The suicide of Europe?

The current pandemic, accompanied by ainfodemic¹ which contributes to increasing its fear or attributing the blame for its diffusion, has aroused a series of reactions that can be interpreted in various ways everywhere, and which make it appear as from another historical era strike against General Soleimani. As always we will try to give an analytical picture, bearing in mind the assumption of Carl Schmitt that it was necessary for the state to be able to perform exceptional and not merely ordinary acts, and in the faint hope that it will be understood net of rigid ideological convictions. A first consequence is that concerning the political fallout in the various theaters.

Evolutions are emerging that, on the one hand, could favor pervasive surveillance states, on the other they could facilitate both nationalist policies and the need to reach a more felt need for transparency towards what are perceived as government failures in addressing the emergency, especially (but not only) in areas of conflict that see risks magnified by the lack of health facilities.

In Iraq, Thailand, Hong Kong, Lebanon, Algeria, despite restrictions, protests have ramped up in order to obtain a review of the agreements between government and social partners. China, as happened for the SARS emergency of 2003, will most likely benefit from the support of the upper-middle classes for greater political-public controls; in Iran the pandemic has widened the rift between the people and the government, already put to the test by the reticent silence shown in relation to the events that led to the shooting down of a Ukrainian airliner and the failure to quarantine the city of Qom, and amplified the effects of U.S. sanctions.

The elements that have most affected the evolution of the infection are different: the malicious Chinese communication deficiency, and the lability of Russian-Turkish information, subject to a censorship regime that is difficult to apply in the West; the lack of effective coordination between countries, each aimed at more or less restrictive forms of personal freedoms; an extreme weakness of international institutions, however conditioned, as in Europe, by the subordination to the exclusivity of national competences; the incompatibility of the opening of the borders with the pervasive aggressiveness of a virus that does not give any importance to the commercial needs of free movement; the next world economic recession that needs to be addressed with measures similar to those of wartime, leaving aside the liberal aspects to allow an inevitable increase in public debt, given the decrease in consumption and the reduction in supply, and hoping for greater flexibility and availability to a repeated Quantitative Easing, also considering the contraction of international maritime traffic.

To this must be added the political and religious aberrations internal to various countries, which conditioned the first and fundamental interventions to contain the infection without apparently inducing any reflection on the maintenance of health services already in themselves deficient, which allowed Ayatollah Khamenei to define the pandemic as one blessing of Allah aimed at punishing opposing countries; just think (and not only) of Iran, which justified the low electoral flow with an American intervention, and who fears that the virus could deprive it of the influence gained in Iraq and Lebanon.

Unimaginable for the Ayatollah regime, already in a credibility crisis, to close Qom, the object of pilgrimage at the end of the year by Chinese theology students and home to a shrine believed to be miraculous for healings, but evidently not so much as to allow forbidden Friday prayers across the country; it is unacceptable to stop economic activities with China managed by the Pasdaran, even after the outbreak of the epidemic.

In the UK the reactions were contradictory, while in the USA the concrete risk of a recession was immediately profiled which could inhibit the republican electoral chances and consequently affect the security of Israel, unable as of now to follow up on the multi-year program TNUFA² for supporting the multi-pronged activities of Tsahal; another hurricane for Trump Katrina, driven by democratic electoral criticisms against the liberalism of the current administration which aims at the sense of cohesion and support for the President, historically always present in times of crisis.

Of note is Saudi Arabia, where the virus did not stop Bin Salman from shelve high-ranking dissidents, and to continue engaging the confrontation with Russia regarding oil production.

That the pandemic triggered one cognitive war has become evident in the course of its evolution, especially with attempts to download responsibilities from one country to another, sometimes passing (why not?) to the ever-present Jewish conspiracy, and damaging both internal cohesion and relations between States, thanks also to the blameless help offered by the media, forced to guarantee frantic flows of information which, among other things, have amplified the soft power of the various hegemons, interested in stabilizing relations with countries that, in function of mutual future economic interests, manage to contain the contagion.

China, which will have to rethink both a difficult one rehabilitation international and BIS international and strategic interconnections³, both to support small and medium level activities in the face of an economic slowdown, was the first to suffer heavy social and economic repercussions which, globally, could not have involved neither the Asia-Pacific area, let alone the rest of the world markets; the importance of certain sectors now developed in China, such as the technological and pharmaceutical sectors, have already led the USA, for the first time not at the forefront of crisis management but only attentive to their internal front, to review production policy, and to try to bring home skills now more necessary than ever. The EU, meanwhile, remains without a shared political solution and with deep rifts between countries, which poses serious doubts about its stability, also considering the reactions determined by the statements of the President of the ECB, which cast further shadows on economic and financial implications critical.

In Europe the virus took root, and then spread, not only due to the effect of biological dynamics, but also due to the evident impossibility of considering the Old World as a single political and social entity. The reports from Brussels, in this sense, strike for their paradoxicality, for a sense of the grotesque that, in the face of the positions of the Northern countries, negligently ignores the Italian military trucks that lead to the cremation of innocent victims, or that rekindles in Germany a anti-American sentiment fomented by unfounded news and cognitively useful to shift attention from internal political theater to the wider international one.

In summary, the evolution of international relations could lead to a new form of globalization directed by the same actors but with varied balances, highlighting a chilling unpreparedness of the ruling classes who, regardless of the flag, have underestimated the devastating impact of the pandemic, and who are now resorting to buffer measures, such as discounts or suspended prison terms, or restrictions on personal freedoms which, however, do not take into account the state of anoxia in which the economy of the various nations is facing.

If the West suffers from these conditions, how can an acceptable health estate in the MENA area be assumed, in constant and serious social difficulties?

Europe, so not very resilient and attentive only to the short term and to the control of the budgets and the containment of investments in the public sector, will make a new tragic mistake in not foreseeing the containment of new waves of contagion from the South, or of return infected ?

Will Brussels, so far inadequate, be aware of the domino effect of events and of an ever less improbable political and economic suicide?