The mutation: al-Qaeda in Syria

The conflict in Syria is more and more reminiscent of a European war by Antico Regime, characterized by continuous reversals in the face and opportunistic alliances. In some previous articles an attempt has been made to shed light on who the main actors of this war are and how, Islamist terrorism, has gained credit and strength compared to the original formations that shaped the backbone of the Free Syrian Army. The power relations between the two main Islamist components, the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, have gone through alternating moments, especially when Jahbat al-Nusra tried to impose itself as an alternative choice to al-Baghdadi. Between ISIS and al-Qaeda there was a relationship built on the logic of convenience or open hostility, especially when territories to control or the management of cash flows entered the game. Since last year, the pounding Syrian offensive has eroded the military strength of both sides, nonetheless the al-Qaeda have shown an extraordinary resilience. After the September 11 and the war in Afghanistan, the organization founded by bin-Laden, later inherited from Ayman al-Zawahiri, was able to reorganize itself, while fragmenting into different realities. Al-Qaeda has proved to be a monster with a thousand heads, constantly evolving and with a capacity for adaptation that - as Bruce Hoffman states - has turned it into a brand appealing to other terrorist organizations seeking notoriety. On balance, al-Qaeda is still alive and ready to recompose itself despite the deafening Syrian scenario which has revealed the ephemeral compactness of the Jihadists, but above all as politics and not religion, regulate the choices of Allah's fighters.

The "false" turning point

Among the various military operations carried out to defeat the rioters, the siege of Aleppo represented the turning point for the destiny of numerous formations of the anti-governmental structure, including the Front of al-Nusra. On 28 July 2016, Abu Muhammad al-Julani's men (photo) launched a desperate counter-offensive in an attempt to break the encirclement of Syrian forces: official sources reported that the attackers waved the insignia of a new fighting formation, Jabhat Fateh al Sham (JFS - Conquest of the Levant Front). Formally JFS absorbed al-Nusra, but the name change was just the facade of a much deeper reorganization program. The few elements in the possession of the various Western intelligence agencies suggested a possible rupture between al-Julani and al-Zawahiri, but as often happens in the world of terrorism what appears almost never corresponds to the truth and stems from non-random evaluations . The choice of al-Julani concealed, in fact, a careful political calculation which, only on the surface, feared divorce from al-Qaeda.

In the same month in which JFS took shape, the Americans and Russians agreed to establish a Joint Implementation Group useful for coordinating air raids against Islamist forces and in particular against al-Nusra and Islamic State militiamen¹. President Obama pushed on the Pentagon for al-Julani's group to be hit the hardest of all, precisely because it is affiliated with al-Qaeda and with branches around the world. According to American analysts - explains Brian Michael Jenkins - al-Nusra represented a greater danger than ISIS due to its ties with Afghanistan and the Khorasan group: "Shortly after the United States began bombing ISIS in 2014, it extended its campaign to Syria, where a cell of seasoned Qaeda veterans from Afghanistan called the Khorasan Group had set up shop in Syria under the Nusra Front's protection, supposedly to launch terrorist attack against the West "².

The military offensive and the growing bleeding of men and means, therefore obliged the leader of al-Nusra to study a survival plan that included a possible departure from al-Zawahiri. Getting out of the shadow of al-Qaeda - avoiding incurable break-ups - would have, in fact, eased the pressure, bringing a double advantage both in terms of propaganda and strategy. If the Americans or the Russians had attacked a moderate organization, not affiliated with terrorism, it could be misunderstood as a war against Islam tout court and cause a departure of other groups useful to the cause; in second place the release from al-Qaeda made al-Nusra more agreeable to other fighting formations which began to woo her to secure a powerful ally. Finally, for al-Julani it was a good opportunity to put together the ranks again, bringing together the voices that blamed his loyalty to Ayman al-Zawahiri³. It did not take long, however, to understand that the detachment between the two factions was nothing more than a maneuver by al-Qaeda itself aimed at greater infiltration between the Syrian rebellion. The truth transpired from the words of al-Julani himself who confirmed the decision-making contiguity between the two groups: "in accordance with the general guidelines and directives of al-Qaeda leadership, it was decided to cancel the name of Jabhat al-Nusra and form Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, ostensibly having no link with any external entity⁴. Al-Nusra had simply mitigated the operational link with al-Qaeda, but confirmed his spiritual leadership: "The ideological continuity with the idea of ​​the ummah as a priority, followed by the state, the group, and then the individual [...] "⁵.

Al-Zawahiri's sneaky project was to weave a new and wider network of consensus around his brand, concealing its presence, changing its name and intermediaries: a consolidated script that has always characterized the modus operandi of al-Qaeda after the 9 / 11 and during the "Arab Spring". Jabhat Fateh al-Sham - according to Colin P. Clarke of the RAND corporation - it was a complete success, thanks also to the concurrence of Western forces which intensified every offensive effort against the Islamic State, regardless of what was happening around. JFS had grown up without attracting clamor, becoming a larger and more influential organization than before: "with approximately 10,000 fighters, JFS is now both the largest al Qaeda franchise and by many accounts, the most lethal [...] "⁶.

The new jihadist cartel

The change in route prepared by al-Julani had therefore had positive effects in the long term, verifiable by the emergence of alliances and the arrival of new recruits. On 28 January 2017 the jihadist propaganda bodies announced the creation of Hay'at Tahrir al Sham (HTS): a sort of cartel which, together with JFS, assimilated four other rebel factions. It had an estimated total force of 31.000 militiamen whose work was concentrated in the sectors of Idbil, Hama, Aleppo in the north and Daraa in the south. The renewed metamorphosis of al-Qaeda in Syria reflected an already known strategy: "to broaden its appeal and deepen its control of the rebel campaign. The formation of HTS will allow the affiliated to operate in wider swaths of territory [...] "⁷.

The four organizations participating in the new pact were: Harakat Nour al Din al Zinki (The Movement of Nour al-Din at the Zinki), Liwa al Haq (the Brigade of Truth), Jabhat Ansar al Din (Religious Front Supporters) e Jaysh al Sunna (the Sunni Army). Besides JFS, each of these realities presented differences and a background military very different, nevertheless they were all united by the intent to strengthen their position in the fight against Assad.

Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki, for example, was one of the most organized and efficient associations among the militias that formed the Free Syrian Army. Its leader, Tawfiq Shahabuddin, has always disregarded the leadership of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, becoming a point of reference among the ranks of "moderates". The unexpected approach to the Islamist front was attributable to various incidents including the deterioration of relations with the FSA, the loss of Aleppo, but also - according to reliable statements - an incorrect Western policy towards Islamic leaders available for dialogue⁸.

Likewise Liwa al Haqq or otherwise known as the Homs Brigade, was born from the womb of Free Syrian Army from which, in the 2013, he distanced himself to join the Islamic Front of Jaysh al Fateh (Army of Conquest).

Then the militants of Jaysh al Sunna and Jabhat Ansar al Din they too have always been independent of both the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.

At the helm of HTS came Abu Jaber Hashim al Sheikh (photo), known to most by the nickname "engineer" as a graduate in mechanical engineering at the University of Aleppo. His resume - in addition to a long period of imprisonment in Assad's prisons - included a long militancy as head of the Islamic Movement of Al Fajr of the FSA, then assimilated by Ahrar al Sham of which he became one of the most influential representatives.

Abu Jaber al Sheikh, in one of his first speeches, reiterated that HTS: "is an independent entity and not an extension of previous organizations or factions"However, his assurances were not very convincing⁹. His biography - released by the official website of Ahrar al Sham - presented some contradictory and unclear points concerning suspicious activities on behalf of al-Qaeda. A second biographical note, published on the website of El-Dorar Al-Shamia it revealed the "professional" ties between the engineer and al-Qaeda in Iraq when he worked to facilitate the passage of guerrillas to the borders with Syria. The succession of al Sheikh at the head of Ahrar al Sham he also confirmed a certain continuity with his predecessor, Abu Khalid al Suri who (killed in the 2014) was a trusted man and advisor to Ayman al-Zawahiri. Although he has always denied all subjection, Ahrar al Sham has had among its commanders people whose ideological growth is attributable to al-Qaeda: for this reason HTS cannot be credible when it declares itself divorced from any infection Al Qaeda.

Conclusions

Analyzing i curricula of the associates in HTS we note that all, except JFS, have always shown intolerance towards the guide imposed by the Islamist macro factions or by Ahrar al Sham. The new cartel, however, disappoints every expectation of independence because it is born from a group that has never disavowed its link with al-Qaeda. There longa manus of the Egyptian doctor has achieved its goal with consequences not yet assessable, especially given the current situation and the advance of the pro-Assad front. One thing is certain: the Islamist front is far from being defeated and just al-Qaeda - given too often mistakenly for the dead - is reinforcing its positions. This has a meaning not only for the Syrian front, but especially for the balance of power within the Jihad. The Islamic State, always declaring itself a full-fledged state reality, could suffer a military collapse with disastrous consequences for its leadership. The low profile adopted by Al-Qaeda, its traditional line of paranoid terrorist organization, closed and careful not to expose itself too much, could guarantee not only its survival, but even its primacy over the region. The Islamic State is seen as a disease that can be eradicated, on the contrary al-Qaeda acts as an incurable cancer whose metastasis affects every part of the globe.