Military and geopolitical implications of the sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva

On April 14, the flagship of the Russian Black Sea fleet, the missile cruiser Moscow, the first unit of the "Slava" class (Russian for "glory"), sank while being towed to Sevastopol, officially due to a fire on board, but much more likely due to a previous impact of several Ukrainian missiles.

The "Slava" class

The idea of ​​a missile cruiser that could in some way constitute a threat to US aircraft carriers was born in 1974 and was born from the Soviet acknowledgment of its enormous technical inferiority in the aircraft carrier sector, which at the time also involved difficulties of an ideological and economic, and the consequent vulnerability in the fleet in the event of armed confrontation.

The Soviet leadership thought that the alternative to competitive aircraft carriers was to build ships that posed a threat to US carriers. A line of well-armed and resilient oceanic missile cruisers was therefore conceived, equipped with cruise missiles with the possibility of both conventional and nuclear warheads, whose multiple launches should have saturated the opponent's defense capabilities. Project 1164 (NATO code “Atlant”), which would later give life to the “Slava” class, responded to these strategic needs.

The ships of this class have a length of 186 m, a width of about 21 m and a displacement of about 11.500 t, with a crew of about 485 men. They are designed to stay afloat even if three compartments have been flooded with water. The main ammunition depots are distributed throughout the ship with their own fire extinguishing systems.

The propulsion uses gas turbines and steam turbines, which can bring the unit up to a speed of just over 32 knots with a range of 2.200 nm, which rises to 8.070 nm in the case of an average speed of 18 knots.

The main armament includes sixteen anti-ship missiles located on both sides of the main superstructure, clearly visible. These are the “P-1000 Vulkan” missiles (NATO code SS-N-12 “Sandbox”), an improved version of the “P-500 Basalt”. They are supersonic missiles that reach Mach 2 and have a theoretical maximum range of about 700 km. The conventional warhead has about 500 kg of explosives (three times the size of an "Exocet"), while the nuclear capacity reaches 350 kilotons (something like 25.000 times the power of the Hiroshima bomb).

The defense system is structured on three levels which, theoretically, should be able to repel any air / missile attack. The first level uses 64 S-300F "Fort" missiles (NATO code SA-N-6 "Grumble") which, with a maximum range of around 150 km, could also be able to intercept missiles with trajectory ballistics. Designed to intercept aerial targets, including supersonic ones, up to 90 km away, at altitudes between 25 and 25.000 m. The launchers are located amidships, immediately behind the funnels.

The “Fort” system allows you to follow 12 targets simultaneously and to engage half of them, a capability far below the US AEGIS. For this reason the Voenno-Morskoi Flot (VMF) is considering replacing it, due to obsolescence with respect to current threats, with naval versions of the S-350 or S-400.

The second level of self-defense is represented by the OSA-M automatic anti-aircraft missile system, it includes a two-armed launcher and 20 missiles, each with its own detection and control system, capable of destroying aerial targets with speeds up to 600 m / sec. , at a distance of up to 15 km and an altitude of 5 to 15.000 m.

The third tier consists of a 130mm six-barreled rotating automatic cannon (AK-630), effective up to 5km away.

Il Moscow was set up on July 27, 1979 and entered service on January 30, 1983, under the name of Glory, then replaced with the current name in May 1996. This name distinguishes the twin units which, from an initial total number of ten, were made in four specimens, of which the most recent (Ukraine) was canceled after only three years of operational life (October 1993).

The other two, the Marshal Ustinov (in service since December 1986) and the Varyag (in service since September 1989 - photo), they are now assigned to the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet respectively.

As with most Russian units, the years following the breakup of the Soviet empire are synonymous with chaos and lack of maintenance, both for lack of adequate funding and as a result of a deep corruption existing within the Russian military-industrial apparatus. This caused a fairly limited operational use of the Moscow, in flag missions, alternating with long stops in port.

Among the most recent uses of the Moscow we recall a brief participation in the operations in the Black Sea against Georgia (September 2009), off the coast of secessionist Abkhazia. On the occasion she was also the victim of a failure in the propulsion system that forced her to return to the dock in Sevastopol. Between September 2015 and January 2016, it also participated in the mission in Syria to ensure the air defense of the Khmeimim air base, before being placed in reserve until December 2019. During this long forced stop, unlike its sister units, the Moscow it has not undergone significant modernization of the air defense and discovery equipment, again mainly due to corruption and lack of funds, seems to be diverted to other needs.

The attack

ON 13 April the Moscow it is located about 80 nm from the Ukrainian coast, south-east of Odessa. The data is entered and missiles are launched against the Russian flagship, which reach the target following a flight profile called sea ​​skimming (i.e. with the final phase of flight on the surface of the water).

The following is a hypothetical reconstruction based on what emerged from the photos and videos that have circulated.

After the impact, on the Moscow powerful fires break out amidships which, however, do not attack the “Vulkan” missiles, which remain intact. However, explosions and fires cause serious damage to the propulsion and, most likely, also to the electric generators.

In addition to the flooding due to damage to the hull, water from the fire extinguishing systems is added, with which they try to fight against the flames. The exhaustion pumps do not work or are not perfectly efficient and, therefore, the main and secondary waterways that are invading the interior of the ship begin to create stability problems. The ship begins to tilt. Meanwhile the crew, predictably shocked and reduced by the victims and wounded, try to manage the emergency, which quickly becomes uncontrollable and leads to orders to abandon ship.

This is a completely plausible scenario, considering that serious deficiencies in the fire protection systems had already been recorded on board for several years.

Some Russian media reports that the escort frigate was hit by another missile, without sustaining significant damage. In the following days, news and denials about the victims are chased. Doubts about the (huge) losses, however, are not dispelled by the TASS and RIA agencies News, which report that all the crew have been safely evacuated. What is certain is that Vice Admiral Ossipov, Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, has disappeared from the Russian news from April 15. April 17 Novaya Gazeta Europeⁱ reports the testimony of the mother of a crew member, who declares that the Moscow it was hit by three missiles and that there are a considerable number of deaths, serious injuries and missing.

Considerations

The "Neptune" is a subsonic anti-ship cruise missile, with a theoretical range of about 160 nm and a payload of about 150 kg of explosives, inertially guided fire and forget, where the coordinates of the target are entered into the system before launch and, once it arrives in the area of ​​probable presence of the target, activates its localization radar (range 15-20 nm) for target acquisition and updating some data. From that moment until impact, the missile travels a few meters above the sea surface, maintaining altitude thanks to a radar altimeter (flight profile sea ​​skimming) ⁱⁱ.

The elements on which one counts to cause the greatest possible damage, like all anti-ship missiles, are the head at war and the residual fuel which, after the explosion, favors the start of the fire inside the affected ship.

The first question that analysts ask themselves is the reason for the lack of defense reaction. Let's try to answer in an articulate way. Due to the failure to update its aerial detection systems, the Moscow it had limited detection capability, failing to detect targets at very low altitudes, and this may have played a key role. Furthermore, its OSA-M automatic self-defense system is somewhat obsolete. Purely by way of comparison, to the contemporary cruiser Kirov (project 1144) 16 “Kinzhal” launchers (NATO name SA-N-9) were installed, definitely more performing.

Il Moscow it had an important equivalent radar surface and it does not seem logical to think that one could believe that it would go “unnoticed” by the adversary means of discovery. For what reasons then did the commander, who was well aware of his operational limitations, exhibit his ship in this way? How could anyone think that the ship's position could be kept hidden, given that her radars were predictably working? The Moscow it had a highly recognizable electromagnetic signature, being the only unit in the area to have those particular radars. Easy to recognize them and get their position with some precision. If, on the contrary, the ship had its discovery radars turned off, to avoid being located, it would be understood the reason why on board they did not notice the launch and arrival of the missiles, or that they noticed it at the last moment, when it was too late to react.

It remains, therefore, difficult to understand why the Moskva, unable to detect aerial targets flying below 5 m altitude, it was well within range of the “Neptune” missile batteries, whose presence along the coasts must have been well known to the Russians.

To justify the lack of reaction and the fact that the escort did not protect the flagship, the Russian side said that two Turkish-made “Bayrakyar” drones had “distracted” the unit's air defense system. However, no later than the day before the frigate Admiral Essen (in service since June 2016), which escorted the Moscow, had shot down a number of drones of the same typeⁱⁱⁱ and it is credible that nothing prevented repeating the performance.

Anyway, regardless of how the Ukrainians managed to locate the cruiser, it really appears hardly credible that a limited number of drones could saturate the air defense capabilities of the Moscow and a modern "Grigorovitch" class frigate, equipped with much more modern and efficient aerial discovery equipment than those of the Moscow, also for the localization of small targets (the “Neptune” is 5 m long by 0,38 m in diameter) at very low altitude.

The flight time of the "Neptune" missiles is about twelve minutes and if, for example, Russia had had the foresight to assign an AWACS to cover the naval group, the missiles would probably have been located in time to allow a decent reaction.

From the photos that portray the ship struck, however, it is clear how the Moscow did not even notice the arrival of the missiles, so much so that i detection and firing radars are aligned per keel and the anti-aircraft defense armament is missile-free.

This leads to another interesting question. What was the state of preparation of the unit? Was the crew at their combat post, being in waters subject to possible enemy attack, or was the ship operating in a more "relaxed" attitude?

A second point, which may explain the unit's failure to react. The Moscow it was not equipped with infrared detection equipment. In essence, that ship had enormous operational limitations and its overall weapon system (detection and firing radars, electronic warfare equipment, missiles and self-defense guns) were obsolete for a highly technological warfare such as today, in particular on the sea.

The lack of localization of the threat and the absence of a credible reaction has, therefore, allowed the enemy missiles to reach the big target and to sink the Russian cruiser with only two warheads of 150 kg of explosives^iv. The impact occurred on the left side of the unit, a two to three meters below the waterline, about amidships, in full live work. The points of impact are perfectly consistent with a flight profile sea ​​skimming. In a photographic comparison, in fact, the damage caused appears identical to that observed on the HMS Sheffield, hit in May 1982 by an Argentine “Exocet” missile.

The superstructures remained intact, while the fire that followed the impact detonated the 30 mm ammunition depots of the close defense gun (AK-630).

But there are also other considerations, which concern more exquisitely the engineering part. The sinking of a ship that is certainly not brand new but nevertheless fearful has, in fact, demonstrated that the "Slava" class has a limited survivability to combat damage. If two missiles with a small payload were enough to eliminate the flagship, what are the real damage survivability of the other Russian surface units? If Russian naval engineers have designed a "high-level" ship that sinks as a result of the impact of "only" 300 kg of explosives, the smaller units, predictably built with comparable criteria, what capacity do they have to stay afloat after having suffered damage, also taking into account that fires can be favored both by the residual fuel of the missiles and by the presence of a lot of aluminum (combustible material) in the ship's structures?

And here another element intervenes, no less important than the previous ones. In fact, it should be remembered that the greatest threat aboard a ship is represented by fires. In a relatively closed environment, such as inside a ship, a fire creates enormous problems (smoke, heat, danger to ammunition). It is for this reason that, especially on military ships, the fire fighting systems are redundant and particularly well maintained and the fire service personnel must be well trained. In the event of a fire, in fact, it is it is imperative that systems and personnel are fully efficient and that they intervene promptly and competently, to contain the damage and avoid the loss of the ship.

In the specific case, it seems, instead, that the fire extinguishing systems and the exhaustion pumps were quite far from complete efficiency and that the personnel involved were poorly trained in the procedures foreseen in the event of damage during a fight, substantially unable to handle the flames and flooding resulting from leaks in the hull and from the fire fighting itself. This would explain why the Moscow in a very short time he found himself in a situation that was now out of control. This raises further questions about the efficiency of the unit and the training of the staff.

Conclusions

The sinking of the Moscow it is the most important naval loss since that of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, torpedoed by a British submarine during the Falklands / Falklands War. For Russia this is the most serious loss after the battleship Novorossiysk, destroyed near Sevastopol in 1955, officially due to contact with a mine (but "rumors of the bow" at the time indicated more likely sabotage).

We ignore how many missiles were actually launched against the Moscow. If the Ukrainians had launched a single salvo (four missiles), this would have been a remarkable success in terms of cost-effectiveness. However, this was certainly favored by the lack of localization of the threat and, therefore, by the lack of Russian reaction, as evidenced by the photos of the Moscow hit, which show that not even the armament for close defense has been activated.

The hypothesis, advanced by the authorities to justify the debacle, according to which the systems of Russian ships would have been distracted, or even saturated, by diversionary maneuvers of drones appears quite remote precisely because, although obsolete, the radar systems of the Moscow and even more modern ones of theAdmiral Essen they would have been perfectly capable of handling multiple air tracks at the same time, as they did the previous day.

It is difficult to give a certain answer to the many questions that analysts ask themselves and, probably, we will never know how things really went on board the Moscow. The causes of the sinking seem, however, to be connected to a set of determining factors such as poor planning, poor crew training, inadequate capacity for cooperation between units, failure to update obsolete equipment, severe underestimation of Ukrainian capabilities. Errors that in combat are always very expensive in terms of credibility, lost means and, above all, victims

Beyond the causes that led to the sinking of the Russian flagship, the fact has some significant military and geopolitical implications. First of all VMF's credibility and prestige are deeply affected. The event, in fact, provides numerous indications about the state of efficiency of the Navy and the training of the crews, having highlighted serious deficiencies and unpreparedness. Navigating on patrol, at distances close enough to the opposing coasts, without having any type of effective detection system in operation (on board or on an airplane) appears to be at least self-defeating and shows a serious lack of preparation. A deficiency that does not seem to be the result of the contingent moment but which, conversely, appears as the result of the lack of fundamental skills in operational planning. A completely different speech must be made, at the moment and until proven otherwise, for the strategic underwater units, flagship of the VMF and, more generally, of the Russian military apparatus.

Secondly, from a geopolitical point of view, the loss of the Moscow deprives Russia of a ship with marked Command and Control capabilities while also reducing the overall arsenal at Putin's disposal in the Black Sea. An arsenal that today sees only two frigates, three corvettes and four submarines active^v. This could not fail to have repercussions also on the Russian strategy of the so-called "bastions" (see "The Russian naval strategy"). And, in fact, Putin's new strategy plans to create naval bases at various strategic points around the world. However, at the moment and in the current conditions of efficiency of the VMF, it seems more like one wish list than a real program.

The navies are, in fact, a powerful one instrument of foreign policy and their presence on the seas of the world, in support of national interests and prestige, represents an unavoidable power factor. It is for this reason that the disconcerting and unexpected loss of the Moscow represents, (in primis), an element of imbalance in the security dynamics in the Black Sea, but with a much wider significance.

All with the intuitive joy of the seasoned competitors, starting with the Turkish friend / enemy who also controls access to those waters, in aan area that is becoming increasingly competitive and important from a geopolitical and energy resource point of view, due to the rich deposits of natural gas (we are talking about hundreds of billions of cubic meters) and oil.

An imbalance and a loss of credibility strongly felt by Moscow and which go beyond the basin in question, so much so that one of the twins, the Varyag (with escort units), was sent to the Mediterranean on patrol, to reaffirm the Russian presence and willingness to play a part also on this theater^vi. However, this meant removing an important pawn from the Indo-Pacific chessboard, reducing (for how long?) Russia's overall operational capabilities in that scenario. The Russian naval group has also made a cruise in the waters of the Adriatic, in order to solicit "... the device of the US fleet and evaluate how it reacted ..."^vii. During this cruise, the Russian cruiser was closely followed by the Navy, as recently underlined by the Chief of Defense Staff, Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone.

The event of the Moscow and its consequences, what do they mean for Italy in military and geopolitical terms?

It is conceivable that in the near future Russia will look to the Mediterranean with even greater attention, intensity and interest, given that "... here are the sources of supply for Moscow, because North Africa is an area that the Russians want to destabilize, from the states coastal to the Sahel ... "^viii. The Russian presence in the Mediterranean, therefore, is destined to continue and increase, in an area of ​​growing competition and which Moscow considers strategic.

It means, therefore, that the need to modernize our overall military instrument, so as to increase our ability to project forces into the enlarged Mediterranean, mainly through air, surface and underwater units able to effectively face the threat, whatever it is, with suitable rules of engagement (given by politics) to adequately protect national interests and prestige. It means making available to the Italian Navy as soon as possible Maritime Patrol Aircraft really performing and able to easily carry out maritime patrol missions and effective anti-submarine combat throughout the Mediterranean basin, evaluating the possibility of bringing these patrol vessels into the Navy Aviation, possibly maintaining their operations with mixed crews (Navy and Air Force ), but avoiding the bizarre and unsuccessful logistic management adopted up to now.

It means building sufficiently large surface units and able to navigate for a long time in waters far from the peninsula, equipping them with the best weapon systems and redundant self-defense systems and detection sensors capable of detecting threats as early as possible. Ships, in fact, reveal all their vulnerability if they are not protected by modern and effective systems of electronic countermeasures, of discovery and of reaction. The technology now makes available means which, properly managed in concert with the aircraft of the aircraft carriers, can constitute a significant deterrent for anyone who threatens the naval group.

For an economy like the Italian one, based on the importation of raw materials, their transformation and the export of processed products, national interests are not protected only in front of the home beaches but especially on the seas far from the peninsula, where it is necessary to safeguard the freedom of navigation along the maritime trade routes of interest or underwater communication lines, in order to ensure the well-being and prestige of the nation (see "The protection of national interests on the sea"). All in all a simple concept, which history has taught all maritime countries and which scholars of the sector are well aware of. It is up to our politicians to translate these lessons into concrete action.