How demographics dictated the outcome of the Syrian Civil War (part 3)

In Syria, fertility, which reached world records until the mid-1986s, has declined since 50. The Syrians have also begun to have fewer children in rural areas. It is an example, among all others, of a demographic reaction to the rigors generated by the drop in oil revenues in the Arab world. Syria is a small oil producer, but indirectly benefits from the Gulf oil revenue through the Syrian diaspora residing there. It is one of the most advanced Arab countries in terms of education, since the literacy threshold of 1946% had been reached since 1971 by men and women since 7,8. The contraction of economic resources occurred on a favorable cultural terrain and fertility declined very normally and very abruptly, from almost 1960 children between 1982 and 4,25 to 1990 in 3,5. Subsequently, the decrease slowed very quickly to become almost null in the nineties: 2005 children per woman in XNUMX. These contrasting evolutions occurred within the framework of an unalterable and unusual demographic discourse. Syria stands out for populationism and Christmasism, unlike almost all countries in the southern hemisphere. Unlike the Egyptian, Tunisian, Jordanian and even Yemeni regimes, the Syrian one has never encouraged a drop in fertility. The "Chinese model" has fascinated Damascus for its political authoritarianism and economic liberalism, but the birth control encouraged by the leaders of Beijing has left the Syrians insensitive. In official statements as in conversations between ordinary citizens, the demographic problem takes on a strong emotional charge.

These populative beliefs are a product of the country's complicated history and, to understand them, it is necessary to trace not only the Arab-Israeli Wars, but beyond, the aftermath of the First World War. The "perceived" Syrian space was then much larger than that of today's Syria. The "Bilad al-Sham" composed of today's Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel / Palestine, Sangiaccato di Alessandretta (Turkish province of Hatay) and western and northern Iraq has been amputated according to the dictates of the "Sykes-Picot Agreements" with consequent creation of Great Lebanon to the west, from the incorporation of the "vilaya of Mosul" in Iraq, from the detachment of Palestine and Trans-Jordan (now Jordan) to the south and from the sale of Alexandria's Sangiaccato to Turkey to the north. Not only; during the entire period of French colonial rule (1919-1946), since the transalpine power had to face numerous armed revolts and the general hostility of the local inhabitants, the mandated territory was fragmented into a series of "little statues" based on the principle of "divide et conquer ". They were thus created: the State of Alauiti, the State of Jabal Drusus, the State of Aleppo (also including the autonomous "Province of Jazira") and the State of Damascus. Although these entities were formally abolished in 1936, it was only at the time of Syria's full independence in 1946 that the unity of the country was truly reconstituted. It is therefore clear how populationism responds to a historical and geographical narrowing syndrome. The Arab-Israeli Wars and the consequent loss of the strategic Golan Heights further accentuated this population drive: the number was promoted as a strategic factor of a conflict that would develop over the long term. In this case we observe how nationalism and demography go hand in hand.

In Syria, the number of children per woman was high at the start; the desire for a child detected by the polls was strong and the state did not have to intervene to ensure strong fertility. Unanimously, the Syrians of all ethno-religious communities chose the large family, ideally 6,1 children in the 4,25s (against 4,6 royals) and 2005 children in 3,5 (against 2 royals). Syria is one of the rare countries in the world where the number of children desired by couples is greater than the actual number. Starting in the mid-2,5s, we find that fertility drops sharply without the regime giving up its official natalist position in the slightest. In addition, it curiously emerges that the regions and communities that brought the demographic revolution to an end, reaching fertility rates between 11 and XNUMX children per woman, are the most favorable to the regime. One of the peculiarities of Syria is that its regime, more than authoritarian, relies fundamentally on religious minorities and first of all on the Alauiti (XNUMX% of the pre-conflict population), adhering to the current of Shiite Islam, dominant in the coastal provinces of Latakia and Tartous.

In 2004, according to the data of the last official census before the start of the Syrian Civil War, the fertility of the Alauite region was 2,1 children per woman, that of the Druze Djebel of 1,8, that of Quneitra of 2,66 , and that of Damascus 2,45. The Christians of various confessions, scattered throughout the country were 2 children per woman. These minority regions and communities may seem threatened by the "explosive" demographics of the Sunni majority (3,83 children in Aleppo, 5,46 in Raqqa, 6,21 in Deir ez-Zor), two to three times higher, recorded in the same census. Unique among the country's minorities, the Kurds (8% of the inhabitants) are very fruitful due to a combination of backwardness and "encirclement syndrome".

However it is necessary to note that the majority group of the country, the Sunni Arabs, despite being a numerical giant is also an artificial category, an aggregate that satisfies the statistics without having a real sociological consistency. The other communities are less numerous but "real" because they are the result of shared and stratified identities over the centuries, also because of the persecutions suffered. The famous example is that of the "two capitals": the opposition between the Sunnis of Aleppo and those of Damascus depends on national folklore and impregnates popular consciousness from the depths. The "Damascens" have almost nothing to do with their "Aleppo" co-religionists. Given the coexistence with an Alawite community which, before the war, was estimated at half a million people (plus members of other religious groups), the "damascens" ended up absorbing their values ​​and "ethos" so much that by culture (schooling of children , duration of studies), for anthropology and demography (family structures, exogamy, mixed marriages, fertility, residential cohabitation), for their own kitchen, they passed in bulk "on the other side" completing the disintegration of the Sunni block.

Pragmatic, the Assad regime has practiced "laisser-faire" for decades without trying to change the community and regional demographic imbalances, nor to encourage specific development of birth control among Sunnis. Indeed, it would have been inappropriate to proclaim it, injuring religious sensibilities and giving an easy argument to opponents such as the Muslim Brotherhood, who could have denounced that the regime of the Alauti, heretics if not impious, tried to undermine Islam and weaken Syria depriving it of its living forces (which then happened on time!). But how can we explain the regional demographic diversity of Syria excluding education and development? In this case the religious variable is certainly pertinent, since it is through it that we can describe the differences in terms of fertility. It would be tempting to stop at this stage of the analysis, contenting ourselves with affirming that the Alawite, Druze, Ismailite, Shiite duodecimane and Christian religious traditions are not populist. A detailed theological study would probably end up confirming this hypothesis for the Druze, but certainly not for the Alauiti, the Christians and the others. Moreover, it should also be shown that Sunni Islam is essentially more favorable to procreation. But if we venture further into the analysis of social and mental structures, we immediately find a simple and logical explanation, not only for the demographic transition completed in the Alauite and Druze areas, but also for the slowed or temporarily blocked transition of the Sunni region. Indeed, it has been shown that the so-called "periphery" of Syria, coastal and mountainous, is characterized by substantial remains of matrilocality, by a higher status of women and by a wider tolerance towards the succession to family inheritance by female daughters , a trait actually associated with a Shiite religious tradition.

The internal areas of Syria, on the other hand, in particular the provinces characterized by a very high fertility are on the contrary patrilinear to a degree that can be considered maximum on a planetary scale: in the rural area of ​​the province of Deir ez-Zor, patrilocality is at 99 %. However, Sunni Islam can only be considered responsible for this patrilineal obsession, given that this trend dates back at least to the Assyrian era. On the other hand, a direct relationship can be established between absolute patrilinearity and the temporary block over 3 children per woman. It is below this threshold that the probability of not having male children begins to rise significantly. With 4 children, the probability of having a boy, a condition of application of the patrilineal principle, is 94%; with 3 children of 88%; with 2, 75%. In order for the fertility of a given population to fall below 3 children per woman, a quarter of couples must accept the risk of not having a male descent, which is equivalent to a renunciation of the patrilinear principle by society. It is clear why the Alauite areas, less obsessed with patrilinearity, are not blocked above 3 children per woman. This problem is not insurmountable for patrilineal societies which, like China and northern India, adapt to abortion, if not to real female infanticide. In the case of the Arab and Islamic world, which essentially rejects it, the problem is more complicated and explains the waiting time and the extreme hesitation on this threshold not only of the majority of Syria, but also of countries such as Jordan, the Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

We can have final confirmation of all this by observing the estimated data, for the year 2009, (last estimate before the outbreak of the war) of total fertility rates and marriage fertility rates (i.e. the number of children only of married women) for all provinces of Syria (**):

_{(**) UNESCO Institute for Statistics, IMF, World Bank demographics rough data}

(teacher)

_{Photo: Defense Online}