
Photo: Giorgio Bianchi