The third Monday of the first month of the year, specifically January 20, 2025, as provided for by the Twentieth Amendment to the United States Constitution1, Donald Trump will officially take office as 47th president of the United States of America bringing the Republicans back to the White House. This analysis, far from wanting to attribute excessive importance to the personal wishes of the New York magnate, or to other prominent figures who will assume roles in the government team and in the apparatus, seeks to offer a contribution to understanding Washington's possible moves in Libya.
In short: the North African country is not a contingent priority for the star-spangled thalassocracy - the competition between the United States and its major rivals is becoming increasingly heated and is touching all continents, but it is in the challenges posed in Asia and Europe that the hierarchy and role of the various world powers will be re-established - it is unlikely that dossier Libya will soon gain relevance in the halls of power of the Number one. At the same time, given the impossible renunciation of its role in the world and given the increasingly precarious situation in the waters of the former Mare Nostrum, Washington is called upon to maintain a constant vigilance.
In short, despite Trump acting as a megaphone and representative of isolationist demands ready to take off his role as "global policeman" to dedicate himself to the various domestic critical issues and to channel his resources exclusively where necessary to maintain world hegemony, the imperial phase is not at twilight as narrated.
The United States will not leave NATO, much less Europe. They will not bring home that manufacturing industry that they knowingly self-destructed in the 1970s and 1980s to become a buyer of last resort. The highest deficit commercial in the world2 and the largest public debt3 These are tactics rationally devised by the US apparatus to create dependence between itself and the various satellites. Although this process has an evidently anti-economic root, theheartland American industrialist is now famous as rust belt4, is functional to maintain world hegemony. At the same time, the era in which the Washington apparatus, affected by hypoxia, due to the disappearance of the Soviet enemy and the consequent solitary achievement of the summit, dedicated itself to redeeming, i.e. Americanizing, the rest of the globe, seems to have ended (perhaps). They simply can no longer afford it.
Today, the Pax americana is under attack by the growing pervasiveness of the People's Republic of China in the China Seas (East and South) and the decline of the Russian Federation to a minority partner of Beijing, a situation that is capable of undermining the balance between the United States and the People's Republic of China. In addition, the Mandarin's designs on the ports of the Russian Far East, possible outposts to shore up the yellow advance in the Arctic, and on the energy basin of Siberia, are well known.
Prevent a definitive takeover of the Dragon on 'Bear has become a new strategic imperative for theAquilaThe necessary freezing of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in addition to preventing the implosion of Kiev, serves precisely to detach Moscow from Beijing.
Finally, the continuing unrest in the Middle East prevents Washington from fully withdrawing from the area. After achieving energy independence5, the United States planned a gradual disengagement from the Levantine region. The way to achieve this goal was indicated by the Abraham Accords (2020). Officially, these establish mutual recognition and diplomatic relations between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan, with Saudi Arabia watching. Unofficially, it is about making Tel Aviv the local security hub in contrast to Iran and its various proxy constituents of theAxis of Resistance. The idea of the United States is to make all those countries that share the aim of containing the Islamic Republic gravitate around Israel, the only nuclear subject in the Middle East. The conflict that broke out after October 7, 2023 has indeed highlighted this security framework, especially during the direct clashes between Israel and Iran, but It also clearly demonstrated the imminent impossibility for the United States to abandon the area.
In this global disorder, how can Libya – a country of relative interest to the United States – acquire a new centrality? A direct US commitment in Cyrenaica is out of the question. The priority, at these latitudes, remains that of preventing the Chinese or Russians from taking over a naval base in Tobruk or Derna. If for the former it seems practically impossible, for Moscow, however, many unknowns persist in this regard.
Rekindling the fears of Washington and, above all, of Rome, the recent events in the now former "Syrian Arab Republic". The first tangible effects of the fall of the Assad regime can be seen in the loss of Russian and Iranian influence in the area, ousted by Turkish covert work. It is still impossible to establish with certainty whether the naval base of Tartus and the air base of Hmeimim will remain at the disposal of the Russian Federation. At the moment, Moscow, in the process of reorganization, is moving personnel, vehicles and heavy equipment from Syria to Russia and to Cyrenaica6, but he's not abandoning the basics7.
It is worth remembering the importance of the naval base in Tartus. Entrusted to the Kremlin in 1971, operational since 1977, the Tartus naval base represents for Moscow an outlet to the warm seas, the only one on the Mediterranean.8. Tartus and Hmeimim, in addition to ensuring Russian presence in the Levant, are also ideal logistical hubs for projecting influence in North Africa. The damage to the image, caused by the fall of Assad, given the Russian inability or reluctance to shoot for the Alawite regime, could also undermine Moscow's image as a reliable actor and hide potentially disastrous consequences for Moscow's foreign projection, especially in Africa.9. If Damascus falls in a week, what guarantees can Niamey or Tobruk have?
Turkey has exploited Moscow's commitment in the Sarmatian lowlands to turn a dossier strategic, proving ready to fill political voids left by other actors. The Syrian slap in the face given to Moscow and Tehran allows Ankara to significantly increase its weight in the Middle Eastern question. Furthermore, having taken note of Russia's vulnerability in quadrants that are determined for it but currently put on the back burner, Turkey could further exploit the favorable moment to repeat the Syrian move in Libya. The most worrying aspect of this hypothesis, for Italy, is that could receive approval from the United States.
Although Washington cannot look favorably on excessive Turkish activism in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, it considers it preferable to a Russian attempt to consolidate its positions. The subject that would be most damaged, besides the Russian Federation, would be Italy. So damaged that this situation could prove to be the necessary spring to push Rome to adapt to the objectives imposed by NATO (2% of GDP for defense).10). If for the Balts and Scandinavians the never-ending Russian threat has always constituted the necessary incentive, for the Peninsula, perhaps, American strategists think, a threat that touches the coasts of Sicily could be functional to this purpose. Here then is that Washington could "use" Libya - especially the threats that would arise from a unification between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania behind the decisive Turkish push - to spur Rome to adapt to the new times.
In light of the new geopolitical context, fraught with risks but also opportunities, there are the foundations for rewriting the agreement between Italy and the United States. It is on the basis of the meeting between the pressing needs of the latter and the Italian need to satisfy the primary needs in its geographical surroundings that Washington and Rome can strengthen their ties. However, primarily, the Peninsula is called to a change of approach towards its own guarantor of security. The idea that by participating in all US and NATO military commitments, especially from the 1990s onwards, thus demonstrating alignment and reliability towards allies, thus trying to acquire political credit, can no longer work. Being the subject present in the central Mediterranean, with which Washington shares its interests most, (preventing Russian or Chinese insertion and avoiding further heating up the rivalry between Paris and Ankara) it is in these waters that Rome should elbow its way and propose itself as the southern security bastion of the Atlantic Alliance, a sort of Mediterranean Poland. Aware of this advantage and through the US diplomatic, military and economic investiture, Italy could thus assume a more autonomous role in an increasingly unstable region.
The risk is that it is now too late. The Russian Embassy in Libya, on Thursday, December 12, urged, through a message on its website11, Russian citizens not to consider the North African country as a tourist or personal destination, especially in its western part. The measure has unleashed the ire of the Government of National Unity of Dbeibah, which, through Foreign Minister Al-Baour, has asked for urgent explanations12.
The possibility that events will overwhelm the Peninsula, thus forcing it to a rude awakening, is high. Moving from a reactive to a proactive position is what the United States is asking of us and what we need most to stay “afloat” in the increasingly choppy waters of the Mediterranean.