An interesting aspect emerged during the border clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, already widely described on the geopolitical side in a previous analysis (v.articolo), was the massive use of UAV by the contenders. This is not a novelty in the strict sense since the first use of unmanned aircraft experimentally by the contenders dates back to at least 20 years ago. However, what began as a muted experiment has slowly taken on the contours of a large-scale phenomenon heralding further evolutions from unexpected existences, as seen from the experiences of the "Four Days War" of April 2016 and the clashes border crossing in July 2020.
During the last arms fights, which took place along the internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani claimed to have shot down 5 Armenian UAVs while in turn the Armenians claimed the killing of 13 Azerbaijani UAVs. Also this time it seemed to witness the ballet of figures that regularly peeps out in the spread propaganda shots of the parties in conflict (propaganda which, it should be remembered, is sometimes the result of deliberate disinformation maneuvers while other times it is the product of the so-called "fog of war ”, the uncertainty of the news coming from the battlefields). However, while Azerbaijani forces have not presented any type of evidence to date in support of their claims, their Armenian counterparts this time caught everyone on the counterattack by organizing, in July 21, a large-scale press conference in an open space in the during which the remains of the Azerbaijani UAVs shot down over the previous days were shown for the benefit of the press and military analysts.
It is interesting to note the fact that, while some UAVs had been destroyed by fire from the Air Defense units, others were "relatively intact" and therefore most likely victims of cyber attacks (Iranian-style) or hijacked by the electronic and electromagnetic impulses of the original EW systems Russian, serving in the Armenian Armed Forces, which have also demonstrated their deadly effectiveness in the southern Caucasus (as already in Syria).
At the same time, the press office of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia published the videos of the shootings of the enemy drones taken by the servants of the anti-aircraft batteries as well as the shooting of the battlefields, this time performed by their drones, apparently free to operate without many Azerbaijani interference.
The Armenian initiative, to tell the truth an authentic "first time" in this genre, had a certain echo and allowed the small Caucasian republic to claim the "palm of victory" as regards the "information war" dimension of the recent resurgence of the conflict.
But how did drones infiltrate the military doctrines and operational uses of Caucasian duelists?
As previously stated, the use of UAVs in this part of the world dates back to the early 2000s and the initiator of this trend was Azerbaijan. Since the end of the "Nagorno-Karabakh War" of 1988-94, Azerbaijan, defeated and crashed militarily, decided to replace the operations of "conventional war" with a real "war intifada" in order to unnervate the determination of the Armenians and force them to abandon Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh). Starting from this political-strategic necessity, and in the framework of a progressive strengthening of their armed forces thanks to the proceeds from the sale of oil and gas, the Azeris have turned to their international sponsors in order to always obtain new armaments. And one of the weapons that Baku's strategists recognized as fundamental to prevail over their enemies were the UAVs, in particular those produced by the State of Israel. This is not the place and time to talk about 360-degree relations between the State of Israel and the Republic of Azerbaijan; for the moment we will only remember that, from a military point of view, Azerbaijan has quickly established itself as one of the main customers of the "made in Israel" arsenals since the 1988-94 war.
Turkey, the great sponsor of the Caspian state and also a longtime customer of the military products of the "state with the Star of David", acted as an intermediary in a very short time, but subsequently Baku learned to move quickly with his own legs .
It is not clear exactly which and how many UAVs are in service at the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan even though it is known that they are controlled mainly by the Air Forces. It is undoubtedly true that part of the sums of money of the "mega-billion dollar contracts", which the Baku authorities trumpet with the same regularity of the seasons, are spent on the purchase of Israeli drones just as it is true that, starting from 2005 , Azerbaijan's Ministry of Defense Industries have started to independently produce a certain portion of their arsenals, including UAVs, but the outline of the picture is still very smoky.
To find some concrete facts one must, paradoxically, "turn to Armenia". In fact, it is on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as on the front line in Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) that Azerbaijan uses the new types of UAV as soon as they enter service and, given that the Armenians shoot them down with equal regularity, we can be sure that, in a few months, the remains of Baku's new "toys" will be shown in front of the cameras for use and consumption by defense analysts around the world.
By following this modus operandi it has been possible to verify that, over the years, Baku has put into service UAVs of the type: IAI Searcher, IAI Harpy, IAI Heron (photo), Aeronautics Defense Orbiter, Aeronautics Defense Dominator, Elbit Hermes 450 and Elbit Hermes 900, in addition to the UCAV of the IAI Harop type. The latter then made an entry literally "with a bang", during the 2016 war, when a specimen was filmed by cameras in the act of crashing into a bus loaded with Armenian volunteers heading to the front killing at least a dozen and injuring many others.
As already said, it is not easy to evaluate the types and numbers of Azerbaijan drones, however in light of what has been said so far, we can say that to date Baku deploys: UAVs of Israeli origin directly supplied by Israel, UAVs of Israeli origin produced under license in Turkey and UAVs of Israeli origin produced under license by Azerbaijan itself. There are rumors, however, that after years of dependence on Israel, the Azeris now want to differentiate their sources of drone supplies and that they are keeping an eye with particular interest on the indisputable successes that Turkey has achieved in the last few years in this field.
After having long been dependent on the United States of America and the State of Israel for UAV and UCAV supplies, Turkey is now absolutely autonomous in this sense and the Turkish military industry can be considered a superpower in the sector. The Armed Forces of Ankara have used drones massively in the conflicts of Syria, Iraq and Libya and, it seems that the strategists of the Turkish Crescent have completely and enthusiastically embraced the Iranian military doctrine of the massive and generalized use of drones in the war, in this so differentiating themselves from their original suppliers, the Americans and the Israelis, who even operating with UAVs and UCAVs for decades already seem to have been "a little behind" from the doctrinal point of view and are "less open-minded". Given that, to date, Turkish industries have been able to produce at least forty different models of UAV and UCAV (not to mention those of foreign origin produced under license), it is clear that Baku's chances of obtaining supplies are enormous.
Instead, the path taken by Armenia was different, whose first UAVs began to fly around 2010; unlike Azerbaijan, however, Armenia immediately decided to follow the path of autarchy. The reasons that led Yerevan to opt for this choice are essentially two. First: avoid like the plague of compromising one's national security in a strategic sector such as that of UAVs by relying on foreign suppliers, especially the Israelis, who already did gold business with Turkey and Azerbaijan, the two enemy countries of the Armenia par excellence. Second: boosting its hi-tech sector and all the small and large companies of Armenia that for years have been driving the development of the high-tech economy segment in close collaboration with the country's university centers. Although this strategy has not proved easy to travel and has required time, money and patience to be put into practice, it has proven to be a paying one in the long run, and today there are several Armenian companies very active in the design and production of UAVs. whose performance, however, is not easy to assess given the refractory nature of the Armenian authorities to allow the export of these means considered "strategic".
Equally complicated is assessing which and how many UAVs are in service with the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia and with the Defense Army of Artsakh. Since the Azerbaijani counterparts have not proved to be as effective in shooting down Armenian drones, despite having very good anti-aircraft defense systems on paper, the only other way forward is to study the "models" shown in the course. of military parades or in videos relating to military exercises. However, it is good to remember that the Armenians are quite "buttoned up" when it comes to revealing the true numerical entity and potential of their armed forces and the means provided and "never fully show what they really have".
After this premise we can say that the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia and the Defense Army of Artsakh have adopted with certainty at least 4 different types of UAV: the Basé, the X-55 (photo), the Krunk and the 'Azniv.
The Basé is the smallest of all and carries out reconnaissance operations at team or section level, in particular in support of the operations of the Special Forces or outposts on the front line.
The X-55 is a little larger and performs reconnaissance operations in support of battalion or regiment level operations. The Krunk and the Azniv (the latter represents an evolution of the previous one) carry out both tactical and strategic reconnaissance operations and have proved to be excellent support platforms for directing the artillery fire during the endless skirmishes along the extensive front line.
The Krunk in particular (which in Armenian means "crane") entered service in 2011 and has since been constantly updated and improved (so much so that at least 11 different variants have entered into service!) And has surprised many international observers, even the Israelis themselves, for its characteristics and performance.
The sudden appearance of the UCAV IAI Harop among the means at the disposal of Azerbaijan, during the 2016 blitzkrieg, literally shocked the Armenians (the secret services of Yerevan for once failed and did not anticipate entering service of this medium) who first publicly rejected an Israeli secret offer for the purchase of the same medium and then mobilized their technological sector which in the following 4 years churned out numerous indigenous UCAV models, among which at least 2 are were adopted and used in the recent clashes of July 2016: the BEEB 1800 and the HRESH (Armenian "monster"). The latter, in particular, became the protagonist of a small international intrigue when several Israeli observers associated him with the Uvision-produced HERO-30 Israeli UCAV, subsequently accusing Armenia of being a "UCAV technology thief", a circumstance rejected dryly by the top of the ProMAQ group, a conglomerate of several companies operating in the drone sector founded immediately after the 2016 war and reporting directly to the government and military authorities of Yerevan.
Beyond the diplomatic quarrel it seems that there is no basis in the Israeli accusations because, in a thorough evaluation, the HRESH does not look like any of the Uvision products (and those who have correlated the HRESH with the HERO-30 perhaps would have better to put it in relation instead with the HERO-400EC which is much more similar to the Armenian UCAV both aesthetically and in performance, instead of the HERO-30 which is totally different) but it seems rather a "shrunken" version of the Serbian missile ALAS with which has in common the same guide system and a fairly marked aesthetic similarity in addition to the same flexibility of use. It is curious that in the course of the clashes of July 2020 Azerbaijan openly accused Serbia of selling arms and military technology to Armenia, a circumstance later confirmed (even if minimized) by the Belgrade authorities, thus opening the possibility that, effectively, there may be some degree of kinship between the Armenian UCAV HRESH and the Serbian missile ALAS.
Finally, during the clashes in July 2020, the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) announced the start of mass production of a UCAV "made in Stepanakert" after a development that lasted two years and ended with an experimental use in the field weapon against Azerbaijani positions. Unfortunately, at the moment, apart from the videos released by the nagornine authorities, nothing is known about this UCAV, not even the name.
To conclude, we have seen how the situation of perennial conflict between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) on the one hand and Azerbigian on the other has created the fertile ground for the development and deployment by the contenders of important UAV and UCAV fleets which have already been massively used and whose use will predictably see an escalation in the future, causing new innovations in war strategies that can then be exported to other contexts of conflict in other areas of the world, even at our doorsteps. One more reason not to turn to the other side and keep our attention high on this hot area of contemporary geopolitics.
Photo: Republic of Armenia MoD / presidency of the Reupublic of Turkey / IAI / Azerbaijani Defense Ministry / Jonj7490 / Youtube
