Syria, it's the day of the meeting between Putin and Obama: the possible strategy of the tsar

(To Franco Iacch)
28/09/15

Who knows what goes through the head of Vladimir Putin, for some the new Tsar, for others a sort of modern synthesis of the anti-capitalist thought of Lenin and Stalin. In less than two hours (16,30 Italian time) a New York face-to-face is expected between Obama and Putin during the session of the United Nations General Assembly.

On the one hand, then, the former KGB operative who, perhaps, still has in his eyes what happened in eastern Germany in the 1989 while he was in his office in Dresden. On the other, President Obama, who to date has never shown himself capable with his staff of scrutinizing the real intentions of the Kremlin (see Ukraine, see Syria). Lapalissian that in that defined as the "Great Game of the Middle East", the Russians hope to extend its influence in the Mediterranean.

What will happen in a few hours? Will we understand Putin's strategy? Maybe yes. We will probably be able to scrutinize it.

In the meantime the doubts remain. One wonders, for example, how "the Syrian affair" is useful to the cause of Putin, perhaps more than the Russian intervention is not to the cause of Assad. In an era marked by heavy economic sanctions imposed by the West (not to mention rampant corruption), the Russians find themselves far poorer than they were a year ago.

Is this war the solution to regaining one's place in the world?

We know that Putin has in mind a "wonderful" rearmament project that will have to be completed by 2020. One wonders how much the current Russian economic asset can withstand such an investment. Beyond his alliance with the besieged Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, Putin could put much of his survival (including political) into his speech today. Putin will appear before the United Nations after years of absence with the aim of catalyzing the attention of the world on the Syrian crisis, invoking (in quotation marks) the abolition of the economic sanctions that have dragged the Russian economy towards the abyss. The important thing is that Putin appears: a strong leader of a folded country (from the sanctions of the West) but never subdued. And who knows, perhaps in those eyes of ice after the collapse of the Berlin wall the memory of the end of Gaddafi or Saddam could still be vivid.

Could Putin really fear a new revolution that could undermine his authority or worse, that could turn to democracy?

Political fiction? Who knows. Of course indoctrination in the homeland continues. The Russian media (close to the government) never miss an opportunity to detect Europe's failure, the ineptitude of its own heads of government and the corruption of America, unable to face ISIS.

And even if part of our reasoning approaches Putin's real intentions (the White House has never understood them), then the intervention in Syria would make sense. The message, in that case, would be clear: the Kremlin took to the field to help a dictator re-establish the dictatorship, reaffirming power. A clear message also to the enemies at home. Putin could do it also in Russia. Tactically speaking, the Ukraine affair was a disaster for the economy, the image and the influence of the entire country (and of Putin). For Ukraine then, it was a tragedy.

Syria, therefore, "serves" Putin more than one can imagine. History could help us. We know that Moscow has always supported the Assad dynasty, the last "outpost" against the US-sponsored Middle East peace process. Assad's father received assistance from the Soviet Union with equipment and military advisers. During the war against Israel, the Syrians received billions of dollars of Soviet equipment. In exchange, the Kremlin obtained a lease for a naval supply depot in the port of Tartus, south of Latakia. 40 years later, the port of Tartus remains the last Russian base in the Region. This is why our axiom returns forcefully: who is really useful to the Syrian cause and how much Assad's fortunes are crucial for Russia's future?

To date, Putin has proved a brilliant tactician in Syria. He knows perfectly well that he can act militarily without incurring any sanctions and, indeed, gaining prestige in the international community. Militarily (just before the Russians arrived ... the Iranians and the Chinese) the Syrian situation was desperate. After losing the northern province of Idlib by the Front to the Nusra and much of the Sahl al-Ghab plain to the south-east of the city, Assad was forced to grant amnesty to all army deserters. It is clear that Russia will also fight in Syria for another valid reason: if Damascus were to fall and if a radical Islamic state (or perhaps a long-term safe haven for terrorist groups) were established, there could be devastating consequences in the Caucasus regions, with a destabilizing domino effect. Finally, without considering the 2000 terrorists of Russian origin at war against Assad. Putin plays everything in Syria.

In the verbal container "jihadist groups", Putin can arrange a couple of pending issues with objectives other than ISIS. This is why on the one hand it is clear that Moscow will attack, on the other it is imperative to carry out "de-confliction" measures to avoid errors at supersonic speed.

And in a few weeks, Chinese fighters will also arrive.