The evolution of the crisis in Idlib has led to the hoped-for meeting between Putin and Erdogan; meeting expected also in light of the pressures that events are exerting on regional relations. For Ankara, Idlib constitutes an unavoidable test of strength conditioned by the Kremlin's permission to grant a (ephemeral?) Tactical success, which would allow to stop the Syrian-Russian offensive on the last part of Syria occupied by the rebels. For Turkey, it would be a matter of advancing towards the Aleppo - Mosul line, or the border to which Atatürk was pointing since 1920. The Turkish action, however, could indicate innovative aspects in the relationship both with Washington, as - now - useful NATO ally, that showed no particular opposition to the shooting down of two Russian-made Syrian fighter planes, and that it received requests for war support from Ankara, both with Moscow, which had to test Erdogan's will.
The Turkish operation in Idlib, carried out with drones, slowed down the advance of Assad, imposing a diversification of the Iranian Pasdaran and Hezbollah operations, now exposed in the counter-offensive along the M5 highway. This evolution could make the March 5 meeting, presumably aimed at updating the agreement signed in Sochi in 2018, more understandable, which in fact provides for a withdrawal of Syrian forces.
Facilitate Erdogan, second Realpolitik, would allow to reposition both Assad and Tehran, to legitimize Turkish positions, strengthening the Russian role as a great mediator.
From this perspective, Turkey could achieve a twofold objective: to work to strengthen its deterrence, carving out a 30 km deep security zone along the border, perhaps assuming the accommodation of at least 1 of the 5 million refugees it hosts on its territory, and stand as a champion of the Sunnis.
However, it should be stressed that, at the moment, despite Turkish declarations of wanting to avoid an escalation with the Kremlin, tensions remain lively, given that Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has accused Europe of deliberately wanting to ignore the illegal deployment of Turkish troops. on Syrian soil, especially those aimed at controlling the strategic hub of Saraqib, 20 km from Idlib, and that Israel has not failed to make its voice heard, beating Syrian positions in Homs and Quneitra with air attacks right at the dawn of March 5.
Beyond the diplomatic appearances and the frictions that have existed in the past between the Russian and Turkish Armed Forces, there is to be stressed the stiffening of mutual political positions according to divergent strategic objectives, which once again leads to Considering the liaison between Ankara and the Kremlin as tactical and not deep-sighted, evidence of this are the multiple violations of the Sochi agreement, which is more useful than anything else to free the field from international actors that Moscow has both wanted to marginalize, and to try to replace, as in the case of the USA.
In Idlib, Turkey aims to support the opposition forces thereby controlling the territory, while Moscow intends to annihilate possible opponents of Assad. Turkey could now focus on a speedy ceasefire, which however could not be decisive, given that the future Syrian political set-up is not possible to have knowledge.
The uncertainty that hovers is what, in fact, led Erdogan to open borders, pressing an EU that is less and less attentive to international dynamics. In this regard, Turkish action is even more to be stigmatized, given that it has been and still is conducted in violation of the agreements entered into in Brussels in 2016 (and the consequent and substantial funds received), and is aimed at creating a strong bag of instability against the usual rival: Greece.
Remarkable - for imprecision and blatant partisanship - the comments of the generalist press who, obtusely, intended to blame the Greek government, almost wanting to ignore films and testimonies that lead back the migratory wave in the hands of the Turkish regime which, with this policy, wants that Close to the Russian government to slow down its action on Idlib.
One of the hypotheses on which to base a temporary agreement, however supported by Washington, could be based, on a tactical level, on the full restitution of the M4 and M5 highways to Assad, however allowing the creation of the buffer zone desired by Ankara. In this context, the American interest in a rapprochement in Ankara should not be underestimated, driven by the not too hidden desire to contain Assad but, above all, Putin.
In the game of the parties, given that in any case it will be a truce, despite the divergence on the points of view, a break between Ankara and Moscow is therefore unlikely, but one can imagine an American rapprochement with Turkey, in a more general framework of political balance regional, thanks to which to make Assad swallow the toad of an undeniable loss of sovereignty.
One aspect that should be highlighted is the fickleness of Turkish politics which, cornered, is forced to request missile batteries from its beloved / hated overseas ally. Patriot to replace the S400, while trying to mend relations with Moscow; in short, very little optimism, given that Putin can certainly not accept either an open-faced Syrian Turkish confrontation that would reopen the civil war, nor move too far from the wake of Trump's foreign policy. It could be, for Erdogan, a moment of rare difficulty, between the Russian anvil and the American hammer, with the uncertainty of the political direction assumed by the Kurds, who had the strategic intuition to agree with Assad.
Last but not least, the assistance offered to Russia by some Sunni countries which, as happened with Egypt and the UAE, have re-established diplomatic ties with Syria.
Photo: Kremlin / Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri / White House
