The political autumn is hotter than the climatic one and does not spare significant geopolitical dynamics; the polls in Moldova have delivered interlocutory results regarding the electoral will regarding both the constitutional changes intended to favor entry into the EU, and to elect the new president, according to a progression that has sharpened the fracture between the east and west of Moldova, according to the Russian-speaking meaning, and of Moldova, according to the Romanian one in use since 1991.
The move by President Sandu (pictured, right), a former economist at the World Bank, failed to achieve the goal of the winner takes it all, she was only partially successful in her intent: if it is true that the polls seemed to push her towards a victory that was all too predictable, the ballot boxes have clipped the wings of optimism, generating fears for a run-off that is no longer so obvious due to the support that her opponent Stoianoglo, who jumped from the 10% of the projections to around 26 – 29% of the votes, will receive from the pro-Russian coalition.
The Russian-Romanian toponymy highlights fault lines accentuated by the nearby Ukrainian war and exacerbated since Chișinău applied for EU membership, obtaining, from June 2022, the status of candidate and thus opening a double front, eminently political on the one hand, purely technical on the other in terms of evaluation by the members of the Union, and under the threat of possible complaints from the countries still on the waiting list. It is no coincidence that President Sandu has indicated 2030 as the deadline for setting the objective of achieving continental access, while President Macron has already proposed, according to usual height , the officialization of an essentially political community. But there is no lack of thinly veiled accusations of Russian interference in the Moldovan electoral arena, also in light of the recent arrests of around 300 people who, recently, would have moved between Russia, Bosnia and Serbia to receive a sort of training aimed at operations to destabilize public order; the stone guest is therefore the disinformation which rejects any possible departure from Muscovite influence.
The result of the referendum and elections will therefore be transformed into a golden or leaden ticket depending on whose presidential pocket it is inserted, whether that of the pro-European Sandu or that of the Russian-speaking Stoianoglo; Moldova is a paradox: less than 3 million inhabitants and an exorbitant geopolitical weight.
While Chisinau is trying to adapt to Euro-Atlanticism, Moscow is aiming to destabilize Moldova from within, also thanks to the collaboration offered by Evghenia Guțul, governor of Gagauzia, heap internal Moldovan autonomous region, only apparently insignificant in the broader game of international relations that confirm the Kremlin's imperial predilection for the strategic use of relatively small regions, notably Transnistria and Gagauzia, as useful destabilizing pawns after Transcaucasia, Ossetia, Ukrainian Donbass and Crimea. But if Transnistria is a separatist state with a Russian military presence, Gagauzia, although autonomous, remains under Moldovan sovereignty, therefore reluctantly subject to the referendum results.
The Russian model suggests that Moldova may be about to face deadly challenges as it is considered a strategic target. As in a serial novel, Guțul represents Șor, the pro-Russian party1 of the multi-sanctioned oligarch Ilan Shor2, allegedly a fugitive between Russia and Israel and implicated since 2014 in a billion-dollar scam against three Moldovan banks, a fraud that has caused a significant decrease in GDP. It is therefore not surprising that Russia is trying to sabotage elections and referendums with disinformation, economic and banking pressure, as well as transcendent (but not too much) moral suasion practiced by religious institutions aimed at rekindling anti-EU sentiment3. If Ukraine and Georgia have already suffered Russian attacks, both militarily and through asymmetric destabilizations, the geographical position and federal troops stationed in neighboring Transnistria make Moldova a sensitive target despite the unsolicited excuses (or of the accusations manifest?) by Kremlin spokesman Peskov who, indeed, urges President Sandu to provide concrete evidence of Russian interference; it is worth noting how Putin's constant revisionist statements lead to surreptitiously depicting Moldova as a historical Russian territory4 while keeping Transnistria in a position of conflict suspended, at least as long as the Ukrainian war keeps the fighting at a distance. The destabilization carried out by Moscow, stigmatized by the EU and the USA, has been further brought to the fore by President Sandu, who denounced an attack (asymmetrical5) unprecedented for democracy.
And Europe? the old continent on the one hand has provided assistance aimed at humanitarian support for displaced Ukrainians together with macro-financial support6 in favor of what is among the poorest countries in Europe, temporarily liberalizing trade in key agri-food products and promoting the modernization of Moldovan FA; on the other hand, it has sent signals of dangerous uncertainty about the validity and feasibility of joint projects. Interesting are the regional affinities that bring together Moldova and Georgia, both interested in important electoral consultations in the same time frames; small countries with medium-low income, marked by the influence of oligarchic politics, both candidates for EU membership, both involved in consultations that represent a crossroads between East and West. It should not be forgotten that Georgia has opted for a de facto political distancing from the constitutional dictate despite the counter-tendency of the people that the West is calling for. President Sandu herself, fearing Kremlin plans aimed at establishing direct control in Moldova, has predicted an attempt to establish a different power in Chișinău thanks to violent actions, disguised as protests by the so-called opposition7.
A pro-Western Moldova obviously has not only European aspirations, but also stimulates transatlantic ambitions that induce Moscow to look incrementally beyond Odessa, and Washington to devote greater attention and assistance to Chișinău, supporting energy security.8, infrastructure, military equipment, all activities destined to continue regardless of the outcome of the 2024 and 2025 elections.
Brigitta Triebel, director of the CDU political foundation, Adenauer Stiftung, in Chișinău, agrees that the outcome of the referendum will influence the race for the presidential run-off; if Sandu's prestige remained intact, as demonstrated by the over 40% of votes obtained, Linking his re-election to the EU referendum has not paid off, which now forces the delicate art of compromise aimed at attracting votes from the pro-Russian camp.
It can therefore be said that taking Maia Sandu's victory for granted falls within the range of risks suggested by evaluations distorted by beliefs. à la page in the West but completely incongruous in an East that has not hesitated to resort to instrumentalisation and the use of influences which have also been strengthened by the mooted reduction in Russian energy flows9Moscow's politics are, however, more subtle than they appear, as the Kremlin does not seem to be seeking an annexation of Moldova, which would alienate the region, preferring instead to play on the exercise of pressure points that make Chișinău flexibly dependent, also in view of the 2025 parliamentary elections.
Currently Moldova is among those who are suspended, eager for Europe, fearful of reactions from the (not so) old dominus, subject to the Caudine Forks of nebulous borders due to the self-proclaimed independence of Russian-speaking Transnistria; in this sense an uncertain runoff will decide the fate of the country, also in light of a not overwhelming referendum result that, geopolitically, is reflected in the clash between Russia and the Euro-Western bloc. If in the West a ceasefire in Ukraine is considered feasible by next spring, it is also true that the balance of international political crystal tends to be disturbed by the American elections and by Central European politics, imbued with a persistent Balkan scent.
The Russian approach consists in buying time by keeping Moldova in limbo and encouraging internal divisions, in light of cooperation with NATO and stigmatization of Moscow as the main threat. It is no coincidence that Minister Lavrov defined traitors Moldovan policies, capable of transforming the country into next Ukraine, a threat that was not kept but which did not ease the pressure aimed at encouraging Moldovan state weakness, social polarization, and friction with Transnistria.
Despite Putin's repeated vilification of Chisinau, there is no doubt that Moscow remains determined to bring Moldova into its sphere of influence.10, strong in the political support of the very poor Gagauzia, a rebel acquiescently dependent on the benevolent Moldovan budget. In concrete terms, despite having specific imperial political weight, Moscow still offers nothing to compensate for the 2,2 billion euros that Brussels, since 2021, has made available to an all too often unaware Moldovan society, exhausted by economic difficulties, terrified by a war that is too close, in the impossible search for easy solutions, for which it is willing to barter sovereignty in exchange for the flimsy Russian promises.
There are many fronts for Sandu, too many: a judicial system to be reformed, the difficulty in prosecuting corruption, the fight against Russian interference, a geopolitics that has brought national identity and history back to the forefront; all political vulnerabilities that the electorate, in voting, has associated in a melting pot with the majority party, the PAS.
Bringing Moldova into the EU but without Transnistria, according to the Cypriot model, deprives the separatists of any influence. Although Brussels may consider this alternative, it is impossible to even theorize Chișinău's accession to the EU while Moscow retains military control of part of its internationally recognized territory; moreover, unlike Cyprus, the tertium in question is not a member of NATO.
There is no doubt that the Ukrainian invasion has drawn new lines of demarcation in the East, followed by the Atlantic accession of Finland and Sweden, with Belarus increasingly indistinguishable from its Muscovite neighbor. If the political geography of Ukraine is in fieri, Moldova remains in a gray area, where the lack of solutions in addressing internal and Transnistrian polarization will keep the country in an undesirable indeterminacy, contested by Moscow and an interested Kiev.
1 Declared unconstitutional and banned.
2 Shor allegedly offered to pay voters to persuade them to take certain directions on social media platforms, claiming that this was a legitimate use of his money.
3 According to WatchDog.MD, Russian politics has heavily invested in euros to support disinformation on Facebook fueling themes such as: the West will involve Moldova in the Ukrainian conflict; Russia remains the main market for Moldovan agriculture; hybrid warfare is a term invented by the Moldovan government to push back the opposition.
4 According to Chatham House, Moscow is attacking Moldova's public information space to undermine social cohesion.
5 In 2023, no fewer than 20 Russian websites were blocked, an action that has provoked protests for decisions taken by decree and without political or judicial control. According to an analysis by the Stockholm-based Center for East European Studies, Russia would have the intent to overthrow the reformist government in Chisinau, take political control of Moldova and prevent it from further moving closer to the West, and in particular from becoming a member of the European Union.
6 In Chișinău's move towards the EU, Ursula von der Leyen has promised 1,8 billion euros in funding.
7 Since April 2023, the Civilian Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova) has been established with theobiettivo to strengthen the country's security against crises and hybrid threats to protect the country's territorial integrity. It is worth noting the recent request for protection from Moscow by the authorities of the self-proclaimed Republic of Transnistria from the government of Moldova according to procedures that recall what happened shortly before on 24 February 2022, with the Russian recognition of the separatist Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in the Ukrainian Donbass.
8 Moldova is currently not dependent on Russian gas and is about to overcome Transnistria's dependence on electricity. By 2025, an efficient transmission capacity from the EU should be built, allowing access to the Romanian electricity market, thanks to green energy and the Cernavoda nuclear power plant.
9 Gazprom, the majority owner of Moldovagaz operator and a monopoly gas supplier, reduced daily deliveries by a third in 2022. With winter looming, Moldova had to organize gas imports from Europe by diverting Russian supplies to Transnistria.
10 Rustam Minnekaev, deputy commander of the Russian Central Military District, two months into the invasion, declared that the Russian army, which had in the meantime captured the Ukrainian city of Kherson, would move along the coast to Odessa, cutting off Ukraine from the Black Sea, to reunite with the Russian contingent in Transnistria; a plan that never materialized, since in the fall of 2022 the Ukrainian army retook Kherson, pushing the Russians back beyond the Dnieper.
Photo: Preşedinţia Republicii Moldova
