Elections, like the animals on Orwell's Farm, are not all the same, as demonstrated by the cautious muted campaigning and the results of the Jordanian elections. On the Hashemite Kingdom, despite being nestled in a geopolitical position of extreme relevance enhanced by the characteristic of rentier state and the persistent reverberations of the consequences of the war in Gaza, the media attention he found no way to linger.
Amman is currently under double fire, that is, the need to maintain fruitful and constant relations with Washington, Israel's tutelary deity, and that of promoting diplomatic action that persuades Tel Aviv to a conduct of de-escalation capable of allowing control of the ferments in the streets that push for political actions of rupture capable of determining a further isolation of the Jewish state and a greater detachment between the social base and the reigning house. It is essential for King Abdullah to narrow the space for popular dissent even in the awareness of risking fueling the widespread favor nurtured for the Muslim Brotherhood; however, political intelligence and the ability to conform like water in the monarchic basin have meant that, despite the divergences, the Brotherhood has always integrated its opinions with those of the regime whenever the latter has found itself in difficulty.1.
In 1992, the obligation of the transition of movements into political parties leads to the creation of the Islamic Action Front, until the Arab Spring which becomes an irreplaceable opportunity to try to carry forward reformist demands, including the impossible limitation of royal power. The lack of shared threats means that the Monarchy and the Brotherhood cease to need each other, not to mention the fragmentation of the movement between hawks (al-Suqur), conservatives and swans (al-Hamaim), moderate2.
The post-Spring successes of the Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia persuade Amman of the need to tighten the containment of an organization that is however increasingly fragmented by internal divisions that lead to ZamZam, a reformist platform created in 2012, and to a Alternative Muslim Brotherhood of 2015, heir of the original organization and more favorable to the established regimeThe immediate monarchic acceptance of the novelty leads to the disavowal of the Brotherhood Ikhwan original until its dissolution in 2020.
Against the backdrop of a difficult economic situation, where recovery is threatened by political tensions; while the Jordanian Central Bank cuts interest rates, the IMF opens vital credit lines3 and inaugurates a program of reforms aimed at the economic consolidation of a country afflicted by endemic unemployment4. The problem, however, has an ambivalent dimension, reverberating from the outside onto internal politics, given the originally strong Palestinian consistence of the Jordanian population.
Starting from the first decade of the new century, Jordanian-Israeli relations are progressively deteriorating as a result of the policies adopted by Prime Minister Netanyahu, so much so as to force King Abdullah to declare in 2019 that they had reached dangerous levels historic lows, a consideration first alleviated by the rise to power of the Bennet-Lapid duo, then exacerbated again by the return to power of the right. Such is the criticality of the situation that the resolution concerning a ceasefire put forward by Jordan at the end of October 2023, was followed in November first by the withdrawal of its ambassador from Israel, then by the agreement water for electricity.
The situation that has arisen is also delicate both in the West Bank, where the general conditions are leading to particularly serious consequences that would inevitably affect Amman, and with regard to the question of funding for UNRWA, a UN agency that provides for Palestinian refugees and also operates in Jordan, supporting no less than two million people.
In this new context, devoid of real political openings, On September 10, Jordanians went to the polls to elect a new parliament, with the reformists ready for a political change, and the Islamic Action Front, long in organizational and ideological relationship with Hamas, dedicated to amplifying anti-Israeli sentiment; note how 41 of the 130 seats in the lower house have been reserved for political parties to ease tribal influence5, net of foreign policy, constitutionally the prerogative of the King. Some formations, such as Eradah, seem to be able to continue to provide adequate support given their presence on the territory and thanks to leaders who maintain a link with the establishment that indicates an orientation that leans towards controlled dynamics and without disruptions.6.
While Houthi missiles are also affecting Jordanian trade, which in Aqaba has suffered a 4,1% drop in exports in the first 5 months of the year, together with the state of uncertainty caused by the Iranian-Israeli conflict, the liquidity shortage and sell-off of commercial activities. Despite the economy being the focus, independent candidates and stakeholders are unable to present actionable proposals.
With the ongoing war, the Islamist party has ridden the wave of the Palestinian cause from the beginning, confident of being able to control the anger of a people never so averse to the normalization of relations with Israel and in friction with its own State, seen as a denier of the collective will; here then, with the focus on the Gaza war and the riots in the West Bank, the concrete representation of threats to national stability and prestige, put at risk by possible exoduses from the area west of the Jordan, and by the feared diminutio regarding the custody of Al Aqsa. The war has in fact allowed the Islamic party to hybridize, that is, both to catalyze Jordanians of Palestinian origin and to set itself up as a nationalist shield, minimizing the ideological basis that wants a disintegrating separation from Israel, therefore from the USA. The most strategically astute Islamist move was to include members of prominent tribes in the lists in order to expand the electoral base, given that the Hashemite House is always vigilant in fear of too high a risk of loss of control.
While it is true that Sunni Amman has opposed Iranian influence since 2004, it is equally true that must maintain a position, albeit formal, of constant warning to Tel Aviv's politics by a constitutional and high-ranking monarchy, but where the executive and legislative powers of the monarch remain extremely broad. Never before has power remained in such a precarious balance, where the position taken by the former prince Hamza, who has disappeared from the news, could only be harshly censured by the king with all the consequences that entailed; a situation of rare instability aggravated by the policies of neighboring countries, by the proximity of pro-Iranian groups and by the relationship with Hamas, given that in 1999, once he ascended to the throne, he proceeded to expel its political offices from the territory.
Jordanian politics can therefore only be realistic, with its closeness to the USA, an economic and military umbrella, and to Riyadh, with the marriage between Crown Prince Hussein and Rajwa Alseif, belonging to one of the richest and most influential Saudi families. It is worth remembering how the Saudi rapprochement with Israel, now obviously slowed down by the war, has constituted a discreet but effective after-effect of the Abraham Accords; for this reason, the success, even if partial, achieved by the Islamic opposition should not be underestimated.7, capable of winning 31 seats out of 138, in an electoral round that saw the election of 27 women and the lowering of the minimum age of candidates from 30 to 25, despite a turnout of 32%.
Let's do some sums. That the Kingdom, realistically, must conform to international reality is evident, as is that the only significant stability comes from the Western context, capable of enhancing the status of rentier; It is equally clear, however, that the Jordanian social base is influenced by the presence of a strong Palestinian core that has not forgotten the Black September. It is no coincidence that about 70% of Jordanians approved the attack of October 7, just as the killing of three Israelis on the Allenby Bridge justified the ritual distribution of sweets in the Jordanian streets. It is clear that wearing the Hashemite crown does not ensure roles comfortable since, on the other side, the current Israeli policy does not make any task easier.
There is no doubt that, despite having provided Israel, among others, with air cover from the Iranian attack, the elimination of Haniyeh has contributed to making the positions more complex, inducing Amman to send its foreign minister to Tehran, to calm an escalation that would leave Jordan at the center of all possible fires.
Although politically distant, the Islamic electoral success cannot but be valorised by Iran in light of the fact that, even if it does not reach the point of influencing national politics, given the direct royal control of the Upper House, it can nevertheless aim to influence public opinion and the general political scene, as hoped for by the Brotherhood's own leader, Murad Adailah.
To date, King Abdullah's political effort is significant, as he has managed to channel and exploit popular anger without undermining support for the US and continuing to warn the community about the Shiite danger.
The task is now becoming, if possible, more difficult, with the formation of a problematic parliamentary majority that cannot ignore tribal influence. If the forecasts intend to provide a reassuring static and unchangeable image, the variables constituted by the Iranian axis of resistance refractory to the sovereignty of others, by the evolution of the Gaza conflict and, above all, by the Lebanese developments must be considered.
What we now seem to glimpse is a widespread situation that sees borders threatened from multiple points, marked political-military instability, an economic context that, despite its deterioration, is unable to persuade any political subject to a wiser and more realistic revision.
1 In 1957 the Brotherhood supported the monarchy during an alleged coup by Arab nationalists and accepted the decision to kill and expel thousands of Palestinian fighters during Black September 1970.
2 The hawks are skeptical about political participation and are more radical about the Palestinian quarrel; the swans are in favor of a compromise, considering the Palestinian question important, but subordinate to the national interest. The two groups have been joined since 1998 by the centrists, and since 2000 by the Hamasists.
3 January 2024 USD 1,2 billion
4 The war in Gaza and tensions in the area have also affected the tourism sector, which accounts for about 14% of GDP. Jordan's unemployment rate is 21,4% and youth unemployment is 40,8%. A study by the Economic and Social Council indicates that only seven of the thirty-one parties have presented specific economic plans or programs.
5 The number of seats reserved for women has increased from 15 to 18, those reserved for Christians from nine to seven, and those reserved for the Chechen and Circassian minorities from three to two. The Upper House remains appointed by the king. Although the new laws appear to favor the choice of political parties over tribal affiliations, the reality indicates the opposite. A University of Jordan survey found that 65 percent of Jordanians trust their tribe more than political parties.
6 Parties must consider the lack of trust of the base, which only 15% said they trusted them (see Center for Strategic Studies - University of Jordan). The new system also does not address the problem of abstentionism, especially in urban areas. In 2020, there was only a 12% turnout in Amman.
7 Jabhat al 'Amal al Islami, IAF The national-oriented Al-Mithaq Al-Watani party won 21 seats; the left-wing Taqaddum group won 8 seats.
Photogram: United Nations
