Moldova Elections: A Battle Won, But the War (For Independence) Continues

While the US is preparing for one of the most painful electoral rounds in recent years, the tiny Moldova has concluded its presidential runoff. The impossibility of making comparisons is obvious, however, in an eminently European context, the outcome of the Moldovan vote has a relevance that cannot be overlooked.

As re-elected President Sandu recalled, Chișinău must prepare for another complex summer election, destined to establish the composition of the Parliament; elections where nothing can be taken for granted, given the possible and not unprecedented signs that could influence the consultations. It is no coincidence that during the two weeks preceding the runoff, the presidential staff intensified the campaign on social media and in rural centers to try to oppose the buying and selling of votes that seems to have corrupted, but not irreparably affected the outcome of the vote.

despite the police-certified disinformation operations, which has also opened investigations into the alleged organization of organized transports to induce Moldovans living in Russia¹ Voters in Belarus, Azerbaijan and Turkey, following dynamics similar to those in Georgia, had a higher turnout of 54,2% than in the first round, also considering the extremely small pro-EU majority and the unexpected performance of the opponent Stoianoglo, champion of the pro-Russian socialist party.

If there is one lesson to be learned for the future, it is that we must consider Cum grain salis the percentages resulting from the polls, given that the disparity between the latter and the results has forced us to consider influences and divisions in Moldovan society itself, phenomena that appear shocking but are peculiar to a country in which the vote has always shown strong contradictions, both by now actually drawing on the EU to recall the local government, and by reminding us that the so-called sentiment pro-Russian is a phenomenon to be interpreted in light of the harsh social conditions and the disillusionment towards a political class often perceived as inadequate.

In Moldova, taking the pro-European inclination as a given is too simplistic². If Sandu, re-ascending to the presidency with 55,4%, has adopted a political and reformist posture similar to the progressive one, avoiding maximalism and geopolitical divisions too complex to explain, Stoianoglo, with 44,6% has been very careful not to be swallowed up by rhetoric dangerously too close to the Kremlin, supporting (incredibly?) integration into the EU.

The vote showed that Moldova is not one-dimensional politically, and that the consultations are very useful to understand the level of influence exercised by Moscow, especially after the support offered by Chișinău to Kiev. Currently, almost all Moldovan political forces avoid presenting themselves as blatantly pro-Russian, including the Socialist Party, which had promised to bring Moldova into the circle of the Eurasian Economic Union led by Moscow on the basis of mutual and pragmatic convenience.

In fact, the Kremlin has never been able to fully exercise its power soft power in Moldova, limiting itself to veiled threats (and not only) economic sanctions while the West insisted on supporting NGOs and infrastructure projects. In any case, Moldovan internal support for Russia remains significant, although it is not certain how long Moscow will be able to enjoy it. It is interesting to note, however, that the detachment matured by Sandu on Stoianoglo was decisively favored by the foreign votes of the diaspora; it is no coincidence that the socialists contested the election outcome, accusing exogenous pressure favored by the opening of polling stations in Western countries to reduce them in other locations. There is no doubt that the management of events has highlighted forms of pragmatic and calm realism, capable of balancing, net of demagogy, the policies implemented by Moscow. Looking ahead, the confirmation of the president for her second term should allow the pro-European thrust to be maintained, provided that the bar is held firmly in view of the 2025 political elections.

However, the problems remain clearly highlighted, starting with the Transnistria, whose reintegration will certainly be, even if the opportunity arises, extremely difficult, especially in light of the consolidated Russian military presence which, however, has not been joined by the troops that, expected, should have joined from Ukraine following an offensive which, at the moment unfinished, has determined a strong commercial contraction between Kiev and Tiraspol³, now tied to Moldova to access external markets. The Moldovan strategy consists in injecting dynamism into the process by inducing Transnistria to make more lenient demands both by penalizing separatism via code and by depriving Transnistrian companies of their privileges⁴. However, the problem connected to the use of Russian gas remains pending, which, free for Tiraspol, was functional to the electricity production then resold to Moldova, a contingency that induced Chișinău to turn to the European market, affecting the Russian monopoly Gazprom. It remains to be seen if and how the energy agreement with Moscow will be renewed, in the absence of which the relatively easier solution will remain the purchase on the Western market also taking charge of Transnistria.

Assuming a reunification with Tiraspol, the situation would certainly not be easy, given that it could produce a wave of unemployment that would be difficult to manage. In short, an extremely complex scenario, also considering the Russian military presence that generates more than a little worry, together with the appeals launched by the separatists to Moscow, not so dissimilar from those that triggered the annexations of Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk in Ukraine⁵It is no coincidence that the new National Security Strategy, in an unprecedented form, recognizes Russia as an existential threat, which however, through the spokeswoman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Maria Zakharova, has defined the Moldovan election campaign as the most undemocratic of all the years of independence because of unprecedented crackdown by the authorities against the opposition and independent media, especially Russian-language ones, With the blatant interference by Western countries in the electoral process.

The feeling, among many, is that Moldova has won a battle, an important one, but not yet the war., given the indecision of the social base and the strong and persistent Russian influences, despite the increase in trade volumes with the EU, which have exceeded those with Moscow; it should also be remembered that Moldovan workers in Russia have decreased in number, and that the Ukrainian war has offered the opportunity to sign a security and defense partnership with Europe, despite constitutional neutrality.

The problem, as already mentioned, remains precisely and not so unpredictably Brussels, towards which the population nourishes a latent skepticism given the continental low propensity for common regional power projections, to instead pursue multi-vector security policies.

In Moldova, therefore, there is an indistinct sense of vulnerability accentuated by the destabilizing actions of the Russian hegemon. Even if Moscow's intentions have not determined the desired electoral victory, it would be disastrous to boast about the referendum success, also because Moldova is aware of an absolute lack of strategic depth. In short, support for the Moldovan government, from the West, should be more incisive especially in light of the importance of the vote brought from abroad, while the interior had to (and presumably will still have to) deal with Russian asymmetric actions. From this perspective, it would be appropriate not to forget the statements of Russian Minister Lavrov, according to whom Moldova could become the next Ukraine.

Chișinău's European path is not a given, also because it is the same Moldovan social base that must be actively persuaded of the validity of the Western narrative. There is no doubt that Western European enlargement is also perceived by Moscow as a threat: it will be essential to raise the level of reactivity and resistance of Moldova, a country perhaps too small for much larger aims.