Iraqi "restoration"

(To Enrico Baviera)
26/10/17

Ten days after the Iraqi central government's offensive for re-occupying the important Kirkuk oil town, Baghdad's military operations continue to restart in the territories still controlled by the Kurdistan Autonomous Region (KRG).

In the past few days, trooping of troops and mass movements along the main rotables have followed in all the controversial areas of the region.

On October 24, Peshmerga rejected a second attack on Shiite popular militias (PMU) in Mackmour, south-east of Erbil, after the lucky one that was launched ten days earlier for Kirkuk's recapture; on the same day, the local press reported further clashes near Rabia, northwest of Mosul.

Also yesterday, pro-Iranian pan-Arabian TV at the Mayadin reported armed clashes in Iraq's north-western border Syria, between Kurdish-Iraqi forces and loyalist forces in Baghdad (mostly Iranian pro-Iranian militants Hashd Shaabi); similar events occurred in some border areas with Iran and in Sinjiar, southeast of Mosul, an important center of Yazida culture, where fighters of the majority Shiite mobilization units (PMU) would open fire against the Kurdish forces .

As we write, according to the Kurdish head RUDAW, the portion of "contended" territory in the hands of the Kurds has decreased by about 40%; a trend that he promises to continue, given the speed with which the opposing team can rely on numerous regular units (ISFs), Special Forces Counter Terrorism (CTS) and many popular Shi'ite militias, many of whom equipped with equipment, weapons and US production media (there are unconfirmed news of at least a dozen M1 tanks Abrams Books destroyed by Peshmerga).

In the face of these sporadic outbreaks of lightning, however, there is a clear impression that a negotiation process for the rapid return of land between the parties is in place in order to bring the situation back quo ante the 2003, the year of the Second Gulf War and Saddam's deportation.

In this framework, the transfer of deliveries between Kurds and Iraqis, which had to be wounded last week, at Mosul Dam, should be placed.

It is precisely the US weapons and equipment used by the loyalist forces of Baghdad and the unwillingness of Washington to the independent cause, to shout leadership KRG policy to "American betrayal"; even though leadership is becoming more and more difficult to speak.

Old Masoud Barzani lost the little credibility he had regained with the 25 September referendum, closed as it is in the magical circle of his family that monopolizes much of the region's political and military offices.

The remoteness of his party, the PDK, by the two main opposition forces, PUK and GORRAN, is now abysmal, with repeated requests for resignations (and elections) put forward by many parties, even if it is yesterday's news of the postponement of 8 months of the KRG administrative elections (1 would have to be held next November).

The severity of the current political crisis is also reflected in the first "collapse" of the granite referendum front, and takes the form of a substantial political willingness of Erbil to "freeze" the outcome of the urns to the full benefit of a renewed dialogue with Baghdad, on the basis of the Constitution (a request that was readily forwarded to the sender).

The will of Prime Minister Al Abadi to punish Barzani for the referendum initiative appears clear and determined, even if it involves a harsh lesson to the population that supported the referendum.

It also has a double value: on the level of national pride, for the drastic resizing of regional borders in a form that clearly rejects the ethnic demands that had motivated its expansion over the last few years; on the political level, considering the strategy in place, aimed at overthrowing the current Kurdish leadership and crumbling the cohesion of the main parties, now more than ever divided among them.

On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the political and military crisis between Baghdad and KRG has in no way conditioned the maintenance of economic and trade relations with the main players Regional (business as usual).

During this period, Erbil continued to deal with important Moscow economic relations that resulted in the conclusion of agreements and contracts of particular importance.

Following the agreement signed in September this week, the Russian Oil Company Rosneft has consolidated its leadership position in the field of oil exploitation in the region, ensuring 60% of the crude oil flow of KRG's most important pipeline and, continuing to talk directly with Erbil, by acquiring the rights to exploit additional 5 mining sites.

Baghdad is also being made to make the most of the huge oil reserves, third parties in the world, and it does so with Saudi Arabia's (Sunni) Saudi Arabia's trip to Shi'ite Al-Abadi (Shiite), aimed at activating new forms of cooperation between two states, major OPEC producers.

In the coming months, it will be particularly interesting to see how Baghdad will be able to reconcile relations with Riad with the usual ones that bind it to the powerful Iranian. And as Moscow will react when, at the end of this crisis, Prime Minister Al Abadi has resumed full control over Iraqi oil production, including those areas such as Kirkuk, which had previously undergone Erbil control.

(photo: KRSC)