In the scorching heat of this summer, some reactions from politicians and some of the press in relation to the Ukrainian offensive in the Kursk Oblast are perplexing. Offensive episode, certainly with uncertain operational outcomes, which however, according to the writer, should receive much warmer support from leading figures of a government that has never skimped on its declarations of support “no ifs or buts” in Kiev.
Ukrainian action
Without wanting to either glorify (as some press outlets do) or mock (as others do) the Ukrainian action, I think it is necessary to make at least some quick down-to-earth considerations. Certainly, it will not be a "game changer" that can radically modify the general trend of operations on the ground. Progress of operations that Donbass has seen a very slow but still systematic Russian advance for months. This action certainly will not contribute to bridging the large difference in "manpower" that the two armies can draw on to fuel their efforts and will not compensate for the losses that Kiev is struggling to make up for.
It is an operation that could also cost Ukraine huge losses among its most trained personnel and that of some of the best assets received so far from the ground forces. But it is an operation that aims to achieve a great media and psychological impact, in Ukraine, among Russian civilians and in the capitals of the countries that support Kiev.
The cost/benefit balance will probably leave us perplexed, but it would not be the first time that Kiev has made choices that involve very high levels of losses in an attempt to achieve results that can be judged to be of little operational significance. Kiev has already demonstrated this to us with the obstinacy (or according to some, the stubbornness) with which it has committed forces in bloody operations with little chance of success (the Mariupol or Bakhmut steelworks) but of great media appeal. According to his numerous detractors, who unfairly call him "Bakhmut's butcher", Oleksandr Syrsky, who replaced Valery Zaluzhnyi at the head of the Ukrainian forces six months ago, would not hesitate to accept high levels of losses to achieve important operational results.
In this case, after a week, it would appear that he is getting them. I'm not referring to the approximately one thousand square kilometers that appear to be currently under Ukrainian control. Land that could be under Russian control again tomorrow morning. No. He achieved a much more important non-military result. It dealt a serious blow to the credibility of Russia's prevention and response capacity.
The fact that the Russians did not realize, before the start of the operation, the inevitable massing of Ukrainian units near the border and in an area far from the fighting was already an unjustifiable flaw. Furthermore, even if we want to justify the initial surprise, considering the air and fire superiority and the greater availability of forces on the Russian side, one would have expected that a strong reaction would be initiated within 24 hours of the start of the Ukrainian incursion and that the forces, ultimately quite limited, that had penetrated Russian territory would be "neutralized" within a maximum of 72-96 hours. This did not happen even after a week, denoting poor reactivity of the chain of command and, probably, a lack of even minimal decision-making autonomy at individual levels.
Even more serious, for Russian credibility, was having to acknowledge the impossibility of a rapid solution to the problem and having started the evacuation of around one hundred and thirty thousand people to date. A fact that cannot fail to send the message to the Russian internal front that, despite the resounding promises of the Kremlin, after exactly two and a half years thespecial military operation not only has it not yet managed to get the better of those “four Nazi and depraved scoundrels” that they had to be expelled from Ukraine, but even the armed forces of Kiev managed, albeit at a high cost and even if only for a week, etc., etc., to "violate the territorial integrity" of the sacred Russian soil.
It's true, history does not repeat itself, the cultures of every people are different and any comparison with the Second World War does not hold up. However, looking at our national history, let's consider the screaming crowds in Piazza Venezia on 10 June 1940 and then think about what the state of mind of those same people was exactly three years later, when in July 1943 the Allies landed in Sicily and Rome suffered the heavy bombardment of San Lorenzo. The credibility before its civilians of a government apparatus that bases much of its internal propaganda on patriotism and its military strength can be significantly shaken even by an "offensive attack" on homeland soil lasting just one week, if Russia he will not be able to quickly achieve significant successes against the Ukrainians, enough to make them forget the shame he has suffered.
In conclusion, the Ukrainian operation is a costly operation, which could lead to significant losses, with the acquisition of control of Russian areas likely to be only temporary. In fact, for the Ukrainians it could be too burdensome to maintain control in view of a future exchange of territories and for the Russians to leave such control to the Ukrainians would be an indignity that they would not be willing to tolerate at the cost of making reconquest their main objective.
At a purely military level, therefore, nothing conclusive. At the communication level, however, the Ukrainians dealt a serious blow to Russian military credibility. Good news for us that, as repeatedly assured by our governments, we will stand by Kiev until peace (there are those who declared until "victory", but there we are in the field of pure fantasy).
Good news both because it represents a small balance in favor of "our ally", and because any internal Russian difficulties can bring closer rather than "remove" (as some hypothesize) the start of a mediation that leads to a ceasefire and a possible future agreement. If, however, we cast doubt on the assumption that only by arming and helping the "weaker side" and allowing it to better counter the side we consider "stronger" can we arrive at a negotiation that is as least unfavorable as possible for the Ukrainians1, one might ask the rationale of Italian politics in this regard over the last 30 months, since “choose between air conditioning and peace” up to the most recent shipments of missile systems Storm Shadow.
Our political position towards the conflict
The writer thinks that in 2022, taking into account our energy dependence on Russia and Russian influence in North Africa, perhaps it would be better for Italy to try to take a more neutral position with respect to the conflict, which would possibly allow us to propose ourselves as negotiators between the parties (as Turkey did). Perhaps it could have been attempted, without excessive damage in relation to the undisputed credibility that was recognized at a European level by the head of government of the time and, perhaps, the EU, France and Germany would have been moderately compliant with this government.
However, once we have convincingly sided with Ukraine and have abandoned the third position of the mediator, we must be consequential with the choices made so far.
In fact, we are already in a conflict situation with Russia, having adopted severe economic sanctions, declaring ourselves in all supranational fora (NATO, EU, G7) alongside Ukraine, sending weapons and financial aid to support Kiev's war effort. So, personally, I think that yes, we are now at war against Russia, as are the USA and the EU, and if what has been done so far is not sufficient, the next step (barring an undignified about-face) could only be the one evoked by the much deplored President Macron, that is, the sending of military personnel to the front by the countries that declare to support Kiev (an option which I understand is not pleasant to declare to voters).
Does Kiev's action in Kursk turn Ukraine into the “aggressor”?
Aside from the stale phrase “there is an attacked and there is an aggressor”, which means nothing because it tends to crystallize in a single event a crisis that could have more remote and intertwined roots, what happened in Kursk was a simple offensive in Russian-controlled territory. Once two nations are at war with each other and one has occupied by military force a fifth of the territory that originally belonged to the other, talking about the inviolability of borders seems utopian to me.
In war, control of territory is gained and lost depending on the progress of operations. Whether the territories that change hands before 2022 were officially Russian or Ukrainian is ultimately of little significance until a ceasefire is reached. When a ceasefire and negotiations are reached, the parties will discuss the fate of the territories that changed hands during the conflict and, possibly, exchanges, restitutions and withdrawals will take place on the basis of the principle of cession of territories to get an agreement. It's always been like this!
From this perspective, “formerly Russian” territories that are controlled by the Ukrainians at the time of the ceasefire would be a useful bargaining chip to obtain back “formerly Ukrainian” territories controlled by the Russians.
From this perspective, the constraints that we intend to place on Ukraine regarding the ban on using the weapons we send to it on Russian territory appear difficult to understand from a military point of view but above all they cannot fail to be perceived as indicators of a weak policy, incapable of taking clear positions and supporting its reasons even against its internal opposition. And our international credibility cannot help but suffer from this.
Balancing is a difficult art, it cannot be improvised! Unfortunately, regarding the Russian-Ukrainian crisis we risk losing credibility with Kiev, the EU and the USA without improving our position towards Moscow (and its satellites in North Africa and the Sahel).
1 Let's leave aside the fairy tales about "just peace", something that history and pragmatism clearly tell us exists only in the declarations of politicians
Photo: MoD Ukraine
