Azerbaijan towards BRICS membership: multi-vector strategic line in foreign policy?

The day following Russian President Vladimir Putin's state visit to Azerbaijan¹, Baku formally submitted its application to join the BRICS², a group of countries united by a rapidly growing economic sector which came together officially in 2009, with the aim of encouraging the rise of the so-called "economies of the global south".

Azerbaijan's candidacy comes in a phase of profound renewal and expansion of the BRICS, which from 1 January 2024 went from five to eleven members thanks to the inclusion of Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates . A geoeconomic aggregate which - above all thanks to the founding powers Brazil, Russia, India, China and since 2010 South Africa - today represents over 42% of the world population, 25% of the total extension of the Earth, 20% of the world GDP and over 15% of international trade.³

From this perspective, the entry of Azerbaijan opens up even more interesting economic prospects, not only because of the huge production of gas and oil which has allowed the West to control the prices of hydrocarbons following the sanctions against Russia for via the Ukrainian invasion⁴, but also for the market prospects in the sector green⁵ and in the infrastructural field: the redevelopment, demining and reconstruction projects of the economic region of Karabakh are progressing, over which Azerbaijan restored its territorial sovereignty in September 2023 following thirty years of Armenian occupation⁶.

For most commentators, the Azerbaijani move is to be understood as a further distancing of Baku from the Western orbit and even more so from the European Union, with which relations have been rather fluctuating and not without tensions over the last five years.⁷, despite the generous memoranda for the supply of hydrocarbons (potentially to be doubled by 2027) signed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and President of the European Commission Ursula Von der Leyen in July 2022⁸.

However, to an expert eye attentive to the dynamics that characterize the Southern Caucasus, the issue appears very different and complex.

In fact, there are numerous events that show how in reality Azerbaijan immediately entered a very specific foreign policy trajectory, based on multi-vectorality and the strategic continuation of alliances, partnerships and relations aimed at pursuing the mere national interest of the country. This is on the model of multiple states in the region and also ethnic Turks - Kazakhstan first and foremost, a champion of multi-vectorality from the Nazarbaev presidency up to the current Toqaev administration, skilled in juggling Russian closeness, the Soviet past, Chinese influence and the need for funds and Western investments⁹.

Since the Soviet collapse, Azerbaijan has in fact attempted with all its strength to emerge from the abyss of the political and economic crisis by projecting itself towards the creation of stability and reliability on the internal level, and greater credibility on the external level. It was according to this logic that the famous “Əsrin müqaviləsi”, the “Agreement of the Century”, was signed on 20 September 1994, through which the then president Heydar Aliyev granted the joint development of the three oil fields of Azeri, Chirag and Guneshli (in the Caspian Sea 90 km east of Baku) to 13 major international oil companies, representing eight countries¹⁰.

No less important, the rise on the international level and above all the creation of a mutual relationship of trust and collaboration with the United States have passed through intense diplomatic work carried out by figures such as Hafiz Pashayev¹¹, the first ambassador of independent Azerbaijan to Washington, subsequently assisted by entrepreneurs, diplomats, state representatives and young students who for the first time had the opportunity to educate themselves in the West and make Azerbaijani culture known in university circles.

If the Karabakh wars have at times inclined the relationship with the United States - in which the majority of the Armenian diaspora is present and, consequently, has a considerable weight in terms of votes in the US presidential elections and beyond - and recently also with the European Union for the ambiguous and sometimes hostile French attitude declared in favor of Armenia (see, lastly, the strategic partnership signed with Paris, which will allow Yerevan to purchase radar Ground Master with missiles Mistral 3 and night vision goggles¹²), the strategic partnership with the West has been strengthened thanks to the infrastructure project of Middle Corridor, median corridor of a multimodal nature strongly desired by the European Union to provide an alternative transit to Russia and connect the Old Continent to China through Central Asia, the Caspian, the Southern Caucasus and finally Turkey. A passage that is not limited to the transport of gas and oil, but which includes roads, ports, railways and latest generation infrastructure and possibly green, able to make Azerbaijan the link that is no longer just cultural but also material between East and West¹³.

On the regional and eastern fronts, Azerbaijan is not only among the most active members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, but rather it is part of multiple geopolitical and institutional structures: a strategic alliance with Russia, with which decades of history are shared due to Soviet membership and friendly relations inherited from personal relationships between the respective national leaders; moderate opening towards China, willing to invest in infrastructure where the European Union funds for Middle Corridor they are often more aspirational than concrete; brotherhood with the Central Asian countries of Turkish ethnicity (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan in particular, which have not held back with funding for schools and infrastructures in the Karabakh region), with which it shares the presence of the Organization of Turkish States and in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as dialogue partners; trilateral partnership with Türkiye and Pakistan, with a view to counterweighting foreign powers active in the Southern Caucasus¹⁴.

Last but not least, the strategic alliance with neighboring Turkey, to which Azerbaijan is linked for cultural, ethnic and above all military reasons, is no less important. Hence the expression “bir millət, iki dövlət” – “one nation, two states”¹⁵ – attributed to the former president of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev, who defines the fraternal nature of relations between Ankara and Baku (an expression also expressed by Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself last December 10, 2020 in Baku during the celebrations of the triumph Azerbaijani over Armenia in the Second Karabakh War). However, it is an alliance based on a clear return to the past, according to which the foundation of the management of regional dynamics should lie in the passage through the Turkish "Sublime Porte" which would connect, passing through Azerbaijan, Turkey to the peoples Turkic speakers of Central Asia. Support for Azerbaijan also lies in this: Turkish people, guarantor of Ankara's energy security, gateway to Caspian and Central Asian resources, politically stable. Proof of the fact that Erdoğan's panturanic narrative has made Azerbaijan functional to Ankara's foreign policy with President Aliyev guarantor of this rhetoric¹⁶, The Turkish-Azeri desire to open the controversial Zangezur corridor, wedged between Armenia and Turkey and recently omitted from the essential points for Baku for the purposes of signing a peace treaty with Armenia, must be read from this perspective¹⁷.

Therefore, interpreting Azerbaijan's entry into the BRICS in light of a possible deterioration in relations with the West (or, even, a break in relations with Washington and Brussels in favor of a turn towards Russia) is totally misleading as well as incorrect and far from the dynamics that characterize the foreign policy of the countries of the Southern Caucasus (Georgia and Armenia included). Rather, Azerbaijan's aspiration to be part of the club of emerging powers reflects thirty years of strategic multi-vectorality aimed at positioning the country in a geoeconomically advantageous position, reflecting the growing regional and international weight that goes beyond that of a mere oil producer.