The "Foreign Influence Law" inflames Georgia

(To Valentina Chabert)
03/06/24

More than two months have passed since demonstrators returned to populate the squares of Tbilisi to protest against the law on foreign influences, approved at third reading despite President Salomé Zourabichvili's veto. The legislation, which protesters commonly refer to as “Russian law" both due to the similarities with a similar regulation in force in Russia and the alleged pressure coming from the Kremlin for its approval, it requires organizations that receive more than 20% of their funding from abroad to register as "foreign agents".1

After Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, also Georgia at the behest of some members of the governing party Georgian Dream enters a spiral of control that risks sliding the country into one authoritative grip capable of extinguishing its European ambitions forever. Especially since the reactions of senior officials in Brussels as well as the United States did not take long to arrive, giving tangible signs of a nullification of the path taken so far by Georgia to obtain the status of candidate country for membership of the European Union.2

Although at first reading the question of the approval of the law on foreign influences can apparently be reduced to one contrast between Georgia's European aspirations and Russian influences in the opposite direction, such a reading is simplistic due to the plurality of interests and implications in the field. On the one hand, around 85% of the pro-European population took to the streets to protest the inevitable authoritarian turn in the country led by Georgian Dream and express the common desire for democracy, freedom and transparency against an opaque and corrupt state system, whose future could not lie anywhere other than the Western bloc. On the other hand, point to the majority party as purely pro-Russian it also appears misleading, since it would mean eclipsing a decade of community-oriented adjustments. It seems more correct to talk about personal interests of a political elite that revolves around the figure of Bidzina Ivanishvili, former Georgian Prime Minister and party leader Georgian Dream, which tries to protect its interests and which has made its fortune precisely by virtue of an indissoluble bond with Russia.3

It is therefore no coincidence that the name of the billionaire oligarch Ivanishvili was mentioned in the famous Panama Papers due to a series of funds from previous business activities carried out in Russia and hidden in foreign tax havens.4 Just as it is no coincidence that in the midst of the protests against the law on foreign influences, a further bill was approved under the name of “offshore law”, which provides for the facilitation of the entry of funds from abroad into Georgia by offering a wide range of tax advantages to companies and individuals who decide to move their assets from tax havens to Georgia. This has sparked a widespread reaction in the country due to fears that this could turn Georgia into a hub of black money, allowing the billionaire founder to Georgian Dream Ivanishvili and some members of his circle to evade potential Western sanctions.5

Sanctions that the European Union does not rule out adopting and which are also being discussed in the United States, which in the House of Representatives they approved the “Megobari Act” (from the Georgian term meaning “friendship”) and promised restrictions in terms of granting visas and travel bans towards Georgian officials of Georgian Dream considered responsible for the weakening of the Georgian democratic framework and considered hostile both towards civil society and its Euro-Atlantic partners.6 He Western sanctions have been welcomed by Georgians in a very positive way and interpreted as a tangible sign of closeness to their democratic struggle, there are equally well-founded fears that the approval of the law on foreign influences could mark a breaking point of no return for Georgian-American relations: the law would in fact hit that thick web of Non-Governmental Organizations, bodies and associations whose availability of funds depends exclusively on Washington, which from independence in the 1990s to today has played a fundamental role in funding and support for Georgia's fragile democratic institutions.7

A peculiar role in the Georgian turmoil is undoubtedly played by Russia, pointed out by protesters as the main destabilizing force in Georgia, as well as as the architect of the adoption of the law through instruments of pressure on the ruling party. On a state level, the law on foreign influences is understood by most local analysts as well as opposition parties as yet another episode of Russian hybrid warfare aimed at keeping the country under its sphere of influence. To the point that on the streets of Tbilisi there are rumors that the exponents of Georgian Dream they may have received pressure for the adoption of the law in the face of benefits that are not only personal, but also have more considerable national and regional geopolitical implications. In this regard, the most considered hypotheses concern one side any guarantees of non-aggression or of direct involvement through the opening of a second front in the context of the war in Ukraine. On the other hand, the hypothesis of one also hovers confederation between Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a proposal that would undoubtedly meet strong opposition from Georgian citizens, but which could constitute a timid compromise for a semblance of regaining sovereignty for Georgia.8

For its part, the Kremlin - which due to issues relating to the occupied territories of Georgia does not have diplomatic relations with Tbilisi except through the mediation of Switzerland - has looked at the protests accusing the West of trying to destabilize the country supporting the protesters in a sort of way “colorful revolution” against the government.9 Without a doubt, Moscow would benefit significantly if Georgia abandoned (forcibly or through "hybrid warfare" instruments) the Western sphere of influence in favor of the exclusive Russian orbit: the Southern Caucasus is in fact part of the rhetoric of “russky mir” as well as geographicallynear abroad of Russia, to whom Russian policy in the post-Soviet space is aimed in order to maintain its (possibly) exclusive dominion. At the same time, having political control over Georgia would potentially mean being able to continue into the South Caucasus and also influence the Armenia's pro-European aspirations, who under Pashinyan at the end of the thirty-year war with Azerbaijan over the Karabakh region expressed the desire to abandon the Russian orbit to move closer to the West.10

Lastly, it should not be underestimated geographical location of Georgia, which has made the country strategically relevant in terms of transit infrastructure Middle Corridor, the multimodal project that connects China and Central Asia to Europe via Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.11 In fact, it's right through the Middle Corridor that the West supplies itself with gas, oil and goods bypassing sanctioned Russia due to the invasion of Ukraine, thus allowing the Southern Caucasus to play an unrivaled role in terms of East-West connections and transit to Europe. In the event of the consolidation of Moscow's influence on Georgia, they could therefore open up new scenarios on the future of this infrastructure project, which is preparing for a significant expansion with a view to the transit of renewable energy from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.

In purely political terms, the only tool left for the Georgians to avoid the consequences of the scenarios described so far remains elections on October 26th. In this sense, the opposition will only be able to win in an attempt to dismantle the authoritarian architecture set up by Georgian Dream, catching up on Tbilisi's path towards Brussels. Nonetheless, the challenge of victory is not as linear as it might seem: at the moment, the possibility that the Georgian opposition parties will present themselves united in the next elections still appears rather remote, and the fears of possible electoral fraud and fraud they will be anything but non-existent.12

In essence, the opposition to Georgian Dream it is extremely fragile, almost as if it reflects the weak hold of Georgian democracy.

1 Georgia's EU dream in tatters as “foreign agent” bill becomes law, Politico EU, 28 May 2024. Available at the link: https://www.politico.eu/article/georgia-foreign-agent-bill-becomes-law-international-outcry-european-union/.

2 European Commission, Statement by the High Representative with the European Commission on the final adoption of the law on transparency of foreign influence in Georgia, 28 May 2024.

3 Broken Dream: The oligarch, Russia, and Georgia's drift from Europe, European Council on Foreign Relations, 21 December 2022.

4 More information is available on the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists website at the following link: https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/13008109.

5 Parliament Overrides President's Veto, Adopts 'Offshore' Law, Civil Georgia, May 29, 2024.

6 US Congress, Wilson, Cohen, Hudson, Veasey Introduces MEGOBARI Act, May 24, 2024.

8 The Russians Want to Build a Super-State. It May Now Includes Parts of Georgia, Caspian Policy Center, November 16, 2023.

9 Russia's FM Lavrov Accuses West of Preparing “Color Revolution” by Supporting CSOs in the Region, Civil Georgia, March 20, 2023.

10 What the new crisis between Russia and Armenia signals, Limes, 18 March 2024.

11 Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, available at the link: https://middlecorridor.com/en/route.

12 Valentina Chabert, “The law on foreign influences in Georgia is part of the Russian hybrid war”: interview with opposition parliamentarian Teona Akubardia, Opinio Juris, 26 May 2024. Available at the link: https://www.opiniojuris.it/opinio/la-legge-sulle-influenze-straniere-in-georgia-e-parte-della-guerra-ibrida-russa-intervista-alla-parlamentare-dellopposizione-teona-akubardia/.

Frame: RAI - Tg3