Defense spending: not just "more" especially try to spend "better"!

(To Antonio Li Gobbi)
20/03/22

On March 16, the House almost unanimously approved a agenda which committed the government to raise defense spending up to 2024% of GDP by 2 (i.e. to go from around 25 billion today to around 38 billion, in any case to be commensurate with the trend in GDP).

Such news leaves me perplexed and doubtful. Of course, this is a positive will expressed by Parliament to stimulate the Government to deal with the problem of the qualitative level of the national military instrument. I hope, in my ignorance, that it is also an invitation to deal more with national security policy, with a view to taking into account the instabilities both on the European continent and in the regions surrounding the Mediterranean. Obviously, the sensitivity shown by parliamentarians in their almost totality to this decidedly complex topic is welcome. Moreover, it is precisely the almost unanimous vote that suggests that the vote was more emotional than meditated.

Meanwhile, let us remember that the commitment to bring defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2024 had already been taken on by the pro-tempore prime minister, Matteo Renzi, as part of the NATO Summit of Heads of State and Government. of 2014 in Cardiff. This collective commitment on the part of European countries was strongly desired (term soft, I would say "almost imposed") by the Obama administration.

Therefore, if Italy usually respects the commitments made internationally, I would expect that (regardless of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and regardless of the recent parliamentary "encouragement") there is already planning to meet this commitment signed eight years ago and regularly reconfirmed in the Atlantic area. Above all, that there is already a detailed idea of ​​"how" to use these additional resources as profitably as possible, quantitatively large and particularly valuable in a period of severe national economic crisis.

I think it is useful to remember that perhaps the most significant aspect of the aforementioned commitment made in 2014 within NATO is that at least 20% of defense spending (i.e. at least 4 per thousand of GDP) by 2024 it will have to be dedicated to "defense spending on major new equipment, including related research & development " or innovation in the defense sector (reference Wales Summit Declaration, art. 14), a point that does not seem to me to have been taken up from the parliamentary agenda.

Therefore, Parliament's unanimous encouragement is welcome, but we also need to have clear objectives and priorities.

As a military man, I always had some suspicions when I heard about "increasing" defense spending, but I didn't hear about "improving and rationalizing" these spending at the same time. Personally, I believe that the problem as well as in the "quantity" of the expenditure lies in the "quality" of this expenditure.

Too many times in Italy, defense spending has become a useful container to draw from to meet needs that little or nothing had with the enhancement of the operational capabilities of the military instrument.

Already in 1930 Mussolini urged the Minister of War Pietro Gazzera "A program of works ... I mean works, not armaments or equipment, ... in order to employ a significant amount of manpower" (ref. Massimo De Leonardis "Cold War and national interests"). The decidedly inadequate conditions with which our soldiers faced the Second World War are also the result of such a mentality!

Coming to the last decades, it cannot be denied, for example, that the substantial percentage of troop personnel placed on permanent service (i.e. with permanent contracts), a percentage higher than those of other similar military instruments in terms of size and functions, has been the fruit of considerations of an occupational rather than an operational nature (also taking into account the progressive unstoppable aging of worrying percentages of our ranks). Certainly sacrosanct considerations from a general national point of view, which however too (like those of Mussolini in 1930) sacrificed the appearance operations of the departments to others deemed of more immediate interest (“Anyway the war won't be made anymore”).

Similarly, too often the policy of acquiring weapon systems, means and equipment has been dictated more by the need to make certain sectors of the suffering national industry work (sometimes even reaching the acquisition of systems or means initially designed for the export that though they had not found sufficient approval on the part of the foreign market).

It should also be borne in mind that in Italy a substantial part of the expenses for the Arma dei Carabinieri weigh on the Defense, which almost exclusively police functions (apart from essentially some contingents of MSUs engaged in external operations).

Furthermore, for thirty years, or since 1992 (“Sicilian vespers” operation), not indifferent forces of the army have been engaged in support functions for the police forces (currently “Safe Roads” operation).

So the point is not just "how much" you spend on the defense sector but "what you spend on".

Obviously, it is also necessary to avoid those undignified "wars between the poor" that we have witnessed in the past with chiefs of staff who, by being supported by this or that component of the national defense industry, tried to steal scarce funds from each other, operating purely with a view to armed force rather than joint forces.

This approach must definitely be overcome, because today an investment policy tending to raise the capacity of the national military instrument must necessarily be based on a genuinely joint vision, which leaves aside the understandable selfishness of an armed force. Selfishness that we can no longer afford, unless we want to end up with a kind of Frankenstein with the individual pieces not compatible with each other but on the other hand with the flag of the "sponsor" armed force planted above.

Certainly we have an advantage having at this moment the good fortune to have as Secretary General of Defense and National Director of Armaments an officer decidedly of great operational experience, inter-force and international and of exceptional ability (General Luciano Portolano). Moreover, the joint approach must be structural and not contingent or based on who occupies a certain position at a certain historical moment.

Similarly, although it is essential for the government to properly support the national defense industry, it is necessary to abandon the idea that the funds are destined "nominally" to the modernization of defense, with the implicit constraint that they then pass entirely to the industry national defense, regardless of the suitability of the products it offers to meet the needs of national defense.

Regarding aircraft, shipping and land-based weapons systems, it is useless to reiterate that international cooperation with other major European players should be sought as long as possible, also to aim for high interoperability in the European context.

Moreover, it must always be remembered that the military instrument is not just an inanimate set of planes, ships, tanks and artillery. The fulcrum is always the human element (first of all, of course, in the land forces but also in the aero-naval components).

The technological evolution of weapon systems does not diminish the importance of the human factor, on the contrary it places even more emphasis on the human component. Component who must be highly qualified, motivated, and be kept permanently trained.

This involves:

  1. That you should be able to make one rigorous selection of personnel who enlist (this requires a large number of applicants, and therefore also that the conditions offered, including salaries, are competitive in the framework of the national labor market);

  2. That the staff is technically trained on technologically complex weapon systems and which is then constantly maintained at an adequate training level. It cannot be ignored that the problem of the availability of training areas in Italy has become extremely critical, both for understandable and inevitable problems connected with the high urbanization of our country, and for anachronistic ideological bias towards the military and their training needs. ;

  3. That the staff, if there are no real emergencies, is not permanently detached for mortifying functions of their professionalism and that they have little to do with their duties in the event of employment in a conflict area.

Therefore, the increase in defense spending is welcome (which given the dramatic economic situation of the nation is a commitment that cannot be taken lightly), but even before deciding to spend more, let's immediately commit to spending better than in the past decades with a view to enhancing the operational capabilities of the military instrument.

Photo: US Army / NATO / Bundesarchiv / Italian Army / Royal Air Force