The August-September crisis1 - culminating in the dismissal of former Central Bank Governor Al-Kabir and the closure of major oil fields – involved the country's main financial institutions (the Libyan Central Bank and the National Oil Corporation). Since these are the only (a)political institutions that play a bridging role between the West and the East, the integrity of the 2020 Geneva ceasefire agreements and the subsequent 2022 agreements on oil revenue sharing were at risk of being undermined.
The stalemate was resolved only through the mediation of UNSMIL2, the United Nations Mission in Libya.
Since October 2, Libya has a new Central Bank governor, Naji Mohamed Issa Belqasem, while the oil fields of Sharara, El Feel and Es-Sider are back in full swing3 and the daily extraction of "black gold" has reached levels not seen in ten years4 so much so that development plans now even aim to produce two million barrels a day5.
Although all this may represent excellent news, especially for Italy which from a stabilization of the former Fourth Shore can only benefit, It would be extremely naive to mistake a tactical pause for a process of peaceful rapprochement between the parties. According to the US State Department6, 97% of Libyan government revenues come from hydrocarbon exports. It is therefore easy to understand how the situation that emerged in the aftermath of the outbreak of the Central Bank crisis, with obvious repercussions on the National Oil Corporation, was not sustainable for too long.
Something, however, is changing. The balance of power between Tripoli and Tobruk is inexorably leaning more and more towards the East.
The recent agreement on the Central Bank does not solve the problem but serves to shore up the increasingly fragile Government of National Unity of Prime Minister Dbeibah (pictured, left). Conversely, the Haftars – specifically Saddam, the dolphin of the General - after having taken control of the political, economic and even social life of Eastern Libya, they expand their influence in the rest of the country.
It is well known that the actors in Cyrenaica, through illicit activities such as fuel smuggling to neighboring countries (Chad, Sudan and the Central African Republic above all), weapons7, counterfeiting of Libyan dinars and speculation on the differentials between the official exchange rates with the dollar and the black market, have managed to accumulate significant liquidity8. This position of strength translates into greater resilience in the face of increasingly frequent economic setbacks. In the long run, the economic disparity between rivals in a context such as Libya can be a decisive factor and shift the balance, definitively, towards the East.
On November 16, municipal elections were held to elect 426 members in 58 municipalities across the country. The elections, on the one hand, were praised by Stephanie Koury, head of the United Nations Mission for Libya, as “broad popular participation signals potential for peaceful transition of power”9, on the other hand, there have been reports of serious episodes of irregularity, such as violence in some polling stations and discrepancies in the counting of the ballots10. The delay in publishing the results then sparked controversy from Saif al-Islam11 Gaddafi, who, claiming his own "overwhelming" victory12 accused the exponents of the National Electoral Commission (Hnec) to alter the results. The inclusion of the second-born of the Colonel in the dispute between West and East represents a further factor of destabilization. It is difficult to establish how much support the latter actually enjoys. At the same time, the possibility that he will be able to channel the demands of the former Greens, like his father, and position himself as a fundamental pawn in the Libyan chessboard is high.
Turkey's approach to the new Libyan crisis is emblematic of the changes underway. Ankara, despite basing its presence in Libya in Tripolitania13, has begun to establish increasingly formal contacts also with the counterpart in Cyrenaica. The need to secure a sphere of influence in the face of the huge resources used up to now, advises the Anatolian apparatus to reposition itself tactically. Tripoli will not be abandoned, but if the various militias, currently alongside the fragile Government of National Unity, were bought by Haftar, could this cause a reduction in Ankara's projection in North Africa? This is the dilemma that is pushing Turkey to diversify its approach in Libya.
Diversification that manifested itself on October 22 in Istanbul at the Saha Expo – a conference dedicated to the defense, security and technology industry that brings together mainly manufacturing companies and government representatives – where both Saddam Haftar (photo), son of the General and the chief of staff of the ground forces of the LNA (Libyan National Army) is Imed Trabelsi, Minister of the Interior of the Tripoli government14. In early November, for the first time in Benghazi, a delegation of Turkish soldiers was received at the headquarters of the Turkish forces. General Haftar to discuss “cooperation between parties”15. At the same time, in a meeting between Begec, the Turkish ambassador to Libya, and Boujwari, head of the Benghazi municipal council, the former communicated, in addition to the Anatolian intention to open a consulate in the city overlooking the Gulf of Sirte, the willingness to deepen mutual ties.
Haftar's need to balance the Russian presence pushes Tobruk to gradually open up to Ankara, the latter, on the other hand, proves to be an increasingly indispensable player in the complicated Libyan quadrant and ensures future influence in local dynamics.
In all of this, what role did Italy play in the recent crisis? Answering this question allows us to glimpse the paradox that condemns the Peninsula regarding the issue called Libya. To our economic supremacy16, Rome is the first destination market for Libyan exports and third for imports, it does not correspond (anymore) to an equal political role.
Since 2019, the year in which Turkey came to the aid of Tripoli, Italy is no longer the point of reference for the Government of National Unity.
Libya has strategic value for us; its control, direct or indirect, would allow Rome to acquire defensive depth, guarantee part of the energy supply it needs, and control migratory flows.
The rooting of a hostile power, read Russian Federation, in this quadrant, would threaten what has just been described. Ankara, despite being part of the Atlantic Alliance, is playing its own game. The recent Turkish realignment to the Libyan cause should, at the very least, represent a alarm bell.
As things stand, the Peninsula continues to exert a significant weight on the coffers of the Dbeibah government. It is in the latter's need to increase its revenues that the recent concession given to Eni to resume exploration activities in the Gadames basin should be read17.
On October 29, the 30th Italian-Libyan Business Forum took place in Tripoli. During the event, agreements were reached in important sectors such as energy, infrastructure, health and agriculture, which, by further deepening trade and investments, confirm the importance of Rome in the eyes of Tripolitania18. The same, however, cannot be said for Cyrenaica, The Peninsula's approach towards Haftar is still too timid. It is no longer enough to propose to rebuild Derna or reach agreements to reduce the migratory phenomenon19; this cannot be (only) our approach to an increasingly influential part of Libya. Ankara has understood this and is gradually changing its stance.The winning horse (maybe) is not the West.
2 Acting Head of UNSMIL's Remarks at the Signing Ceremony of the Agreement Between the HoR and HCS on the Central Bank of Libya | UNSMIL
9 DSRSG Stephanie Koury: Municipal council elections demonstrate potential for peaceful power transition in Libya | UNSMIL
10 Libya: Armed group inserts pre-filled ballots into ballot boxes during municipal elections - Agenzia Nova
11 Saif al-Islam Gaddafi is a very influential person. He has never officially held a government position, however, de facto he was part of the inner circle of his father's regime and was responsible for weaving relationships between Tripoli and the various Western chancelleries. Despite the Colonel and the favorite son had different views on the matter Jamahiriya, both shared the necessary defense of the "Republic of the masses", under penalty of the disintegration of the country. Between the two there was a difference in the form, not in the substance of the trajectory to be impressed on the community. For a long time Saif was considered, by the various Western governments and by a segment of the Libyan population as the natural "reformist" successor of the rais. With the emergence of tensions and clashes, in February 201, and the subsequent intervention of NATO, his reputation as a new face gradually faded as a consequence of his increasingly extremist attitude towards the rebels and their supporters. In November of the same year he was captured by the Zintan militias in Awbari while trying to escape to Niger. Held prisoner until 2017 and then released, he was not handed over to the International Criminal Court - which in 2011 issued an arrest warrant against him on charges of crimes against humanity for his role in repressing the protests and has been asking, in vain, for his extradition - nor, even less, to the government of Tripoli controlled by the Islamists at the time. The decision of the Zintan militia to keep Saif in custody stems from his political and symbolic importance in the Libyan context. Both because he was a potential bargaining chip and a guarantee of survival for the militia itself, and the progressive degeneration of the crisis in Libya has suggested to many of those who were initially rebels and fought to oust the Colonel to see in Saif the only possibility for a reconciliation of the country. The fragmentation of what had the appearance of a State in mere geographical expression, the proliferation of ISIS, mass migration and civil war have progressively disillusioned the various ethnic groups that make up the Libyan puzzle of the goodness of the political actors currently competing in favor of the former Greens. At the end of 2021, presidential elections were scheduled, then postponed and still not held, in which Saif had presented his candidacy however rejected by the National Electoral Commission. Both in Tripolitania and in Cyrenaica they see the son of Colonel as a threat capable of taking on the demands of a population exhausted by almost 14 years of chaos. Even the various external actors present in Libya, the protagonists on the scene, do not look favorably on Saif for the moment. His few public appearances derive precisely from the risk that his enemies take advantage of the opportunity. At the same time, simply because he is still alive and in Libya he has influence in the eyes of part of the Libyan population.
17 After a halt since 2014.. Eni and BP resume operations in Libya, while Repsol and OMV prepare to follow suit - NOC
19 Italy-Libya: Giorgia Meloni in Benghazi to meet General Haftar | TGLA7
Photo: Kremlin / Presidency of the Council of Ministers / X
