Lebanon: In Balance With an Eye Towards a Fragile Reconstruction

(To Gino Lanzara)
10/01/25

The recurring political feature on the international stage is the one that reiterates state fragility and instability, elements that determine the unattainability of any type of endogenous and exogenous balance of power. Lebanon is an unstable and clear example.

The friction that began on October 8, 2023 with Hezbollah's initiatives in support of Hamas exploded in the summer with the incremental increase in the Israeli response that led to the induced explosion of pagers, the annihilation of Hezbollah's Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, at the beginning of the ground invasion in the south; a set of factors that aggravated a political structure in the process of definitive disintegration, weighed down by a clear financial default.

The policies adopted have been dysfunctional for decades, with a weak banking system and in gray list of the FATF1, an economy without diversification, non-existent growth and very high inflation exacerbated by the devaluation of the lira and a constant contraction of GDP2. Even Hezbollah, despite its parallel economic structure and funding from Tehran3 seems to suffer from the prolongation of the conflict4.

In this context, the US military apparatus in the area, including the Horn of Africa and Oman, appears strengthened both by the effect of Israeli attacks on pro-Iranian forces, and by the dissolution of the Syrian Baathist regime, and by Turkish revanchism that has led the US, interpreters of a preponderant naval power also in the Mediterranean, up to Kobane and covering the gaps left by Russia. Even Beirut airport seems to be now closed to Tehran's projections, a symbolic stopover of the new geopolitical spaces opened up, after Syria, also in Lebanon and of the possibilities of operational extensions that were not even conceivable for a long time.

After an institutional vacuum of over 2 years, General Joseph Aoun, a candidate welcomed by Tel Aviv, Paris, Washington and the pro-US Middle Eastern group, has ascended to the presidential throne with the strength of a shareholders cartel essential to achieve the support and reconstruction objectives.

In the broader context of MENA, one cannot exclude the possibility that Riyadh will be able to find a political formula and balance that legitimises unprecedented Liaison with the Jewish State. In the meantime, Tehran is beginning to feel a decline in its influence, connected to the compromise of the Syrian corridor; an aspect that should not be underestimated, where it forces a revision of the Persian deterrent strategy, now more than ever directed towards nuclear power, without prejudice to the imminent arrival of Trump and the (remote) possibility of an agreement with the West, given the upcoming expiry of the UN sanctions.

The Lebanese problem, characterized by the lack of political innovation, is aggravated by the contrast between a depressed society and a narrow elite that protects its own interests thanks to an institutional hysteresis artfully fueled and that has sharpened the Palestinian quarrel vulnerabilities unresolved since 1948 to be added to the policy of Hezbollah, faithful to its own right detached and autonomous from the Lebanese national one. It is therefore understandable that the Lebanese political arc, except Hezbollah, has tried to avoid the spread of the conflict from Gaza to Lebanon by conforming to other regional governments and also given a manifest fragility in war especially when compared with the power of Tsahal, with a heartfelt greeting to pan-Arab solidarity regarding Palestine. All this considering the fact that Hezbollah, despite being part of the Lebanese political constellation, remains militarily autonomous and surpassed by Israel in the number and nature of its attacks, such as the one that led to the elimination of Saleh al-Arouri, leader of Hamas, in the southern outskirts of Beirut, an area traditionally under the security cover of the Party of God.

After a two-year stalemate and 12 failed attempts, a military man was elected, the army commander Joseph Aoun, a Maronite, who managed to prevail in the second round, despite being hindered for a long time by Hezbollah, now more than ever weakened by the blows of the Merkava Israelis. As a military man, the fifth in the history of Beirut elected to the presidency, Aoun, supported by his reputation for incorruptible integrity, has gathered a heartfelt popular consensus, overcoming the obstacle of Article 49 of the Constitution5 and following the implementation of the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah to be renewed on January 25, an agreement that the Lebanese army is monitoring. A turning point for the election, on January 8, the withdrawal from the electoral race of former Interior Minister Suleiman Frangieh occurred6, supported by Hezbollah and the Amal Movement and which provided, in a Saudi key, its support to Aoun. In fact, Frangieh's step back, in highlighting the weakening of Hezbollah, has brought back to the fore the effective US political pressure and the hoped-for opening of credit (in all senses) of Riyadh.

In his acceptance speech, Aoun wanted to focus on the reconstruction of the country7 but, above all, on the (difficult) promise to bring all weapons, including those of Hezbollah, back to exclusive control of the army, therefore under the mandate of the State. Another key issue is to be able to receive a financial aid package from the IMF.

There is no doubt that the problems inherent to war efficiency are significant but, in a future perspective, it is equally important that the new leadership be allowed to internally reform the political system in order to both avoid the repetition of unjustified parliamentary abstentions at the time of voting and to be able to review a confessionalism that is unable to guarantee an equanimity that prevents exclusions, a need now even more felt with the fall of Syria. Aoun therefore does not have much time, he must proceed with the consultations for the nomination of the government and must guarantee the maintenance of the ceasefire aiming at the reconstruction of the State, taking into account that Hezbollah has seen its ability to impose its will paralyzed despite the efforts made by the new secretary general, Na'im Qassem, evidently unaware of the fact that the Party of God has been able to do little against the IDF.

With Trump coming in, if Hezbollah were to impose Shiite boycotts on the government, it would create an unsolvable crisis that no one now wants to be responsible for, since no Sunni prime minister wants to lose support for backing Hezbollah, while also being supported by mainly Christian FAs. If the rich Gulf states were to see renewed Shiite control, as is obvious to expect, no aid would reach Beirut.

1 Financial Action Task Force

2 The responsibility lies with Hezbollah, which wanted the default as a challenge to the world's financial institutions. Lebanon has illegally blocked the bank accounts of all citizens with a deposit in hard currency but at the same time has not taken any measures to prevent the flight of capital abroad.

3 There seems to be a debate going on in Iran about the money spent on the regional strategy. The cleric Mohammed Shariati Dehghan, was quoted by the NYT as calling for a new approach that prioritizes building alliances with countries instead of supporting militant groups and redirecting money and resources to the Iranian people. It therefore seems unlikely that the Iranians will intervene to rebuild the Shiite areas of Lebanon.

4 An article from L'Orient-Le Jour reports how the branches of al-Qard al-Hassan (the benevolent loan), a non-profit credit institution that has provided loans of about $4,3 billion since 1983, suffered damage from the bombing of Tel Aviv, so much so that the actual size of its gold reserves is unclear. The Martyrs Foundation, which supports the families of the fallen and provides education in Shiite areas, is also absorbed by huge financial problems

5 It prohibits serving government employees and members of the FA from running for president unless they obtain a two-thirds majority of the vote. Aoun therefore needed a minimum of 86 parliamentary votes and not just a simple majority (65).

6 Elias al-Baysari, acting head of Lebanon's General Security Agency, stepped down shortly thereafter.

7 Estimated, according to the World Bank, at no less than 9 billion dollars

Photo: IDF