In Italy, in terms of security, but not only, it seems that politics tends not to address the problems that fester over time until a crisis brings them out in the newspapers. A bit like a lazy domestic worker, who thinks she's smart, who continues to hide the dust under the carpets, until they cover real Saharan dunes.
At that point it sometimes becomes impossible to solve the problems that you did not want to face previously, or in any case their solution may require more time, more money and sometimes loss of credibility.
In relation to the UNIFIL mission in South Lebanon (present since 1978, in which Italy has participated since 1982 and of which it has almost constantly been the largest contributor of forces since 2006) many people are asking today for the implementation of the Security Council Resolution 1701 of 2006.
This resolution in para 81 required, among other things:
► the establishment of an area between the Litani river and the blue line (which would effectively be the border between Israel and Lebanon, nations formally still at war as no peace treaty has been reached) of an area where the only armed formations were UNIFIL and the regular Lebanese FA. This therefore envisaged the withdrawal of both the Israelis (which occurred promptly in coordination with the deployment of UNIFIL II s) and the Hezbollah (which in fact never occurred)
► that there were no military forces in all of Lebanon without authorization from the Beirut government. Obviously this it never happened and in Lebanon groups that take orders from Tehran and Damascus continue to operate (albeit with the tacit consent of the powerful Shiite party).
In paragraph 112 it is established that a "reinforced" UNIFIL compared to the 1978-2006 period should supervise the implementation of what is established by the Resolution and, above all, in paragraph 123 authorizes UNIFIL to take all necessary actions and within its capabilities to prevent the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line from being used for hostile activities.
Without wishing to express value judgments, it is clear that after 18 years, resolution 1701 has not been fully implemented. Not only that, unlike the IDF, Hezbollah and other military formations that do not respond (at least officially) to the Beirut government continue to operate with worrying freedom of action and launch attacks against Israel from Lebanese territory. Attacks to which the IDF obviously responds. Furthermore, in these 18 years, Hezbollah has undoubtedly increased its military capabilities, including in South Lebanon and has acquired worrying quantities of short and medium range ballistic missiles as well as rockets of various types and ranges..
It seems clear that Resolution 1701 has never been implemented and that the United Nations does not have the capacity to manage a military force capable of implementing such an ambitious resolution. It seems clear to everyone today, but we had 18 years to realize it. Thinking about taking action now, when Israel seems to have (rightly) lost patience, seems decidedly late.
Nor can we expect that in the current geopolitical context, the UN Security Council will be able to make the USA converge on a new and more decisive position regarding the role of UNIFIL (in a clear leadership crisis, with Biden crippled, Harris in the electoral campaign with fear of losing support from the pro-Arab or pro-Israeli electorate and the looming Trump nightmare), Russia (which in the region is closely linked to Tehran and Damascus and which, therefore, would not accept anything that displeases Hezbollah), China (which from the failure of the UN would have all the advantages to increase its role as a new negotiator for the Middle East, as already demonstrated with the agreements between Iran and Saudi Arabia) and France (whose foreign policy is today more than ever hostage to its own declining influence in the former Islamic colonies).
In unsuspecting times, also as the greatest contributor of forces (from both a quantitative and qualitative point of view), we could (and perhaps should) have threatened the withdrawal of our contingent from UNIFIL if conditions had not changed. Today such a hypothesis would be undignified and in any case would no longer obtain the desired results.
It is very likely that Israel, if it does not obtain certain assurances at a political level, will launch a military operation, albeit a limited one, in Lebanon crossing the UNIFIL area of operations.
What would the “blue helmets” do in this case? Will they comply with the provisions of articles 11 and 12 of the oft-cited Resolution 1701 and block the Merkava advance with their bodies? No, absolutely, as they were in fact unable to prevent Hezbollah from South Lebanon from firing rockets at Israeli villages in the north of the country.
Let them lock themselves away in their bases safely (what already seen with the UN contingent in Bosnia in 1995) or if an unlikely and almost impracticable emergency withdrawal is decided (which could make the NATO withdrawal from Kabul appear to be a work of great logistical mastery) however, the credibility of the UN and UNIFIL in the Middle East would be shattered (which many permanent members of the Security Council probably don't mind at all).
1 UNSCR 1701 para 8. “Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements: – full respect for the Blue Line by both parties; – security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any S/RES/1701 (2006) 06-46503 3 armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area; – full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State; – no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government; – no sales or supply of arms and related material to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government; – provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon in Israel's possession;”
2 UNSCR 1701 para 11. “Decides, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978): (a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities; (b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2; (c) Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel; (d) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; (e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8; (f) Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement paragraph 14;”
3 UNSCR 1701 for 12"Acting in support of a request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, authorizes UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations S/RES/1701 (2006) 4 06-46503 is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; "
