Four years have passed since when the French army entered Mali to block the expansion of al-Qaeda, which has now reached a step away from the capital Bamako. The operation as a whole, led to the drastic reduction of jihadist groups present in the territory of West Africa but the last year and a half has seen an understandable slow weakening of the French results and a permanent weakness of the Institutions of the African State. But why to guarantee a usefulness to the French intervention and eradicate the terrorist problem in this area is it necessary to think of a material support to the European soldiers already present?
In 2013, the intervention of the French Special Forces, which operated in close cohesion with the French army, air force and navy, was aimed at liberating Malistan: that northern area of Mali which has become since the beginning of the problem of Islamic terrorism a veritable stronghold of al-Qaeda. Once the operation was completed, France expanded its fight against terrorism, according to the plans of the United Nations, in the territories of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritiana and Niger. Meanwhile, the European Union was deploying a military formation in Bamako in support of the Armed Forces of Mali to support them in the rejection of the state and in the estate in the north of the country. The tasks of training the Malian Forces in counter-terrorism and in particular in preventing a re-emergence of al-Qaeda were not simple and some jihadist groups continued to operate.
If it is true al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was badly damaged by the first attacks of 2013 and it is equally true that some of its leaders, such as Mokthar Belmokthar, survived. Some intelligence agencies believe that he was killed in Libya following a US air raid in 2015 but, nonetheless, his armed group continues to operate in Mali. Other terrorist cells also continued to act undisturbed: this is the case of the Movement for Unity and Justice in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar al Dine, but not only: in 2015 a new entity arose, the Liberation of Macina, who carried out a series of attacks across the country.
In late 2015, al-Qaeda, in collaboration with al-Mourabitoun, stormed the Radisson Hotel, one of the most important landing points for international guests in the Malian capital, taking 170 civilians hostage. This act has clearly shown that there are still obvious flaws in the security system which, from the initial alert phase of 2013-2014, is gradually deteriorating. Subsequently, another hundred attacks were claimed by AQIM both in Mali and in neighboring countries: in the first months of 2016, Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast were targeted due to their support to the United Nations for the stabilization plan of the African territory of 2014.
Mali has always been a cradle for small terrorist groups that very often changed their alliances for the convenience of the moment but with the growth of the Islamic State in 2015, some Malaysian jihadist cells swore allegiance to it. If today it is true that ISIS is in progressive withdrawal (just think of the liberation of Sirte and the progress in the Libyan theater) it is equally true that the situation of the African country and of AQIM continues to be worrying and should not be underestimated: persistence Islamic fundamentalist groups are constantly contributing to undermining efforts to build a solid state. The current Malian context, with its socio-economic factors and the persistent activity of the Wahabbite Sunnis, remains too fertile for the development of Salafist jihadist cells.
In light of this, it is clear that the French presence in the African State must be considered an asset and must find material support in the other States interested in the elimination of Islamic terrorism, with particular reference to the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and those of the Union. European. France has stationed more than a thousand men in the northern part of Mali and has continued uninterrupted operations against jihadists from 2013 to date, killing top elements such as Abu Baher al Nasr, Ahmed al Tilemsi and Omer Ould Hamah, but now it is employed on too many fronts, first of all that of internal security. The constant attacks show that France is reasonably under target due to its intervention also for the commitment in Africa. The risk is that there will be a point where Paris reduces the commitment of the troops for domestic needs and that Mali will once again become a haunt of terrorists.
Prevention of this scenario is undoubtedly a priority: France needs strong support, help that is not an end in itself or addressed to another country but a direct aid to the fight and eradication of Islamic terrorism. A return to the pre-2013 Malaysian situation would mean a great victory for armed anti-occidentalism both on the material and, above all, on the moral level, greatly strengthening fundamentalism.
(photo: État-major des armées)
