The worsening of Covid-19, in some cases, does not seem to prevent the evolution of the crises underlying international relations. Libya is not exempt from these dynamics; an index of the criticality of the situation was highlighted with the resignation of Ghassan Salamè, head of the UN delegation; resignation which, for many, did not constitute a surprise, regardless of the alleged "health problems", so as to suggest a decision driven by external elements, perhaps from those same segments of power that have repeatedly accused Salamè of not being able to understand the Libyan reality, and of not being able to win the trust of the Tripolina wing or that of Benghazi, towards which he was accused of a wait and see which allowed Haftar to continue its action aimed at taking Derna and Fezzan according to an (unjust) assessment that did not take into account the lack of respect for the Field Marshal. Beyond everything Salamè, throwing in the towel, left Libya in chaos and with an inconsistent oil production.
Precisely the drop in revenues attributable to the extraction of crude oil is penalizing the efficiency of the Libyan health service which, already proven by years of war, sees a source of resources extinguishing useful for the payment of hospital staff. Moreover, despite the apparent acceptance of the UN invitation of 22 March of a humanitarian truce for the pandemic in progress, the violations have followed one another with mutual accusations, thus sanctioning a state of perennial hostility determined by the fragility of the agreements already made starting from the Berlin Conference which has not produced any lasting value results; given the position of strength acquired, a humanitarian truce, for Haftar, is not very advantageous, given that, among other things, the general has managed to receive broad international recognition despite not being head of an internationally recognized government.
No suspension of the conflict therefore, because it would impose coordinated actions with the counterpart, but which will inevitably increase the health emergency, with in the background the constant support provided by the various mentors, starting with the Syrian mercenaries in support of Serraj, to move to Emirate, Egyptian and Jordanian aid for Haftar which can also count on the first internal rifts in the Tripoli government, with the Interior Minister Fathi Pashaga committed to pursuing an action of rapprochement to the USA and UK which seems much more personal than collegiate, and aimed at containing the power of the militias. In this respect, the declarations of the LNA spokesman, Mismari, who revealed that the Command, in compliance with the UN requests, could decide to stop hostilities against Tripoli to confirm the desire to establish a unity government, should not be underestimated. national with the task of leading the country to the elections.
At the moment, to counter Haftar's action, Serraj has started the self-defense operation Peace storm, further element of concern for those chancelleries who, in spite of the coronavirus, manage to keep the bar on foreign policy, paying attention, moreover, to the uncertain respect of the embargo on weapons destined for Libya.
Beyond the good intentions, Haftar took control of the city of Zliten, and part of the areas in front of the Tunisian border, continuing to launch missiles on Tripoli from the al Watiya Air Base (still under dispute), a short distance from the capital, with further legitimacy the use of force by the general, following the controversial results of Berlin, more useful to mark the definitive decline of the moral suasion European.
Given the weakness of the recognized government, and the will of Elder Haftar, determined to block the oil pipelines, the only way that seems most logically to lead to the end of hostilities is the one that passes through the debellatio of one of the conflicting parties.
In the meantime Haftar has approached the Tunisian border, waiting to coordinate with the local government; note that the fleeing Tripoline forces are heading right towards the Tunisian border. The assault on the Libyan capital, meanwhile, feeds concerns both in Algeria and in Tunisia, conscious of an increase in regional instability, also considering the extreme border porosity of an area which is also sparsely populated and difficult to control for the purpose of preserving integrity of oil plants.
Unlike Egypt, which confirmed its pro Haftar line, both Algiers and Tunis preferred to maintain equidistant neutrality, avoiding, beyond official formalities, getting involved in the Libyan conflict, probably also due to the complex political conditions - internal economics. The Algerian position, in this regard, sees the recognition of the GNA, but does not deny a decisive role in Haftar, engaged in the Fezzan campaign precisely in coincidence with the Algerian protests against yet another candidacy of President Bouteflika.
Another aspect that can lead Haftar to concern and lead him to decide for a further acceleration of events, can be found in the new Tunisian government of Elyes Fakhfakh, in which the presence of the Islamist party Ennahda, in support of Turkey and Qatar, could make tip the balance towards Serraj's GNA.
At this moment, therefore, with the Petromonarchies in political support, but geographically distant, Tunisia is facing growing security problems that highlight the need for coordination and sharing of information, tactical and strategic planning and evaluation; this in light of the memory, always alive, of the unforeseeable threats that, over time, have come from the Libyan neighbor.
It is worth mentioning the Gafsa incident of 1980, in which Libya organized an armed action against the Tunisian government, which was followed in 2016 by the action of fifty ISIS militants who, coming from the Libyan city of Sabratha, they tried to take possession of the center of Ben Gardane. Hence the Tunisian need to remedy the tactical and operational deficiencies according to a plan projected to contain the possible Libyan trajectories from now to at least 20 years, since, moreover, Tunis over time has remained without constant political and administrative reference points in Tripoli . It is undeniable that Libya remains a concern for Tunisian national security, in a context in which the Tunisian military are forced on the one hand to make contact with the multiple representatives of the various Libyan militias, on the other hand to continue to support the diplomatic path.
While Tunisia closes its borders to contain the coronavirus, pressure is growing on the neighboring states with Libya for an intervention to the detriment of Haftar's ambitions; despite the assurances of Tunisian President Saied that he does not intend to move away from his proclaimed neutrality, the general issued the orders necessary to control the border between Ras Jedir and Dhehiba, to prevent Tunisia from becoming a jihadist tank with the connivance of the Muslim Brotherhood.
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