Hot August in Libya

The recent events and developments in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania represent a real alarm bell. Although the Geneva agreements of 2020 had the merit of bringing about a cessation of hostilities between the parties, critical issues and tensions that had never subsided are resurfacing, capable of definitively plunging Libya into chaos. It is difficult, if not impossible, to establish whether it is still relevant to talk about Libya; it would probably be more correct to talk about the historical regions of the country (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan).

The month of August was marked by a progressive increase in unilateral actions by the two Libyan political centers and mutual provocations that exacerbated tensions.

In the first week of the month the various militias that make up the LNA (Libyan National Army), led by General Haftar and his son Saddam, marched southwest towards Gadames, a town located in the Nalut district, close to the Tunisian and Algerian borders and a border crossing about 500 km from the Libyan capital. Although this initiative was justified by Haftar as a necessary action to secure the border areas, in Tripolitania and elsewhere they fear instead that this could be a cover for other purposes, above all the preparation for a new assault on the capital. We must go back to April 4, 2019 when Haftar launched what, for the moment, remains the last offensive towards Tripoli. Then Only the timely Turkish intervention averted the worst for the Government of National Accord, at the time led by Fayez-al-Serraj.

In addition to the resourcefulness of the LNA militias, another decisive factor contributed to further destabilize the situation: the case of the Sharara field. Although the closure of the latter was hastily dismissed as an isolated and frequent episode in that context, it later exploded into a new and profound Libyan energy crisis.

THEAkakus Oil Corporation, one of the country's largest oil companies, on August 7 announced the interruption of crude oil supplies from the Sharara field to the port of Al-Zawiya, blaming the event and the responsibilities related to the Fezzan movement. In reality, as reported by Libya Observer¹ and from Energy Magazine² , Saddam Haftar would be behind the closure of the oil field. The son of the strongman of Cyrenaica, once he learned of the existence of an alleged Spanish arrest warrant³ for arms smuggling against him, he would have, in retaliation, imposed the closure of the important deposit since it was also managed by the Iberian company Repsol. If initially it could be assumed that the move was aimed at damaging the Spanish company, the intention to hit, delegitimizing it, immediately emerged fragile government of national unity by Dbeibeh.

Confirmation that it was not a mere dispute over the control of black gold, a resource that has always driven the limping Libyan economy, but a multi-vector and aggressive tactic adopted by the leaders of the Eastern part of the country came a few days later. house of representatives, chaired by Aguila Saleh Issa, on August 13 declared the mandates of Prime Minister Dbeibeh and presidential council. It also gave legitimacy to the government led by Prime Minister Hamad⁴. Although the Tobruk government's stance is symbolic, it will not bring about any significant changes in practice. Parallel parliaments, governments and armed forces already coexist on the national territory. The relevant aspect today is the hardening of the tone on both sides, the result of the shared desire to disempower the other in every respect.

In the same days, in Tripoli and in the southern suburbs of the capital, they are furious fierce fighting between rival militias⁵The clashes, in addition to causing several victims, have highlighted another salient aspect of Libya: the increasingly scarce influence and "authority" of the institutions, especially those of Tripolitania, with respect to the militias, in opposition to each other for the control of resources and infrastructures, with the aim of imposing their own agenda and placing themselves on the proxies towards external and internal actors.

Since August 18, the standoff between Tripoli and Tobruk has also involved the Central Bank of Libya (CBL). The latter, being the institution responsible for managing and distributing the proceeds from the National Oil Corporation, plays a key role. Its involvement in the dispute between the West and the East risks dragging the country into the most serious crisis since 2019. The presidential council, based in Tripoli, has removed⁶, accusing him of corruption, the governor of the Central Bank Sadir-Al-Kabir and the entire board of directors. Al-Kabir's defenestration, due to sympathies shown towards the East, combined with his escape to Istanbul⁷ provoked a reaction from General Haftar. International appeals for dialogue to find a solution were in vain. Since August 26, Tobruk has issued an order to stop oil production as a means of putting pressure on Tripoli. As confirmed by Saleh himself⁸, Chairman of the house of representatives, the blockade will continue until Al-Kabir returns to his post.

To better understand the type of relations established between the two Libyan political centers and the various militias present throughout the country, we must pay particular attention to the Fezzan region. Of vital importance due to its geographical position, a corridor that connects the Sahel to the Libyan coast and therefore to the Mediterranean, the desert region of southern Libya is the one that suffers the greatest levels of instability and precariousness. Down here, the main tribes (Tuareg, Tebu e Awlad Suleiman)⁹, have been involved in the illicit trafficking of weapons, drugs and people since the time of Colonel Gaddafi's regime. The substantial freedom granted to these ethnic groups to support themselves through these practices, in exchange for loyalty to the regime, was the recipe for success adopted to coagulate the otherwise too varied Libyan population. Once the glue, capable of blunting the autonomist tendencies, was missing, the heated rivalries that had been put away but never buried re-emerged, especially between Tuareg e Sugarcane. Rivalries that are exploited admirably by the two political centers to penetrate the strategic region and acquire a tactical advantage over the rival, in a game of precarious alliances and volatile balances that in turn influence the political and military situation of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Fezzan as a litmus test of Libya where excessive tribalization, always a salient characteristic of the Libyan populations, no longer seems suitable to be channeled towards a broader interest.

Although the “politics” of energy blocks is nothing new in those latitudes, the partial blockade of the majority of infrastructure dedicated to the production and export of Libyan oil is not sustainable for a long time. The risk, in addition to the increase in tensions between the parties, arises from the possibility of armed interventions to overcome the stalemate. The stalemate created seriously threatens national and international payments. The minimum of political-economic stability, achieved with the Geneva agreements, seems a miraggio.

Al-Kabir’s eventual resettlement will not solve the country’s problems. Libya seems ready to add a new chapter to its history.