The Middle Eastern geopolitical framework is close to entering a phase following the electoral results of several countries, a moment that is grafted onto a persistent instability destined to condition the plot of international relations both regionally and globally; we will then see how reality, stripped of ideological-religious motivations, has managed to go beyond the imagination, due to the dynamics induced by the health emergency that has also involved our country. Let's start from the acquired results, the Iranian ones, to move to a framework that, even if geographically much smaller, cannot fail to lead to possible wider imbalances, the Israeli one.
In addition to Iraq and Lebanon, Tehran also has to deal with internal disputes that aim to stigmatize, since 2017, the worsening of the economic-structural and inflationary conditions, of problematic water distribution, and of political unease that do not appear easy and quick solution, despite the rash reports accidental tourists claim otherwise.
Given the decentralization of the protests, and the pervasive force of a security apparatus that from the protests of the Green Movement of 20091 has drawn considerable lessons about prevention and repression, the hypothesis of a regime change appears unlikely; however, it would be rash not to take into account a situation that, over time, is proposing a generational clash between clerical-radicals and young people.
The electoral victory of the most retroactive conservative wing, which should be read with a view to the next presidential suffrage, rather than enhancing the religious aspect, can be interpreted from a nationalist perspective, inspired by the reawakening of characters that have always been present in the DNA Persian, who throughout history has privileged sporadic protests rather than revolutions, often lacking effective coordination in the execution of collective actions.
Politically, the events were instrumental in attacking the reformist Rouhani, while the main objective was the private financial companies linked to religious institutions and Guardians of the Revolution.
In summary, although considering the impact of the American sanction system, the problematic internal structure at an economic-institutional level and information control cannot be overlooked, at the moment of exclusive prerogative of a State called to decide on the renunciation of the nuclear program. JCPOA, and support for proxy regional (Hezbollah - Hamas), a signal directed towards the Sino-Russian expansions, and supported by sanctions that offset the American intention of withdrawing from an area that instead needs more and more credible political-military reassurances in Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait. The execution of Qasim Soleimani, and the Iranian reaction, in fact, constituted a cheaper way to solve the problems of US dissuasive credibility, never so pungent towards the Iranian intelligentsia, concerned about the manifest vulnerability of the individual targets.
Excessive Iranian weakening could compress the Israeli role of nuclear protector of the Saudi Kingdom, but reassure Jerusalem about the weakening of Hezbollah, on condition that it maintains national cohesion hitherto guaranteed only by a state of immanent danger.
On the geopolitical level, and despite the conservative victory, the Iranian strategy remains extremely pragmatic, proof of this being that the launch of missiles in retaliation for the elimination of Soleimani has been preceded by appropriate warnings.
Iran is at a crossroads: on the one hand keeping the point by running the risk of breaking the internal front, on the other softening the positions towards the US by weakening its theocracy; in any case, a choice harbinger of sensitive risks; the exclusion - sanctioned by the USA - of many reformist candidates in the elections for the Majilis by the Council of Guardians2, could be an indicator of the fears that agitate the Khomeinist leadership, devoid of real leaders and in any case conditioned by ambivalent sentiments: on the one hand that properly Shiite of isolation, on the other the one who wishes to project power in the region while maintaining profitable Sino-Russian relations , but without forgetting the strongest electoral abstention since the birth of the Republic (42%)3: in fact, from a political point of view, an embellished institutional debacle that raises doubts about the credibility of the ruling class.
Vows and Qabala
If Tehran cries, Jerusalem doesn't laugh: from closed ballot boxes to repeated suffrages. The outcome of the third 11-month vote scheduled for March 2 in Israel remains uncertain, and characterized by scandals and propaganda.
According to the latest polls, neither Netanyahu nor Gantz (founder of Kahol-Lavan, "Blue and White" - in the photo, standing), will succeed in achieving the majority, so as not to exclude the hypothesis of a fourth election round, to unless the various outsiders are inclined towards a change of political direction such as to allow a new alignment of alliances useful for defining a more stable political framework.
Since 2009 Netanyahu has shaped Israeli political life, so much so that he managed to be the most long-lived and polarizing premier in the history of his country, until the problems arising from his involvement in investigations of corruption episodes, for which he exists the precedent of the fall of the Likud-led government in 1992; legitimate to believe that the convening of early elections as early as April of last year was functional to the formation of a new center-right coalition capable of guaranteeing immunity.
The unexpected, which materialized in the defection of Avigdor Lieberman, historical supporter of Likud and political needle of the balance, has effectively prevented any possibility of forming an executive, even seeking the co-optation of other external political representatives. Further difficulties arose with the return to the field of Tsahal's former chief of staff, Gantz, from the lack of support provided by the foreign policy business, including the Trump plan, and from the unappreciated good performance of the economy, which did not attract the marks he needs. The epilogue of the September elections, despite party loyalty and allies, is known: new consultation on March 2.
The widespread perception is that both Netanyahu and Gantz are mutually canceling each other, given that the margin within which they are operating seems to be very small; the polls do not seem to indicate significant changes in orientation, however taking into account a small floating percentage of voters who could decide on the fate of the elections, and on which the two sides focus their attention. Gantz aims to fight corruption according to a social appeal which, however, albeit with not always consistent declarations, rejects an alliance with the center-left block represented by the Arab Joint List, composed of Israeli Arabs, and maintains conservative positions towards the territories Palestinians not disdaining the Trump Plan.
In summary, it almost seems that the primary objective is only to remove Netanyahu, whose future could in any case be conditioned by the outcome of the US Presidential elections.
That there is a concrete possibility of stalemate is evident; the only way to avoid it, by avoiding the risk of the definitive blockade of the country's political life and the approval of the budget, is to bring Lieberman back into the covenant of the center-right alliance and the religious parties that advocate the law which exempts from military service anyone who claims that "the study of the Torah is my occupation", or by operating decisively on that small nucleus of still undecided center voters, or, imaginatively, hoping for a step back from Netanyahu, which would probably clear a Likud in difficulty.
Much more realistically, where an electoral solution could not yet be reached, in light of the damage that would arise for the country, an compromise route could be theorized which, with a reasonable temporal limitation, would allow the Likud leader to exit the impasse, sharing power with competitor Gantz.
Elections in the time of the virus
While Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia invite Palestinians to evaluate the Trump proposal, considering it realistically improved, the coronavirus, as a silent candidate, has made its appearance in Iran, where victims and infections have been identified, and is expected in Israel, which is trying to limit dangerous access to the territory.
Needless to hide: the whole MENA area can become a potential vehicle of contagion, with cases that are also affecting Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, Egypt, Morocco, Oman, Lebanon. Given that Iran does not seem to be able to provide consistent data on the contagion, we cannot fail to exploit what asserted by Ayatollah Khamenei, who defined the elections as a "public jihad", a kind of "divine proof”Able to guarantee respect for detractors.
What is more important to note, is that the Shiite crescent, so patiently built by General Soleimani, could be reduced by the measures taken against an unpredictable enemy.
1 Against the election of President Ahmadinejad
2 About 7.300 out of 16.000
3 In Tehran alone, 75% of those entitled to vote did not participate
Photo: IRNA / The White House
