From Syria to Libya, the standoff between Moscow and Ankara (re)emerges

An ancient fault line, never truly dormant, resurfaces from the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean, in North Africa, in the southern region of the Caucasus, the Ciscaucasia, with potential repercussions all the way to the heart of Central Asia. Although in recent years the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey have moved significantly closer, so much so as to fuel the discontent of the United States and its partners, centuries of rivalry and conflict cannot be erased - especially for peoples attached to collective memory such as the Russians and Turks - with a merely tactical understanding. In short, the future between these two empires is anything but rosy.

Looking back, it is possible to discern the nature of relations between Moscow and Ankara. From the liberation of the Slavic peoples from Tatar-Mongol rule in the 15th century, to the subsequent Russian imperial expansions towards Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Black Sea and the Balkans, Slavs and Turkic peoples have faced each other in a zero-sum competition throughout Europe. Where the advance of one has always corresponded to the arrest of the other.

The Russian Empire, eager to establish itself as an emerging European power, had in its Sublime Door a natural obstacle. From the 16th to the 19th century, the various disputes between Russians and Ottomans originated from different factors such as: territorial domination, control of the main trade routes and access to the warm seas, the latter being a Russian strategic imperative from the 18th century to the present day. The conflict was immediately enriched with messianic overtones, in protection of the Christian peoples who had ended up under the Muslim yoke, the Third Rome he sided against the Second.

Only at the end of the Great War, with the implosion of the Ottoman Empire and the October Revolution, the contingent weakness and the extreme international isolation into which Ankara and Moscow were plunged forced the two to enter into atactical alliance. It is with the “Treaty of Moscow”¹ of March 16, 1921, when Bolsheviks and Kemalists, with the need to respond to various domestic critical issues, decided to put aside centuries of antagonism in the name of their respective, imperative, strategic imperatives: to survive.

The unusual friendship lasted throughout the 1952s and came to an end once, at the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union emerged threateningly as a potential regional hegemon at the gates of the Anatolian peninsula. The pressure of the Soviet giant on the borders was such that it pushed the young Turkish Republic to join the Atlantic Alliance in XNUMX. Throughout the bipolar era, the conditions that had previously pushed Ankara to draw Washington closer to itself, while simultaneously distancing Moscow, did not disappear. Only with the implosion of the Soviet giant and the consequent disappearance of the threat, did relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation take on a new form.

Since then we have witnessed the development of an unprecedented relationship. Turkey of the new millennium, seeking greater autonomy from the US guarantor and eager to fuel internal growth, began to adopt a multi-vector policy. Thus Ankara began to look with interest at Moscow's immense energy resources to cover its needs.

Over the last two decades, a real energy interdependence has been created between the two. It is enough to remember the inauguration, in 2003², of the first gas pipeline between the two countries, the Bluestream, followed in 2020³ from the second, the Turkstream. The infrastructures in question meet the needs of both countries. If Moscow, through the two gas pipelines, manages to reach the Anatolian peninsula and southern Europe without passing through Ukraine or other potentially hostile countries, Ankara guarantees itself a direct gas supply line, allowing itself to cultivate the ambition of becoming a European energy hub.

Finally, it is impossible not to mention the flagship of Russian-Turkish cooperation in the energy sector, the Akkuyu nuclear power plant. The latter should be operational by the end of 2025 and become the first “Turkish” nuclear power plant. In fact, Rosatom, provided more than 90% of the plant construction costs⁴ and will retain significant influence in the near future. This is in line with Moscow's tactic of "atomic diplomacy", based on the penetration of emerging markets through its extensive experience and Know-how in the nuclear field.

Relations have become even more intimate with the Western sanctions system set up against the Russian Federation, which Turkey has not joined., in fact, 2022 saw Turkish imports from Russia grow by 100%⁵ compared to 2021 and exports grow by 80%⁶. So far this unbalanced relationship, just check the Turkish trade balance⁷, but necessary for both, has resisted even if in various contexts Moscow and Ankara have found themselves in opposing positions over the years, from Nagorno Karabakh, to Syria, to Libya.

Today, however, the balance of power between the two is inexorably changing, thus causing a domino effect on their respective spheres of influence.

Azerbaijan's lightning military victory in Nagorno Karabakh in September 2023⁸ and the recent fall of Basar al-Assad's Alawite regime in Syria⁹ are events that can be linked. In both cases, Ankara, taking advantage of Moscow's distraction in Ukraine, has been able to turn some of the dossier of crucial importance knowing that they could not incur a reprisal from Moscow. In Syria, the future Russian presence is still uncertain, especially in the important bases of Tartus and Hmeimim. Although, TASS has repeatedly reported that the issue has been at the center of negotiations between the new Syrian authorities and their Russian colleagues since December 9th.¹⁰, an agreement does not yet exist. Since November 13, Moscow has suspended grain exports to Damascus¹¹ demonstrating how the negotiations, beyond the proclamations of both sides, are not proceeding in the right direction. As if that were not enough, Ukraine, in the most classic of disturbance maneuvers, has inserted itself into the dispute. On December 30, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Sibyha, together with a delegation of officials and ministers, met the new leadership Syria to re-establish ties between the two countries¹². Kiev has thus resumed supplying Damascus with cereals and flour¹³ in the name of a newfound friendship.

The risk, for the Russian Federation, is that this will be repeated in Libya too.. The North African country has been hit by the consequences of the fall of Assad. Moscow, to mitigate its dependence on Syrian bases, has begun to transfer part of the personnel and equipment located in the Levantine country to Cyrenaica. These movements are taking place both via an airlift¹⁴ between the Syrian air base in the province of Latakia and the Libyan air base of Al Kadim, east of Benghazi, both through the use of naval units, as demonstrated by the case of the ship "Orsa Maggiore"¹⁵. At the same time, the armed forces under the control of General Haftar have taken control of several military sites in the town of Ubari, located in Fezzan, about 700 kilometers from Tripoli. The surprise initiative, in addition to alarming the authorities of Tripolitania, fearful that the general could violate the ceasefire agreement¹⁶, is preparatory to the Russian maneuver. Moscow, in fact, is completing the construction of a new air base near the borders with Chad and Sudan, in Matan as Sarah¹⁷. The control of the town of Ubari, therefore, in addition to allowing the Libyan political actors of the East to consolidate their control in Fezzan¹⁸, would constitute an important logistical corridor for the Russian armed forces on the ground and their activities in Sahel.

Despite this, both the Russian Federation and the Rais of Cyrenaica currently have the resources necessary to attempt a new assault on the Libyan capital. Rather - if the Kremlin does not find a way out of the conflict in Ukraine - Ankara, as in Nagorno Karabakh, as in Syria, would be ready to reap the fruits of its meticulous work, filling the gaps left by a Russian Federation that is tired and distracted by a war that risks turning into a Pyrrhic victory.

Russians and Turks, in the name of a vaunted multipolarism, have put aside centuries of rivalry, but they have conflicting ambitions and interests.