Syria and Libya: end of the games

In the days when a nation that aspires to global hegemony finds itself vulnerable within it, increasing the ranking of technological and health unreliability, we focus again on a theater no less relevant, the Syrian one that, due to its collateral nature, brings to spillovers that also see Italy as a direct interested party.

The meetings and conferences that have followed since the Syrian crisis has exploded have highlighted what, in internationalist terms, can be defined as yet another debacle of institutional theories; congresses which, born with the chrism of the announced bankruptcy, have in fact shown themselves incapable of composing a framework which, despite the time that has passed, still presents strong elements of criticality.

Since March 23, 2011, the day when government forces intervened in Daraa, the Syrian puzzle has experienced continuous moments of instability which the UN, in competition with the leaders held unilaterally in Sochi and Astana in Kazakhstan, Russia, more and more interested in outlining a "new post-Western order", Turkey and Iran have failed to end.

The first roughness is precisely to be found in the peculiarity of the tripartite meetings which, without the UN imprimatur, have interestedfully brought together political subjects who, at the beginning of the conflict, supported opposing factions (Russia the Assad regime, Turkey the rebels ), and in addition they led to the negotiating table (albeit separately) both government authorities and insurgent factions more or less moderate except those close to Daesh, but without going beyond labile cease-fire, a situation however marked by the diffidence of the USA, with the UN in an increasingly marginal position, probably not inclined to favor an albeit fragile political survival of the Assad regime, and with Turkey in turn not very favorable to facilitate a strategic line in able to strengthen, at that time, the Kurdish outsiders in the Syrian northwest in Idlib.

International interests have therefore led us to consider, albeit with strong reservations and with a good dose of Appeasement, the possibility of maintaining a political role for Assad even after the conflict, thanks also to the presence of pro-Iranian Shiite forces of Hezbollah hidden from the rebels, and in consideration of the invasive Turkish military presence in Northern Syria. In summary, despite the work of the UN intermediaries, and the corollary of meetings that have been held, it has not been possible to achieve lasting peace; first Staffan de Mistura, then Lakhdar Brahimi and now Geir Pedersen (photo), continued to juggle in a context made further harsh by the cross vetoes that were expressed in the Security Council.

In the meantime, by favoring a political rather than a military solution, Europe has reasserted its support for UN-led negotiation activities, both by collecting the contributions brought by the meetings in Astana and by maintaining bilateral relations with regional actors, but often failing to grasp the developments in the field in time, which bring dynamically rapid changes. There seems therefore to be no hesitation in believing content the objectives of Geneva, with a marked attribution of intervention capacity to Iran and Russia, against the huge costs of an intervention that lasts over time.

In 2019, Europe, never so marginalized, reiterated its commitment to facilitate a political process led internally by Syria and facilitated by the UN, aimed at promoting the drafting of a new constitution thanks to a Committee composed of 150 members, welcome to both sides, but with the caution not to consider the committee itself as a decisive tool, but rather as a means capable of allowing the parties to embark on a political process from which to bring about peace.

In a perfect world all this could perhaps lead to results, but in the Middle Eastern context, based on angular but objective realistic bases, most likely not; Pedersen himself warned that "alone, the committee cannot resolve the conflict, and that there is a need for "tangible progress " in Geneva and "significant progress" on the ground, a line also shared by Italy which continues to favor political solutions that are difficult to pursue, in ways that have however led to foreseeable frictions with Turkey. So many good intentions, but very few practical results.

The actors who took turns at the Syrian bedside were different; a PLO and Fatah delegation visited the Syrian authorities in an attempt to thwart any reconciliation between Hamas¹ and Syria and to reiterate dissent to floor of the century American aimed at defining the status of Jerusalem and outlining the Palestinian state; a visit which, however, does not seem to undermine the relations of the Palestinian authority with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, nor the aversion harbored by Damascus, Riyadh and Cairo for the Arab revolutions.

Another major player is Turkey, which has no interest in Western political blandishments, has already initiated the repatriation of both ISIS fighters to their countries of origin and some of the 3,6 million Syrian refugees hosted by Ankara. Turkey with its proactivity and potential support for opposition to Assad has gained proscenium, even if shaken by significant internal dynamics: the economic trend, the seismic events to which the country does not seem adequately prepared, the tax burden, the military commitments, the apparent branches that recently led to new purges among the ranks of the AM, the Kurdish problem, the increasingly strong frictions with Greece for the definition of the EEZ with Serraj's Libya.

While the US adopts an apparently more slack policy, which does not seem attentive to Iranian containment and is highly questionable from the Kurdish point of view, Moscow aims to maintain a role of weight in the area, with Turkey present both west and east of the 'Euphrates and with the Kurds in apparent harmony with Assad in anti-Ankara function; in short, a strong upheaval in which Turkey, Russia and Iran aim to define the future Syrian structure in relation to the possible areas of influence. However, a precarious balance remains that could lead to the establishment of unprecedented tactical alliances between countries once openly enemies².

Let's go back to Ankara; the weight of the Syrian issue with regard to refugees is of particular importance, also considering the electoral result of Istanbul, where in the neighborhood hosting a large percentage of refugees, Fatih, the consensus useful for the success of the AKP of Erdogan. The regime's open arms have not only closed, but also the opposition has found fertile ground to support the expulsion of Syrian refugees, also heavily present in neighboring Lebanon who increasingly tolerate them more openly. How will millions of Syrian refugees return productively to their country?

Meanwhile, Turkey, involved in the case of forced returns, aims to create one safe zone on the border with Syria, where to transfer Syrian refugees. The attack on the Kurdish population of Rojava could therefore only be one of Erdogan's steps which, against the western governments that criticized the Turkish invasion, used the weapon of blackmail, threatening to bring more than three million into Europe and means of Syrian refugees, of whom there are appreciated the avant-garde that fueled the turnout in the hotspots of the Greek islands, and in the light of the veto of Russia and China on the resolution that provided for the delivery of cross-border aid for one year from Turkey and Iraq.

Erdogan, meanwhile, according to the Guardian, he sent Syrian mercenaries to Libya to support Serraj's government with the promise of granting a Turkish passport.

It is not possible to make certain estimates about the numerical consistency of the fighters, however the substantiality of Turkish politics remains which, despite the participation in the Berlin conference, has no scruples in making decisions that, in fact, pour on other additional countries and irrepressible elements of instability.

Libya is therefore transforming itself into a new Syria, into a new terrorist hub with France criticized by Le Monde for your ambiguity towards Haftar? On the one hand, Turkey is shaking the already turbulent regional waters, worsening crises for which there do not seem to be adequate political resources, on the other, an axiom that does not always seem understandable, especially in countries where politics and war are valued as opposing activities, and where one does not consider the fact that at the negotiating table it is not enough to be physically there, but it is necessary to reveal all one's actual strengths. Provided you have it.