This year is also coming to an end; it cannot be said to have been worse than the previous ones, having politically confirmed all the pre-existing propensities, nor better than the next ones, given the premises and the rational impossibility of reaching certain predictions. Better to stick to Gramsci, for whom iThe old world is dying. The new one is slow to appear. And in this chiaroscuro monsters are born. Let us therefore remain in reality, and project rational hypotheses, although not very attractive, starting from the assumption that there is no shaded joy, or any inner joy at the misfortunes of others.
2024 was an election year that, however, did not blow any poetic breeze à la Walt Whitman, but the dreaded stormy effect of the flapping wings of too many butterflies.
2025 also heralds important electoral consultations, starting with the restless South Korea, fresh from the vote for the impeachment of a president probably incompatible with the very essence of politics, especially in proximity to very tenuous parallels. Europe is no exception, with German elections looming after the collapse of the government coalition, while France is struggling in an ever more uncertain crisis.1; those who do not know if they will ever be able to go to a polling station are the Syrians, who have passed through a fifty-year despotic regime and entered the era of an unprecedented and dubious jihad in a suit and tie. The persistent political pathology clearly indicates a syndrome (currently Parisian) that prevents clear majorities, and forces an unstable alchemy of alliances to which one must pay the price from time to time. In fact, the collapse of the Franco-German governments leaves Europe without what, with its merits and many defects, has long been a guide without a shared, far-reaching plan. In short, the certification of the absence of common policies aggravated by the possible negotiations that, individually, the various States will entertain with the new US Administration.
From another point of view, new coalitions, coming to power in conjunction with the American presidential anointing in January, could guarantee greater stability in a world that is all too changeable: beautiful and impossible, given that events problematize politics. Russia, China, the real American competitor, North Korea (which includes the first to fall into the Ukrainian mud), Iran have made concrete the prospect of an autocratic axis that will test the US power engaged in the balkanization of Syria, the Syrianization of Libya, the internal migratory front, the fentanyl containment, on the Divide and conquer between Moscow and Beijing but without a Kissinger.
The US and EU will be forced to invest now in resisting Moscow or resign themselves to paying an exorbitant price later, given that Russia is and will remain a challenge for the West, even if not yet mature enough to replace global hegemons: Russian military reconstruction is not an if but a when, with methods incompatible with a Europe that is deliberately unaware, with the exception of Poland, the Baltic States, and the new Atlantic entries Sweden and Finland, while hypotheses and avenues for Arctic exploitation remain open, the poetics Polar Silk.
The Russian objective remains to degrade the Western capacity to counteract by creating Atlantic rifts, starting with the modification of the nuclear doctrine that lowers the threshold of atomic use. Moscow will therefore rely on an Indo-Pacific conflict between Beijing and Washington, such as to give it the time necessary for a military reconstruction capable of allowing it to target the eastern flank of NATO, a hypothesis that fits the Russian propensity to take risks rather than consider variables.
Meanwhile, post-Assad, Saudi forces have attacked Houthi targets in northern Yemen: the new American course may have begun to change the balance of power. Elections with a foregone conclusion also in Belarus, where power regenerates like Faust a president who is politically immune for life and on the crest of the wave since 1994, even if in a condition of de facto vassalage towards the Kremlin court. Elections also in the closest and most restless Kosovo, for the Serbs yet another rebel province generated by historical evolution.
Elections also in Australia, where the Labor Anthony Albanese fears (rightly) that he might not be confirmed as leader of the country, in a clear and common case of usury of power. Even the humorously defined (but not so much) 51st US State is heading to the polls, with an uncertain Trudeau threatened by the conservative Poilievre.
Two aspects stand out: the first is the popular distrust towards policies so ecumenical as to penalize the internal social base; the second is an electoral campaign that, from the opposition, does not propose particular solutions but only personalized attacks, a practice that generally leads to poor results, as they should remember at Hôtel Matignon (but it doesn't seem so). The spoil system, however captivating, has not been so innovative, given that the dissatisfaction of the voters has not failed to be felt, prompted by various governances that have overall disappointed2; the parties that have maintained power, with careful and new candidacies, have however registered a weakening of consensus3, with elections that have not brought about profound changes in the fundamental political conditions, but have revealed social suffering that has not been adequately appreciated. On the one hand, countries like Georgia and Venezuela have exalted the courage of oppositions suppressed by autocracies capable of co-opting even Santa Claus in advance; on the other, elections like the Indian ones, which have expressed a reaction to the illiberalism of a tenacious prime minister, to the point of reaching the Romanian high judiciary, forced to intervene against documented foreign interference.
The hegemon of the moment, if it wants to leave a unifying mark on a fragmented world, will have to overcome evident dysfunctions, especially if, as among the BRICS, it aspires to a new world order that is ever broader, however, ever more fragmented and where the generic resentment for one side or the other is not enough to ensure a balance of power that, especially economically, requires cooperation. The expanded heterogeneity of the BRICS, with a widespread desire to maintain useful political-diplomatic flexibility in the liquid (in all senses) environment of a G20 crisis manager, will not allow (perhaps) the genesis of Cold War blocs, so much so as to determine measured, incremental, non-rupture approaches. In short, for some the BRICS remains a governance project that is perhaps beautiful, but certainly – now – impossible, because it is fragmented internally and founded more on propagandistic and minilateralist symbolism than on a substance that does not clarify strategies and privileges Chinese dynamics. hub and spokes.
And now the cold, omnipresent and inevitable princess: the economy, the thorn in Russia's side. Global real GDP growth is expected to remain stable at +2,8% in 2025-26, with developed economies slowing, with growth declining from +1,8% in 2025 to +1,7% in 2026, and emerging economies increasing by +4,1% and with risks associated with conflicts and protectionism; however, low growth conditioned by public debt and political fragmentation. The US is expected to grow by +2,3% in 2025, to slow in 2026 to +1,8%, with the EU growing by +1,2% in 2025 and +1,5% in 2026. With Germany trying to emerge from recession, China4, necessarily oriented towards consumption to give new life to its economy, will stabilize around +4,2% with India growing by 6,4% and Brazil by 2,5%; Russia bringing up the rear with its war economy and the need for its Central Bank to act aggressively in the face of a GDP that will fall to 1,3% due to the slowdown in domestic consumption and investments.
A trade war by the first half of 2025, with US tariffs rising5, could increase financial risks, with central banks focused on growth and containing inflation driven by rising freight prices. In short, there does not seem to be much chance of monetary policy easing before the second half of 2025. Foreign trade will therefore be a vulnerable element in the year to come, assuming the US pursues the decoupling or prefer to increase duties; certainly China will respond more assertively than in the past, protecting its national currency but exposing itself to American and European reactions, opposed to state interventions. If American policy creates inflation, slowing the pace of rate cuts, the dollar debt of other countries will grow. In the Middle East, the energy market has not been affected at the moment and apparently by the ongoing conflicts, although the costs will impact long-term growth, just to increase the instability between Israel, Jordan and Egypt.
As the IMF pointed out in its latest World Economic Outlook, it is necessary to prepare for uncertain times, where the international tax system with the global minimum corporate income tax, i.e. a minimum taxation of 15% on the profits of multinational companies, is coming to the fore.6. Since it is known that dreams are wishes, a first obstacle will come from the different national regimes and from the possibility of moving profits to tax havens with dumping tax after the manipulation of import and export prices. While the global minimum tax is addressing a systemic problem, a coordinated global response will likely never be seen.
Some bold conclusions. Trudeau will fall for Poilievre, while the Christian Democrats will return to power in Germany, inheriting a struggling economy and facing a France in constant balance. Ukraine will be forced to accept armistice talks with a war destined to continue in other forms, General Kirillov teaches.
It is not excluded that NATO budgets will increase by almeno 1,5% by 2030. Fear does not even exist on the stock exchange in Russia, where the redde rationem economic looms.
Even the registry office knows no impediments, and Trump, in addition to the rest, will have to consider, in addition to his advancing age, the tensions with the Federal Reserve. Just to please the dystopians, in the UK Starmer could encounter difficulties in the confrontation with the inconclusive populist Farage; realistically, Xi will remain at his helm as long as he guarantees better economic conditions for the people. Not easy, also given the Taiwanese quagmire. It is easier to foresee a consolidation of AI and a further division into political macro-blocs.
In the Middle East, Syria's fate will mark the evolutions of Türkiye, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, with Iran on the nuclear path given the political-military degradation it has suffered, which Israel is counting on.
The American economy is expected to continue to grow, with low unemployment, falling interest rates, and a cutting-edge technological advantage. Of course, we have not forgotten the Turkish crescent on the Piaggio factories, which elevates Anatolian geopolitics and depresses the memory of Cavalier Enrico Piaggio.
In 2025, the cliché that we should expect the unexpected will be repeated. Of course, we remain free to abandon the path of harsh reality and slip into the first and most hospitable pub available. That is a certainty, fleeting but certain.
1 The executive was born as a minority coalition and alliance between the Democratic Movement, Macron's party, Renaissance, and the moderate center-right of Les Républicains, with the Rassemblement National and the New Popular Front out of the game. The government has 4 technicians including Eric Lombard at the economy and finance, the first technician at Bercy since WWII. Moody's has downgraded the reliability of the country's debt from Aa2 to Aa3, so France is forced to pay a higher premium on the issuance of new debt. Possible contagion for other countries with high levels of debt (Belgium, Italy).
2 See Bangladesh
3 Finland, Indonesia, Ireland, Mexico, Moldova, Taiwan, India, Japan; in South Africa the African National Congress lost its majority after 30 years
4 The real estate crisis, local financial difficulties, and the introduction of further American tariffs are the major downside risks for the next two years.
5 Especially towards Canada, China, Mexico
6 If the profits of a multinational with annual revenues exceeding €750 million are taxed where the effective tax rate is below the minimum rate, participating countries will be able to apply a top-up tax equal to the difference between the 15% rate and the rate of the competent jurisdiction. If applied, the tax is expected to increase global tax revenues by $220 billion per year.
