Libya in turmoil: Turkey advances, Italy loses ground and risks being ousted

While the United States and the Russian Federation are preparing to start negotiations to reach a necessary compromise on Ukrainian soil, thus giving a new shape to their relations and effectively monopolizing the already precarious attention of the media and public opinion in our country, Libya is seething. By focusing almost exclusively on the controversial al-Masri case, the risk is that Italy has turned its attention away from the most relevant recent event in those latitudes: the "resignations"¹ by Farhat Bengdara at the head of the National Oil Corporation; the potentially harmful migration crisis for the North African country highlighted by the recent Copasir report²; the demonstrations of force, both by the Government of National Unity³ that of the National Stability Government⁴, to maintain a firm grip on their respective areas of influence; the alarming Turkish desire to become a dominant player in the Libyan energy sector⁵; finally, the Russian consolidation in the South and East of the former Fourth Shore. But let's proceed in order.

The new year in Libya opened with a large military operation by the Government of National Accord. Initially focused on the coastal city of al-Zawiya, 40 km west of Tripoli, the operation responded to the need to eradicate networks of human, drug and fuel traffickers⁶, as well as in securing the facilities of the city's refinery, the second largest in the country⁷. Given the successes achieved, the operations were expanded to reach the city of Zuwara, not far from the Ras Ajdir border crossing, near the border with Tunisia.⁸.

At the same time the troops of the Libyan National Army, under the command of the chief of staff of the ground forces, Saddam Haftar, launched an operation in al-Qatrun, in the south-west of the country, near the borders with Niger and Chad⁹. Although the reasons given for this operation also included the elimination of mercenaries and criminal gangs involved in various types of illicit trafficking, it seems that it was a settling of scores between factions within the Libyan National Army. The clashes that occurred would be yet another change of alliances between the tribes Sugarcane, Awlad Sulaiman e Warfall. The Haftar clan, after having disbanded the 128th brigade - operating within the LNA and composed mostly of Chadian groups belonging to the tribe Awlad Sulaiman e Tebu – launched the anti-smuggling operation against alleged Chadian mercenaries to disarm the now former allies¹⁰ and assume direct control of a strategically important border area.

In addition to the military operations conducted by both Libyan political factions, the last month has also seen a sort of economic and financial reorganization of a key institution, the National Oil Corporation. Following the resignation of President Bengdara, the reins of the institution have been entrusted to Masoud Suleman. Although it may appear to be a simple change at the top of the NOC, the new president is making structural changes. One of these is the planned stop, on March 1, to the crude oil-for-fuel swap program.¹¹. This system, while allowing a country often short of cash to meet its daily fuel needs, has also fueled local corruption and the influence of foreign powers. Following his predecessor, Suleman will seek to attract foreign investment aimed at increasing both crude oil production and refining.¹².

The Government of National Unity, represented by the Minister of the Interior Emad Trabelsi in an interview given to a Libyan television channel¹³, also called for greater involvement of European nations in the issue of immigration. Lamenting the presence of three million immigrants on the weight of the political, economic and even social stability of the country, the minister indicated the possibility of resorting to forced expulsions¹⁴ on the model of the United States. A strong discrepancy emerges between the figures reeled off by Trabelsi and those made public by the Copasir report¹⁵; the latter estimates that there are 700 thousand immigrants currently present on Libyan territory. The actual number could probably be somewhere in between.

It is therefore by adding Libya's need to increase its crude oil production and control the migratory phenomenon that Italy and the Government of National Unity could give a turning point to their relations. Rome, in order to maintain its privileged economic position in Tripolitania and perhaps expand it to the rest of the country, must be ready to take on greater responsibilities, under penalty of being definitively excluded.. It is about balancing our economic influence on Tripoli – we remain firmly in first place as an export market for Libyan goods and soon bilateral trade will exceed 10 billion euros -¹⁶ with greater political influence. But how?

Subordinating a greater economic commitment of the Peninsula in Libya, both through direct investments aimed at increasing hydrocarbon production and financing limited to the management of immigration, in exchange for a revision of the MIASIT plant¹⁷. In summary: increase its economic exposure to Libya while increasing its military presence. Investing more and more resources in one of the most unstable and corrupt countries in the world¹⁸, without adequate security guarantees, risks being counterproductive.

Turkey, the real political point of reference for the Dbeibah Government, is pushing to increase its economic influence by inserting itself into the dispute over Libya's enormous energy resources. Emblematic are the words of the director general of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), Ahmet Turkoglu, at Libya Energy and Economic Summit last January “We have invested in the past but unfortunately we had to leave, now we plan to rebuild relationships and we are ready to invest billions of dollars in this potential”¹⁹. Words perfectly compatible with those of the Minister of Oil and Gas of the Government of National Unity, Khalifa Abdulsadek, who indicated the figure of four billion dollars to reach the quota of 1,6 million barrels of oil produced per day and return to the levels prior to the implosion of the Gaddafi regime.²⁰. When Ankara has added considerable economic influence to the already significant political authority it has acquired, it will be able to once again, through the Government of National Unity, ask that Italian troops leave their positions in Tripoli and Misurata, as attempted in 2022.²¹, maybe succeeding this time.

The Turkish-Russian partition of Libya is almost complete. Moscow, for the moment, controls five air bases scattered between Cyrenaica and Fezzan (al-Khadim, al-Jufra, Brak al-Sham, al Qardabiya, Maaten al-Sarra)²² but no naval base was granted to it. For this reason, an agreement was recently ratified between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Sudan for the use of the naval base of Port Sudan in the Red Sea²³The latter will allow the Russian Navy to station itself on one of the busiest trade routes in the world, bringing it closer to the powers already present in the gendarme state of Djibouti, but it cannot be considered a valid alternative to the naval base of Tartus in Syria.

It is possible to foresee an increase in tensions between the United States and Türkiye in the coming months. Among the various probable points of contact between Washington and Moscow there could also be the common will to contain the apparent Ankara's unstoppable rise. Italy, increasingly threatened by the Turkish advance in its near abroad, from Libya to Albania, would thus have the opportunity to rebalance the balance of power with the Sublime Door. Although the Turkish presence in the Land of the Eagles is not as pervasive as in Cyrenaica, it must be kept under close observation. In those latitudes, Ankara projects its influence through the sharing of cultural, identity and religious affinities resulting from centuries-old Ottoman domination, achieving notable successes. The area of ​​closest collaboration, however, is the military one. Albania, aware that the US umbrella no longer casts such a shadow, has long aimed at modernizing its army and for this reason turned to Türkiye. So, the Albanian armed forces are trained by the Turkish ones and supplied with the infamous drones, as happened last October²⁴. All this in the wake of the Anatolian desire to become a stabilizing power in the fragile Balkan region.

The recent Copasir report²⁵, proposing to establish a permanent NATO mission in Libya, Iraq-style, signals a new awareness of the changing balance of power in the waters of the Mediterranean Sea. Yet, this is unlikely to be achieved. There is not enough widespread consensus to push the various member countries of the Atlantic Alliance to contribute to the stabilization of the southern shore of NATO. In addition, Ankara would vigorously hinder such an initiative. It is necessary, in the wake of the changes that are being felt in the international arena and that do not represent fleeting and volatile feelings, to adapt and move from a reactive to a proactive approach. Therefore, the hypothesis of activating the safeguard clause for defense spending to which the European Commission has opened in recent weeks is welcome²⁶. Separating defense spending from the stability pact will allow Rome to reach the necessary investments to face the new security needs. However, once budget constraints have been put in place, they will not be able to relaunch the Italian presence in its near abroad without a change of approach, first cultural and then political.

Libya does not wait. In the last month, General Haftar has undertaken several significant visits. While on February 17 he went to Belarus to meet Lukashenko, on the 26th he was in France²⁷ to speak with Macron, who has just returned from a visit to the United States. If economic and military cooperation was strengthened in Minsk, the threads of dialogue were re-tied in Paris. The Elysée, fearful of being crushed by an ever-increasing Russian presence in Cyrenaica, offers Haftar an additional platform to diversify its relations, but not without a price. Paris has in fact requested both the use of the military base of Louig in the south of the country, and the release of the recently arrested opposition leader of the Nigerien military junta, Mahmoud Sallah²⁸ by Haftar's military forces. Russia, Türkiye and France are increasing their presence on the ground, the risk that this will lead to an exacerbation of tensions is high, we must be ready.

The United States and Ukraine were supposed to sign the rare earth agreement on Friday, February 28.²⁹, then the unexpected. Although it leaked out in recent days that the agreement had already been reached and that only the signatures were missing, something evidently went wrong. The feeling is that the Ukrainian delegation considered the security guarantees offered by Washington insufficient and that the Trump administration has thus decided to portray the Ukrainian president as an obstacle to peace. This situation distances, but does not close, any hypothesis of deploying troops from European or non-European countries as an interposition force in Ukraine. Recently France, Great Britain and Türkiye³⁰ they have set their own (diverging) conditions for a possible deployment of their own troops.

It's Italy? Rome appears to be against any involvement that goes beyond missions voted by the United Nations Security Council. In the background, two possible paths emerge: joining a coalition led by Paris and London, thus showing the United States that it wants to contribute to the redistribution of burdens for the components of the Atlantic Alliance, but diverting resources where it is less salient for the Peninsula; or delegating the Ukrainian question to Paris and London, more Baltic and Eastern, to focus where it is more relevant.

The greatest threats to Italy come from the South, not the East. Not seeing them or, better, not wanting to see them, will not alleviate them.