Let's try to better understand why the Russian forces have so much difficulty in taking control of the city of Mariupol, despite often, as admitted by the leaders of the Azov battalion which alone represents a fifth of the defenders in uniform, the balance of power is of a resistant Ukrainian against ten forwards in individual battles.
We will do this by helping us with "The Eight Rules of Urban Warfare and Why We Must Work to Change Them"1 by John Spencer, a recent text2 but already much appreciated. Let's start with a fact that neither the newspapers nor the so-called "analysts" often consider: “The cities are full of structures ideal for military defense purposes. Large government buildings, management complexes or industrial plants are made of thick reinforced concrete and reinforced with steel which makes them almost impervious to many military weapons ".
At this point, let's look at the map of Azostal (opening image), one of the largest iron and steel complexes in the world, where for almost a month the Russian military leaders have been throwing hundreds of men and vehicles every day, resulting in substantial losses.
Let's take the measurements: it is a rectangle of just under 5 for almost 10 kilometers located in a south-west north-east direction, with an area of approximately 50 square kilometers, that is to say a third of Lake Como or three times the size municipality of Ladispoli. To the south it has the infrastructures of the port, for an area of further 15-20 square kilometers and to the north-west it has a marshy area that envelops it on all that side and which does not allow the attackers to move safely or easily. The branching off of the rail network on the north side creates a space where the defenders can hit the attackers with hardly any effective responses. The fact that the Russians did not attack in force from the sea is perhaps due to the fact that the forces of Kiev still have weapons systems capable of troubling Putin's landing forces.
Starting from Azovstal, we follow Spencer who helps us understand: “Every building in the hands of the enemy (Editor's note in this case, the Ukrainians for the Russians) interrupts the forward movement of the attacking force ". In some historical cases, only a few enemy fighters in a building, such as those in Pavlov's house, managed to stop entire divisions of mechanized infantry. Let alone a rectangle of steel and concrete ...
Why not just stuff the defenders into the Azovstal?
“In any other environment with a defense, an attacking army would try to avoid the enemy's strongest positions, maneuvering around them to deliver surprise blows or massing into a single position in the defensive line to outflank major fortifications. But in a large-scale city attack operation, the buildings cannot be avoided. They cannot be bypassed. This would leave an enemy capable of attacking the flanks and rear of the advancing unit ". Thus, ten defenders of the City of Mary manage to make life hell for a hundred Russian invaders.
Spencer explains even better why even the simple siege of a stronghold is not practicable in this case: "This is not feasible for forces in a city attack that may face hundreds of enemy fortifications and have to maneuver through an entire city with multiple targets rather than dealing with a single building". Think of an industrial complex with walls built to withstand bombing and hundreds of buildings, to be reclaimed one by one. The enormous extent of the Azovstal also makes it impossible to seal it: in fact, even approaching from the southeast side, where the Russian forces are stationed, is a nightmare.
Therefore, it is evident how “The benefits provided to a weaker force to occupy urban land are great. A weaker enemy can ... hide and cover himself " but also "fight" e "maneuver (e.g. through buildings or underground in civil infrastructure and prepared tunnels) ... In short, they can reduce the effectiveness of a substantial part of today's military technologies and tactics ".
In short, Mariupol is proof of how “Urban defenders can hide in any of the thousands of places in the urban jungle. They can choose which buildings, windows, alleys or sewer holes to hide in without worrying about getting caught. They can also choose the moment of contact by deciding when to attack the approaching force… They use guerilla tactics to attack and then disappear into urban terrain. And they can channel the attacking armed forces to ambush or along roads full of booby traps and improvised explosive devices ".
From the point of view of the attackers, these “They have to move along known approach routes - streets and alleys - making it nearly impossible for them to surprise the defenders. They are fully visible and vulnerable as they move across urban terrain. Despite all the technologies available to the most advanced armies in the world, in an attack on the city, crossing the road can be one of the greatest risks for the lives of soldiers ". And, in fact, the Ukrainian defense ministry declares every day that it has eliminated tens or hundreds of Russian fighters: there would be talk of propaganda, if the exceptional death of officers did not confirm that the Russians suffer real carnage every day.
Try now to step into the shoes of the Russians engaged in this urban combat: “They cannot aim or focus on enemy positions until they are discovered, usually when the defenders open fire. They won't know exactly where the enemy forces are until they close the gap and make contact with them. Many attacks on the city are therefore actually movements to be contacted. Furthermore, once contact is established from a specific defended position, the attacking forces are still constrained as they cannot distinguish if there are non-combatants in the position ".
The difficulties of urban combat also emerge from the positions held by the Russians in the north of Mariupol:
It is clear that Putin's troops have settled around the inhabited centers, finding it enormously difficult to advance through the narrow streets and rubble.
Things are even worse in the south-west: the advance “to the city center” took place all along the M14 motorway and its junctions, only to stop in front of a dense network of streets.
If the fact that the city is bagged and partly penetrated is enough for you, consider that the Russians have withdrawn, out of exhaustion, from positions around Kiev, Chernihiv and Sumy that many journalists and "analysts" seem to have already acquired. The siege of Mariupol is not near the end ...
2 It is from 2021
Photo: web / YouTube
