The referendum for the independence of Kurdistan of the last 25 in September risks upsetting the Middle East not only for the political and territorial implications, but also and above all, for the precedent it introduces.
The question proposed the secession of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region (KRG) from the Republic of Iraq: an event of disruptive importance not only for the integrity of the State, but also because it intervenes strongly on the current regional structure, son of the Sykes- agreements Picot of the 1916 with which France and the United Kingdom defined their respective spheres of influence in the Middle East.
And since (also) in geopolitics the gaps always tend to be filled, everyone at the moment is rushing with declarations and threats to support the state integrity of Iraq.
Baghdad does that, reacting immediately by closing the airspace on the KRG and downgrading the Erbil airport as a national airport.
The Iraqi parliament also voted to remove the governor of the oil city of Kirkuk, guilty of supporting the referendum, and sending troops to its urban center freed by the Peshmerga in the 2014 and still manned by them, on whose building the at the beginning of this year, the Kurdish tricolor was raised.
Not even Iran and Turkey, the main regional powers, remained inert fearing that the initiative could cause a domino effect in the respective Kurdish minorities (20% of Turkish inhabitants is Kurdish, 10% in Iran).
The Sublime Porte threatened the closure of the Kirkuk-Ceylan pipeline that brings Kurdish oil to the European market, suspended all air connections with Erbil and removed three Kurdish channels from its own satellite.
Iran instead distanced itself from the Erbil initiative by closing the borders (reopened the 3 October US), although the referendum was also supported by the Patriotic Union of Workers (PUK), the second Kurdish party based in Sulemanye, traditionally pro-Iranian.
Tehran cannot accept an independent Kurdish state on its borders for a number of reasons, including the presence within it of a significant Kurdish-Iranian minority (in Iran, in 1946, the first attempt at Kurdish autonomy with the Republic of Mahabad) and the danger, with the weakening of Shiite power in Baghdad, of losing influence over the region.
Russia, for its part, has assumed an ambivalent attitude marked by recent statements by Minister Sergey Lavrov on Kurdish TV Rudaw, of clear opposition to the initiative of Masoud Barzani motivated by the "considerable geopolitical, geographical, demographic and economic implications"Related to it, but followed last August by those of the deputy head Consular in Erbil, who announced full"support to decisions taken by the people of Kurdistan, if the result of a referendum passage".
Finally, even the US, although KRG's sponsors and historical protectors, have repeatedly declared their opposition to an independent Kurdistan.
At this point it is natural to wonder if President Barzani is just a gambler who made a mistake in the last bet by betting the entire estate (the KRG) on the table, in addition to his and his family's name and history (his grandfather Mustafa Barzani, general, was the epic defender of Mahabad).
Is it possible that none of the councilors was able to suggest a different line of conduct, was it only the procrastination of another referendum to another era?
Everything would seem to lead to this conclusion, given that to date the consequences of the Kurdish choice seem to nullify the potential advantages.
The freezing of the Iranian and Turkish borders together with the closure of the air space risk giving the final blow to an economy in continuous recession that began with the fall in the cost of oil in the 2014 and continued throughout the war against ISIS.
That of the KRG remains, in fact, an economy to "render state" totally focused on the production and marketing of oil, and Ankara's threat to close the Kirkuk-Ceylan pipeline would sink the only economic source: the reserves of the Region - source The Sun 24 hours - amount to 45 billion barrels, which rise almost to 60 if Kirkuk is included.
These elements which, together with the isolation of Erbil (currently formally supported only by Israel) and the joint military maneuvers between Iraq-Iran and Iraq-Turkey to their respective borders with Kurdistan, seem to reinforce the hypothesis of a real hazard strategy by the Kurdish leadership.
However, Barzani's game can have its own very specific logic.
In fact, an independent Kurdish state would create an interruption of the Shiite backbone that from Tehran reaches Hezbollah in Lebanon via Iraq and Syria, whose constitution the US has greatly contributed to the 2003 by delivering Baghdad to the Shiites.
In this perspective, the US formal declarations against the referendum would be the expression of a party game in which what is said is not always what we want: an independent Kurdistan, seen from a different perspective, would end up weakening Iranian influence in the area, just as the current US administration proposes.
Then there is the Turkish position with the threat of interrupting economic relations. Even in this case, the threats of embargo and closure of the pipeline may not have any real effect.
The Kurdish client is functional to the Turkish economy - Ankara is the first economic partner with about 4000 companies present - and the suspension of relations would cause enormous losses in terms of financial commercial transactions.
Ankara's commercial interests in the KRG amount to around 9 billion, recently joined by an 50 oil deal for the exploitation and transportation of Kurdish crude oil, whose benefits would be canceled tout court from the closure of the aforementioned pipeline with enormous damage to a country like Turkey of progressive industrialization.
Without considering that a unilateral initiative to break trade relations would end up facilitating the economic interests of the Persian competitor, traditionally very active in the area.
The oil card could make the difference even in the Russian approach to the Kurdish problem.
Moscow is greatly interested in Kurdish oil, both because it is easy to extract and inexpensive, but also because GAZPROM and ROSNEFT, the two OIL Companies present for some time, have invested considerable resources in the Region and would suffer heavy losses in the event of a pipeline closure ( ROSNEFT, seven days after the referendum, signed an agreement with the KRG for the construction of gas pipelines up to Turkey).
Moscow's relations with the KRG are ancient - (Mustafa Barzani - photo on the right - lived for over 10 years in the Soviet Union after the failed independence experience in Mahabad) - and to think of a sudden closure is not reasonable, given the Russian tendency to exploit situations to make the most of them.
If we add to this that the presence of a reliable interlocutor, and Erbil has been for years for Moscow and Ankara, introduces a factor of stability in the whole area, certainly preferable to a situation of progressive chaos in which Israel too would risk having a role, Masoud Barzani's bet would seem to respond to a very specific strategy, potentially capable of producing better results for the KRG than the current situation.
Perhaps only an extensive review of the current borders of the KRG including Kirkuk (originally Kurdish, Saddamized), in a federal state framework, postponing the referendum to another time, in a manner to be agreed with the Iraqi counterpart. non-advisory.
A result of great importance, which would ascribe Masoud Barzani fully among the fathers of the nation, just like his father Mustafa; for the old president who is now close to relinquishing command, a considerable achievement that would consign him to history.
(photo: US DoD / Rudaw / Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri / web)
