Romantically speaking, our continent can also be old, but it certainly does not have the stability gene in its DNA. Formed by antithetical political, cultural and historical realities, Europe, while still paying the bill for the 900 wars, is still in a geopolitical framework characterized by the search for a shattered order by the dissolution of the Empires following the Napoleonic fall; two world wars hot and a war cold, aimed at the hegemonic conquest, they found their fulfillment in armistices without allowing a shared outcome between winners and losers.
United in diversity, the EU motto, especially after the Brexit, does not seem to fit into a composite and differentiated reality, in which not even too limited aggregations of states contribute to the achievement of peculiar political objectives, with a common characteristic: the formation of coalitions aimed at having relevance in the game of political compensations. In many cases, therefore, European states point to Liaison in an extra community key, trying to privilege interest groups capable of influencing continental politics.
In the face of the Franco-German agreements, from the north-east and along the north-south axis, clear signs of an evolution arrive which, in geopolitical terms, cannot fail to arouse interest: Visegrad group, which originated in the post-Soviet historical moment of the 90 years, it must be associated both a grouping of Baltic and northern political subjects that, referring to the traditional Hanseatic League advocate a rigorous and liberalist line, and another set of countries, components of the Trimarium, which aim at the cohesion of Central and Eastern Europe, an area historically undervalued by the empires of which it was a part. Although these are not alliances in the strict sense, the overlap with the formal ones makes it possible to take, and more often block, the most relevant decisions, especially from the 2009, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty which extended the scope of the matters concerned to qualified majority voting, and formalized the blocking minority, therefore, to exercise the right of veto, a proposal must be rejected by at least four Member States representing at least 35% of the EU population.
Our country is very absent, penalized by an ethereal foreign policy if not difficult to understand, and therefore not part of any of the paying alliances.1. The Italian approach to executives with different strategic targets (eg. Visegrad), placed outside the usual procedural practice addressed to the formation of alliances within the community, did not however lead to any useful concrete results, as evidenced by the lack of support for the positions national economic-financial issues.
The principle of lesson learned it would require a reconsideration of the tactic of seeking consensus, and a political behavior devoid of sudden differences aimed at consolidating stable alliances; the lesson was given, all that remains to be learned from his learning is to await the political evolution of the results of the electoral round.
Many faces, same medal
Geographically, alliances and close agreements between the countries that compose Visegrad2, Trimarium3 and the so-called New Hanseatic League4, outline a front that, starting from the Baltic Sea, touches the Black Sea and reaches the Adriatic affecting all of Central Europe. The three political subjects do not have a clear and definite institutional connotation, however they have characteristics that, in political terms, express a value that cannot be neglected. Populism, characteristic of the contemporary panorama, supported by the economic social asperities to which the social-democratic executives have failed to remedy, has been reflected in non-confident electorates in the European project, considered not able to manage recurrent contingencies and shaken by crisis of legitimacy.
Visegrad symbolizes intolerance towards the acceptance of directives perceived as undue interference violating sovereignty; there revenge nationalist is therefore the consequence of identity crises caused first by the Soviet constraint of national impulses, then by the passage from real socialism to liberalism. The nationalism of the Visegrad Group, that since the 2015 migration crisis it has lost its eminently technical meaning, it is based on the not always coherent combination between dated territorial claims, ties with the Church, and a renewed impatience with ethnic minorities, according to a conservative principle that opposes the idea of a federal and, above all, supranational Europe.
Two issues remain fundamental: the economy, based on growth based on domestic consumption, low-cost labor, European capitals disbursed to a greater extent than those paid to the Union, a production directed above all towards Germany, and the controversial and inhomogeneous relationship with Russia, returned forcefully to what it has always considered its own backyard, and that no scruples were made in issuing severe lessons such as Georgia in the 2008, or in using the energy weapon against turbulent neighbors (Ukraine 2006 and 2009), up to resorting to destabilizing Russian-speaking communities and the secret services. The problems, therefore, are neither few nor irrelevant; macroeconomic dynamics, despite the fact that growth is in any case conditioned by the accession of Slovakia to the euro area alone, involve unknown factors that cause financial Hellenic syndrome, together with white immigration that has led about 2 millions of Ukrainians outside their national borders to countries that, in turn, suffering from demographic crises and having witnessed the departure of their best and most prepared youth, oppose the entry of ethnic groups deemed unassimilable and potentially a harbinger of extremist fanaticisms.
The problem, though Visegrad, concerns the ways in which to support one's reasons, trying to avoid falling back into geopolitical areas of little relevance, both in light of the accusations made by the European institutions against Poland and Hungary and which could punishively determine the amount of the funds of which to be able to enjoy in relation to the evaluation of good behaviour national level, both for the formalization of a Union a more speed economic and a variable geometry, capable of relegating the countries unable to compete with the Franco-German locomotive into second and third floors.
Visegrad it is only a framework within which cooperation can vary in relation to the degree of cohesion; if on the one hand for the common defense it was possible to proceed to the constitution of a Battlegroup, an intervention force formed by more than 3.000 soldiers from the 4 Countries, on the other side the Czech Republic and Slovakia are starting to suffer the lack of empathy generated by Poland and Hungary, also by virtue of German diplomatic efforts to split the regional bloc to which they belong. But if Visegrad encounters difficulties, the geopolitical entity named Trimarium5 aims even more strongly to stimulate a profitable coordination regarding political, economic, energy and security relations between the twelve countries that make it up, a regional anti-Russian alliance but which also aims to emancipate itself from German protection.
According to more concrete indications relating to Trimarium, it seems possible to affirm that the latter is not aimed at shore up the continental unity, but to confirm the recognition of the actual existence of a double-speed Europe, and to allow Hungary to make the geographical region of belonging enhancing their specificity with respect to the Western front and preventing a possible marginalization. The intent is therefore to develop ties that transform the countries concerned into active political subjects and not merely passive receptors of Western initiatives; currently the Trimarium collects around 105 millions of citizens with an overall GDP of almost 3 trillions of euros, and with the countries that compose it guaranteeing political stability and security for entrepreneurs; in addition there is a profitable geographical contiguity and consequent lower costs for transports already enhanced between east and west and now close to being along the north-south route, with the four Visegrad countries and Croatia as the founding nucleus: the area therefore presents all the potential to enable it to become an attractive economic base both for the EU and, potentially, for China.
The last entity, but not least, is the so-called New Hanseatic League, unofficialized or institutionalized, but which is an indication of the reorganization of northern Europe following Brexit, with a marked liberalist connotation against any state intervention to support the economies of others.
In summary, the Alloy constitutes both a reaction to the departure of the great British protector, both an opposition to the French policies, and a (interested) bank to the German projects following the badly tolerated outsourcing Commission activities in favor of France and Germany.
In light of the transalpine intention to move the center of gravity south-west away from the German area, Germany can use the Alloy to reject French proposals but without having to expose themselves.
Which way for the future? Where Hanseatic they might coalesce they could have a considerable weight in demographic and GDP terms, even if the current trend does not show common political intentions other than those aimed at operating obstructions based on the search for variable and extemporaneous coalitions that do not favor the emergence of leaderistic subjectivities , given also the Dutch attitude never benevolent towards the presumptuously inferior countries.
What highlights, in summary, is the favor with which Germany looks at the birth of a further and influential economic center set up on a stable Northern Mediterranean, useful for absorbing its surplus.
Geopolitics, I presume
One of the tasks of geopolitics consists in identifying the most durable aspects of political dynamics, evaluating the possible evolutions over a long range. On the one hand, President Macron has repeatedly called attention to the achievement of strengthened economic political cooperation, but without considering the risks associated with a deepening of the faults resulting from the institutionalization of the different speeds. If it was deemed essential to check the legislative compliance of Visegrad with respect toacquis communautaire, it should be considered equally appropriate to understand the reasons why the EU is no longer considered a reliable partner; not doing so could lead to the consolidation of competing blocks capable of influencing regional political dynamics. Like it or not, the political inclusion of the most skeptical countries is a necessity, especially now that Russia has resumed treading the scene with greater assertiveness.
Given the importance given to finance, it would be more necessary than ever to return to to be a politician, offering projects and common directions that are mutually convenient, while recalling the consistency of the funds provided at the time. Given the obtuse rigidity adopted by countries that are richer in money but culpably lacking in political terms, it would perhaps be wiser to consider how, in times difficult, the national character tempered by previous harsh experiences, and the state of necessity, can attract more than empty formalities.
1 See the Italian non-inclusion in the G3 Group, and in which Spain was preferred
2 Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia
3 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria
4 Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia
5 Three Seas: Adriatic Sea, Baltic Sea, Black Sea