Piaggio Aerospace and the dilemma over the strategic sale to Türkiye

(To Gino Lanzara)
07/01/25

In full information saturation, general attention has been distracted by the American attacks, by Trump's upcoming rise, by the kidnapping of Cecilia Sala, an unwitting victim of theocratic games that were much bigger than her, as they were than anyone else. This is therefore a more than favorable moment to include in the main stream geopolitical events at Piaggio, divided between the flight of the iconic Ape towards India, an economic giant refractory to European technical-environmentalist constraints, therefore suitable for the production of the vehicle, and the transfer of the aerospace component to a direct competitor and even more detached from community contexts and repentances not very suitable for investments, Turkey.

Geopolitically, the picture that opens up lends itself to numerous perspectives that are not without interest, starting with the Turkish economy which, although in less than brilliant conditions, does not leave out the private sector of investments, even more relevant where "sanctified" albeit indirectly by government patronage, present with industrial war production, UAVs in particular. Inflation remains the phenomenon to beat, despite the presence of a group of foreign investors waiting for political-economic developments, and clarifications of the panorama that, at a distance in Gaza, directly in Syria and Libya, see Ankara on the shields. However, it is no mystery that Turkey has managed to integrate production and national strategic vision with a strong resourcefulness, also in terms of R&D, which has contributed to the Anatolian rise on the sector markets, with Baykar as a reference player who has managed to overcome the most recent and challenging field tests, between Ukraine and Syria. 

After all, any power that aspires to a hegemonic role, even if regional, cannot separate economic competitiveness from military projection in an interventionist key; here the acquisition of Piaggio takes on even greater importance, while the procurement of aircraft and know-how maintenance in favor of the Italian Defense, although it is not immediately clear what the actual motivations were that led to entrusting a historic industry of the Italian technological sector to a foreign production reality projected towards the creation of combat systems.

There have been many mistakes, too many, and they date back over time. Piaggio entered into crisis in the 1990s and already then, thanks to the Turkish state fund Tushav, is rising from financial difficulties at a time when Erdogan is not yet in power; the offer of Ala, composed of a pool of Piaggio managers, is overtaken and thus born Piaggio Aero Industries. Several other novelties appear on the stage, given by the brief entrance of the Indian Tata, from the management of Piero Lardi Ferrari and Josè di Mase, from the withdrawal of Tushav in 2000 to finally land with the white knights of the Emirati fund MubadalaWhat is certain is that the Turks already had clearer ideas and plans.

Given the situation, in addition to the subsequent Arab exit from the scene, Piaggio must submit to the controlled administration entrusted to Vincenzo Nicastro, Carmelo Cosentino and Gianpaolo Davide Rossetti. Recapitulating the events in the manner of a (tragic) soap opera, in 2006 Mubadala acquires 35% of Piaggio Aero Industries; in 2008 Tata Group becomes the owner of a third of Piaggio shares, becoming one of its main shareholders with Ferrari and Di Mase.

From a perspective from Golden Power, the Ligurian company would have deserved greater luck, not separated from a company policy more attentive to investments according to the paradigm for which one must to help internally in the hope of being helped from the outside.

Today, authorizing Piaggio Aero Industries and Piaggio Aviation, the two companies in extraordinary administration, to proceed with the sale of all their industrial complexes to the Turkish company Baykar, took just a fleeting moment, just as talking only about drones is reductive, given the quality of the electronic equipment needed.

Baykar is fully aware that it has acquired a globally certified aviation company, capable of opening up even more markets.. Piaggio also maintains aircraft engines, an important aspect for Turkey at the moment. excluded from elite Western programs after the purchase of the Russian S400 anti-aircraft system.

If a guarantee of relative stability is provided by the Turkish presidential control, another (temporary) reassurance is given by the fact that part of the shares will have to remain in Italian hands. The situation of the national aerospace industry that operates for Piaggio is more delicate, a melting pot of productivity and competence dangerously balanced in the possible and complete transit to Anatolia, as happened with Beko.

Although the national establishment believes that there is a revival and prospects, the vision is not yet entirely clear, given that civil aircraft production does not seem to bring significant revenues, unlike military aircraft production which It attracts multiple buyers, however, to be politically evaluated and which, among other things, could be included, at least in part, in Leonardo's basket.

If the entrance of Mubadala it happened in its time without any apparent broad strategic vision, Baykar presents himself as a high-level interlocutor who, however, needs an alliance with an Atlantic representative to consolidate his credibility.

The next steps are not to be underestimated and concern, in order to close the deal by March, Golden Power, Antitrust and union negotiations.

Given that there are currently no national production companies capable of competing in the aerospace sector to the point of maintaining full ownership in Italy, it should be emphasized, in terms of remuneration, that a Turkish engineer does not earn as much as an Italian equivalent, just as Italian workers earn more than Turkish ones. It would be a good idea to pay attention to this.

Photo: Piaggio Aerospace